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ABSTRACT 
 
Consumer protection has become an important issue in many spheres of trade. This fact is borne 
out by the many consumer protection laws introduced in many countries globally. However, 
despite these developments Swaziland is lagging behind. Obviously, this state of affairs has left 
consumers in Swaziland in a totally vulnerable position. Consumers are often exploited in two 
material respects. They are either subjected to unfair contract terms in the provision of services, 
or supplied with defective products having the potential of causing serious bodily harm. In 
protecting consumers the common law has been judicially developed over many centuries to 
curb these unfair trading practices. The doctrine of freedom of contract has been the driving 
force in regulating the relations between consumers and suppliers. The import of this doctrine is 
the unyielding recognition of an individual’s autonomy in the conclusion of consumer 
transactions. The underlying percepts of this doctrine are privity of contract, which only 
recognises obligations between contracting parties, and pacta sunt servanda which requires 
contractual undertakings to be recognised. The operation of contractual freedom in concluding 
agreements often leads to unfair results against consumers because suppliers usually impose 
unfair terms as a result of their stronger bargaining power over consumers. In short, problems 
faced by consumers were twofold; first, they have to battle the issue of potentially harmful 
goods, and secondly, their economically weak bargaining position is exploited by suppliers 
through the use of unfair contract terms. Many countries, including the United Kingdom and 
South Africa, addressed these two consumer issues decisively through statutory reform aimed at 
protecting consumers against potentially harmful products and unfair contract terms. Swaziland 
requires statutory reformative measures that will ensure a shift from the current consumer 
framework regulated by outmoded common law principles towards a modern framework that 
will comply with international standards. 
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1. GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Howells1 warns that comparative studies in general are fraught with hazard particularly because 
‘any comparative law work is a major undertaking for the researcher who faces being 
embarrassed by his incomplete knowledge of foreign legal systems’. These words serve as a 
caution for the present international consumer law study involving a comparison between 
Swaziland, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK). The last two countries boast of 
advanced consumer frameworks while Swaziland has extremely thin legislation and case-law 
material available on the subject. While Howells2
Consumer protection in this study will be considered from two perspectives, namely unfair 
contract terms in consumer agreements and product liability. With regard to unfair contract terms 
in Swaziland the question is whether the power to invalidate unfair contract terms will continue 
to vest in the courts as seen in some decided cases.
 cannot be faulted for his observations, the need 
for consumer law development and reform in Swaziland far outweighs any inaccuracies and 
incompleteness that may be occasioned in this work. It is hoped that this dissertation will lay a 
consumer foundation for Swaziland on which future developments will be built in this very 
important area of law.  
 
3 At the heart of this question is the doctrine 
of contractual freedom which requires courts to recognise and enforce the wishes of contracting 
parties.4 Standard form contracts are the main instruments that defeat the freedom of parties to 
enter and conclude contracts since they dispense with negotiation. The problem is that 
recognition of contractual freedom has led to many consumer injustices because courts have 
refused to discharge consumers from disadvantageous contract terms embodied in standard form 
contracts. This is the main weakness underlying freedom of contract.5
                                                          
1 G Howells Comparative Product Liability (1993) vii. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See the cases of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (AD) and Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537. 
4 Hawthorne ‘The Principe of Equality in the Law of Contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 152, 163. See also Printing and 
Numerical Registering Co. v  Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462; Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 
571; Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 at 73; Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & Co. Ltd 1922 CPD 
531 at 546; George v Fairmaid (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 472; Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas 
and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A); Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 SCA 34; Brisley v D rotsky 
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
5 Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & Co. Ltd (note 4 above). 
 While courts generally 
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enforce contractual provisions, there has been uncertainty because in some instances it has been 
held that strict adherence to freedom of contract perpetrates injustices and as a matter of public 
policy courts will ensure that ‘simple justice between man and man’ is achieved in contractual 
relationships.6
Concerning product liability the study examines the liability of manufacturers who disseminate 
defective products to third party consumers. Third party consumers often lack information on the 
origin of goods they purchase coupled with the lack of knowledge on how to enforce their rights 
against suppliers. The issue of liability is of importance in Swaziland because a majority of the 
consumed products are imported from foreign countries and determining the liability of foreign-
based manufacturers to consumers in Swaziland is crucial.
 This will be one of the areas of focus. 
 
7
The undeveloped nature of consumer protection in Swaziland has been the cause of many 
consumer injustices, particularly because the common law has failed to adjust to the varying 
consumer imperatives. In giving the study its proper context, the definitional quagmire of the 
term ‘consumer’ which many scholars have attempted to clarify and define will be considered. 
The term will be addressed in light of the legislative and judicial divergence with regard to its 
use in the different consumer jurisdictions to be considered in this study. There are two 
 The study will consider this issue 
and the remedies that may be available to third parties in Swaziland. 
 
Foreign jurisdictions like South Africa and the UK once faced the difficulties surrounding unfair 
contract terms and issues of product liability. Both countries were able to address the problems in 
these areas by introducing certain control measures to mitigate consumer exploitation. These 
measures were introduced under the common law and later entrenched through legislative 
regulation. Consumer protection in this study will consider both these developments and 
recommend consumer law reform in Swaziland that will introduce practical changes that will 
accord with international standards. 
 
2. BROAD PROBLEMS AND ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED 
                                                          
6 Jajbhay v Cassim (note 3 above). See also Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 3 above) at 9; Botha v Finanscredit 1989 
(3) SA 773 (A) at 783; Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another (note 4 above) 613. 




fundamental issues that this study attempts to address. The first issue will be to consider whether 
the common law of contract is sufficient in protecting consumers outside the realm of legislative 
regulation. In considering this issue specific focus will be directed to contractual freedom and 
standard form contracts. An argument in favour of legislative regulation will be developed by 
focusing on the adverse effects of freedom of contract and how the courts in different 
jurisdictions have reluctantly challenged this concept through the introduction of certain control 
techniques.8
The present study is undertaken in the context of Swaziland as an emerging economy.
 The second issue will consider whether consumers are afforded sufficient 
safeguards in instances where defective products are supplied. In this respect, the study will 
examine whether the common law of liability for defective products is sufficient and legislative 
reform will be suggested where appropriate. 
 
3. SOURCES AND APPROACH 
9 As 
Swaziland endeavours to become more investor-friendly towards local and foreign businesses it 
must be remembered that enacting drastic consumer protection legislation may be counter-
productive towards this aim.10
‘There are, however, other considerations of which this Court must not lose sight. This Court 
should not, by its judgments, stultify free trade and economic development within the country. 
It must take care that it does not place unnecessary restraints thereon and create obstacles that 
may lead to the discouragement of foreign investment in the Kingdom.’
 Tebbutt JA highlighted this fact in the Swaziland Court of Appeal 
case of Shell Oil Swaziland (Pty) Ltd v Motor World (Pty) Ltd (unreported) Civil Appeal Case 23/ 
2006, as follows: 
 
11
While the above observation serves as caution, great care must be taken that consumer reform in 
Swaziland does not become superficial, leading to the introduction of a weak consumer 
protection framework. This is especially because consumer protection mechanisms remain 
elusive and no systematic structures are in place to safeguard the interests of consumers in 
 
 
                                                          
8 In the case of Sasfin ( Pty) Ltd v  B eukes (note 3 above) the concept of freedom of contract was challenged 
successfully. 
9 ‘Swaziland’ available at http://www.sadt.int/files/2013/0277/8289/Swaziland.doc, accessed on 25 September 2012.  
10 Ibid. 
11 At Para 63. 
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Swaziland. While safeguarding the interests of consumers through legislation has become a 
common feature in many countries of the civilized world, as will be evident in the coming 
chapters, Swaziland is lagging behind. The objective of this study is to consider the advantages 
of enacting consumer legislation to regulate product liability and contract terms because the 
protections offered by common law are no longer adequate in protecting consumers. 
 
The thesis will outline the background of the law in Swaziland from the historical and 
constitutional perspective as it evolved from the colonial era until the current constitutional 
dispensation. In this respect the study will consider text book sources and legislation inclined 
towards consumer protection. This will include the Swaziland Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969, the 
Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991 as well as the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
These statues are relevant in this study because they contain provisions that safeguard consumer 
interests. In considering consumer protection in the South African context, particular attention 
will be directed to the South African Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA of 2008) since 
the Act is the main statute regulating consumer protection in South Africa. Consumer protection 
in the UK is mainly regulated by statute and the different statutes will be considered including 
the Consumer Protection Act of 1987 and the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. The application of the 
case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 is wide-ranging and will be discussed throughout 
the dissertation in the area of product liability. The study will also make use of other sources and 
literature including journal articles and textbooks. Case law will also be used in the study in 
order to provide insightful direction. 
 
4. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The first chapter in the thesis will focus on the history and background of the manner in which 
Roman-Dutch law became the common law of Swaziland. This chapter explores the inter-
relation between the common law of Swaziland and South African law from a historical 
perspective. Furthermore, it establishes the link between the law of Swaziland and South Africa 
which has a significant influence in shaping legislation and the common law of Swaziland. This 
chapter also considers the extent to which South African law applies in Swaziland in light of 
constitutional developments brought about by the Constitution of Swaziland Act 001 of 2005. 
Chapter two introduces the concept of consumer protection and dissects the term ‘consumer’ by 
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examining various definitions proffered by legal scholars, statutory provisions and case law. The 
influence and impediments of the law of contract and delict in consumer protection law is also 
discussed. The need for legislative regulation is emphasised throughout the chapter in light of the 
consumer injustices perpetrated by common law regulation. 
 
Chapter three focuses on Swaziland. This chapter examines a number of important cases on 
consumer protection in Swaziland from the manufacturer’s liability under the common law to 
specific provisions of the Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969 and the Money Lending and Credit 
Financing Act of 1991. The various delictual and contract law principles directly impacting 
consumers are critically discussed and juxtaposed with case law in their sphere of application. 
Although not exhaustive, this chapter is amongst the most elaborate in this dissertation. Chapter 
four focuses on South Africa. It commences by setting out and critically discussing the genesis of 
South African consumer law and the lacuna that the CPA of 2008 sought to fill. The main theme 
of this chapter is a rights-based approach to consumer protection where provisions of the CPA of 
2008 on unfair contract terms and product liability are critically interrogated.  
 
Chapter five examines consumer protection law in the UK. In this chapter, the history of 
consumer law in this jurisdiction will be examined in line with specific decided cases which 
shaped consumer law at its infancy. The leading Scottish case of Donoghue v Stevenson12
                                                          
12 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 
 will be 
dissected in the chapter particularly its role in the development of the law of negligence. In 
addition, an analysis of the different statutes regulating consumer affairs leading up to present-
day European Community regulation will be made. Chapter six focuses on international law 
development of consumer protection. This chapter considers the impact of the various 
international agencies, particularly the steps that are continually being implemented to improve 
the current consumer ambience. Chapter seven is the concluding chapter which will summarise 
the findings of the study and also propose recommendations in order to map the way forward 





HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SWAZI LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the historical background and the development of the legal system of 
Swaziland. The legal history will enable a better understanding of the nature of the problem 
causing the slow development of consumer protection in Swaziland and the challenges faced in 
developing a sound consumer framework. Initially the legal developments of the late 19th and 
early 20th
The historical dispensation of Swaziland is divided into four phases: the period of the clans and 
the emergent state (from the 15
 century will be discussed. This period is important because it is at this time that written 
laws were introduced to operate in tandem with the long established customary law practices and 
it is these early developments of the Swazi legal system which provide the context in which 
consumer protection will be discussed in chapter 3. In particular, the consequences of Swaziland 
being a British protectorate will shed light on why the early underdeveloped legal system of 
Swaziland could not accommodate a consumer framework at the time. In this respect the reasons 
behind the inapplicability of English consumer laws in Swaziland will be considered. Next, the 
post-independence events of 1968 that could have signaled changes in consumer development 
will be considered. It will be argued that after gaining independence, however, this did not take 
place. Finally, with this historical background, it will be contended that the recently enacted 
Constitution of Swaziland Act 001 of 2005 should be the driving force in developing a modern 
consumer protection policy because consumer rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
 
2. THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF SWAZILAND 
th century up to 1839); the Concessions Period until the Partition 
of 1907; the post-partition period up to 1968; and the Independence Period after 1968.1 Of 
relevance in this study are the last three periods. The discovery of huge gold deposits shortly 
before the close of the 19th
                                                          
1 JSM Matsebula A History of Swaziland (1972) 3-24, 28-97, 98-121. See also H Kuper An African Aristocracy: 
Rank among the Swazi (1980) 11-33. 
 century in the former Transvaal, the Witwatersrand, as well as the 
Eastern Transvaal border areas of Swaziland (Forbes Reef), commences this discussion on 
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events that were to later shape the legal history of Swaziland.2 The mineral content in the areas 
mentioned motivated white settlers in Southern Africa in the 1800’s to draw closer towards the 
borders of Swaziland.3 Swaziland had fertile soils conducive for the cultivation of crops.4 Before 
the arrival of white settlers and the development of capitalist Swaziland, the country was 
occupied by its native inhabitants who lived according to the dictates of Swazi law and 
customary practices.5 The life of the occupants was typically guided by principles of tradition 
and unwritten customary rites passed down from generation to generation.6 At the beginning of 
the 19th century relations between Swaziland and foreigners on issues of commerce and trade 
came into existence.7 The first time Europeans came into Swaziland was in 1844 when they 
established a missionary camp after being invited by the then King, Mswati II.8 Boer settlers 
then followed in 1875 and from this period onwards the population of Swaziland became a 
mixture of Europeans, Boers and indigenous Swazis.9 The result of foreign presence meant that 
portions of land had to be allocated to the settlers at various fees for subsistence purposes.10




2.1. The granting of concessions 
11 signed a treaty with the ZAR12 Boer leaders (the Boers) which recognised their 
presence in Swaziland.13 The treaty also provided that Swaziland would give military assistance 
to the Boers in times of war.14 In return, Swaziland was guaranteed peace through protection 
from any form of enemy invasion.15
                                                          
2 R Levin ‘Is this the Swazi way? State, Democracy and the Land Question’ Transformation No. 13 (1990) 47. 
3 Ibid. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 16; P Bonner Kings, Commoner and Concessionaries: The Evolution and 
Dissolution of the Nineteenth- Century Swazi State (1983) 171. 
4 Kuper (note 1 above) 21. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 36; Levin (note 2 above). 
5 Kuper (note 1 above) 35-36, 137. See also Bonner (note 3 above) 49. 
6 Kuper (note 1 above) 35-36, 137. See also B Dube & A Magagula ‘The Law and Legal Research in Swaziland’ 
(2007), available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/swaziland.htm, accessed on 14 October 2012. 
7 RT Nhlapo Marriage and divorce in Swazi Law and Custom (1992) 7. See also Bonner (note 3 above) 45. 
8 Matsebula (note 1 above) 21, 36. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above). 
9 Matsebula (note 1 above) 35-36; See also Nhlapo (note 7 above); Bonner (note 3 above) 45. 
10 Kuper (note 1 above) 25. See also Levin (note 2 above); Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (unreported) Appeal 
(No. 158/ 1924) 518 at 519. Concessions ranged from £15, 000- £20, 000. 
11 King Mbandzeni reigned between the years 1875-1889. 
12 ‘Boer War’, available at http://history-net.com/Start/Boer_War/boer_war.html, accessed on 14 October 2012. 
13 Matsebula (note 1 above) 29. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 7-8; Levin (note 2 above); Bonner (note 3 above) 
136.  
14 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 29; Bonner (note 3 above) 136. 
15 Matsebula (note 1 above) 29. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8; Bonner (note 3 above) 136-137. 
 Protection was necessary in the colonial era because other 
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states and tribes sought to increase their territories through conquest.16 Therefore, the treaty 
signed between the Boer leaders and King Mbandzeni served as an instrument of protection.17 
However, the signing of this treaty gave rise to three material issues. First, the Boers began 
claiming land previously belonging to and occupied by natives in Swaziland.18 Secondly, the 
Boer settlers were effectively given access to exploit Swaziland’s mineral resources upon 
payment of subsidized mineral levies directly to the king.19 Thirdly, as the grant of concessions 
continued, so did efforts by the South African Republic to indirectly press for their claim to 
annex Swaziland.20 King Mbandzeni had not anticipated these results when he signed the treaty. 
Perhaps this can be attributed to his lack of formal education since formal education in 
Swaziland was introduced only in the early 1900s.21 King Mbandzeni’s death in 1889 resulted in 
the Boer settlers exerting more pressure in their quest for the annexation of Swaziland into the 
South African Republic.22 However, this attempt was foiled when the King’s counsellors sought 
the intervention of the Europeans who had already settled in Natal.23 The Europeans intervened 
solely to restrain the Boers after conflict had erupted along the borders of Swaziland in their 
endeavours to annex the country.24
Disputes on the validity of concessions frequently arose amongst white settlers in Swaziland.
 
 
2.2. The introduction of foreign law 
25 
The problem was that they did not recognise the indigenous dispute resolution framework which 
regulated the native inhabitants as being the proper forum to decide issues amongst themselves.26 
After the death of King Mbandzeni in 1889, Queen Sibati, who acted as the Queen Regent, 
experienced difficulty in controlling the settlers involved in disputes on the concessions granted 
by King Mbandzeni.27
                                                          
16 Matsebula (note 1 above) 16-19. See also Bonner (note 3 above) 136. 
17 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above). See also Kuper (note 1 above) 25; Levin (note 2 above). 
20 Kuper (note 1 above) 25-27. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 45, 80-81; Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8. 
21 Kuper (note 1 above) 25. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 100. 
22 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8. See also Kuper (note 1 above) 25-27; Matsebula (note 1 above) 45, 80-81. 
23 Bonner (note 3 above) 176. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8. 
24 Matsebula (note 1 above) 81. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 8. 
25 Matsebula (note 1 above) 40. 
26 Ibid. see also B Khumalo Legal Systems and Methods (1996) 97; Nhlapo (note 7 above) 9, 15. 
27Matsebula (note 1 above) 43. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 9. 
 This led her to issue a Proclamation to the Nation of 1889, which 
officially recognised Roman Dutch Law as the law that would regulate disputes among the 
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settlers.28 This proclamation was probably the second legal instrument, after Mbandzeni’s treaty, 
to regulate the affairs of foreigners in Swaziland. Several other legal instruments having the 
same effect followed the Proclamation, including the Swaziland Convention of 1890, which 
vested a ‘Chief Court’ with general jurisdiction over settlers.29 Another significant addition was 
King Bhunu’s Organic Proclamation30
‘The laws to be administered by all Courts of Justice shall be established under this 
Proclamation to be the Roman-Dutch law as in force in South Africa, but subject to such 
alterations, additions, or amendments as may be made by Proclamation of the Government 
Committee of any laws, Rules or Regulations approved of by Her Majesty’s High 
Commissioner and the State President of the South African Republic, without whose joint 
consent no Law, Rule or Regulation shall be proclaimed by the Government Committee, or if 
proclaimed be binding…’
 which provided that: 
 
31
The impact of Queen Sibati’s Proclamation of 1889 on the possible existence of a consumer 
framework in Swaziland must be briefly discussed. The process of adopting the English 
consumer protection framework in Swaziland may have had its roots in the late 1800s after Jan 




When the proclamation came into force in 1889, South Africa was constituted by four colonies, 
namely, the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.33 From 
1814, when the Cape Colony had been formally ceded to the British, Roman Dutch law was 
infused with a very strong dose of English law.34 For example, the court structure was based on 
the English law.35
                                                          
28 Matsebula (note 1 above) 68-69. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 9, 13. 
29 HR Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 570. See also Matsebula (note 1 
above) 68-70; Khumalo (note 26 above); Nhlapo (note 7 above) 9.  
30 Proclamation of 1890. 
31 Article 8 of King Bhunu’s Proclamation. 
32Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 571; See also P Havenga et al General Principles of Commercial Law 7 ed (2011) 
4; KD Chetty ‘Sources of Law’ in MA Fouche (ed) Legal Principles of Contract and Negotiable Instruments 3ed 
(1995) 7; FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The 
Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71.  
33 Hahlo & Kahn, (note 29 above) 150. 
34 Havenga (note 32 above). See also Chetty (note 32 above) 8. The Cape Colony was officially ceded to the British 
in 1814. 
35 Havenga (note 32 above). 
 In addition, parties could launch their claims with a magistrate’s court and end 
10 
 
up in the appeal in the Privy Council in London which was the highest court.36 Furthermore, the 
English laws of criminal procedure, evidence, and insolvent estates were incorporated into the 
law of the Cape during that time.37





‘In the general case of a British protectorate, although the protected country is not a British 
dominion, its foreign relations are under the exclusive control of the Crown, so that its 
government cannot hold direct communication with any other foreign power, nor a foreign 
power with its government.’
 A protectorate, as opposed to a colony, was defined by the Privy 
Council in the land dispute case of Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (unreported) Appeal (No. 
158/ 1924), as follows: 
 
39
The significance of the above case will be discussed in 2.3 below. As a protected state, 
Swaziland was only to become semi-sovereign.
 
 
40 Britain, as the protecting state, had the 
authority, albeit limited, to interfere in the affairs and administration of Swaziland in order to 
fulfill international law obligations.41 The Transvaal Convention of 1894 placed Swaziland under 
Boer administration.42 However, the Anglo-Boer war between the British and the Boers for the 
control of the Transvaal from 1899 to 1902 resulted in the Boers being defeated and their rule 
over Swaziland coming to an end.43 The Swaziland Order-in-Council of the 25th June, 1903, 
discussed in 2.3 below, made the position official.44
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. See also Chetty (note 32 above) 8. 
38 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 9-10. See also Kuper (note 1 above) 28; Matsebula (note 1 above) 76. 
39 At 523. 
40 WordWeb Dictionary, available at http://www.wordweb.info/free, accessed on 15 July, 2012, defines a ‘semi-
sovereign state’ or ‘protectorate’ as a state or territory partly controlled by (but not a possession of) a stronger state 
but autonomous in internal affairs, and are established by treaty. They are also referred to as ‘associated states’. 
41 Under the English Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890. See Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above) at 522-
523.  
42 Lucky Nhlanhla Bhembe v The King (unreported) Criminal Case No. 20/ 2002 at 2, 5. See also Hahlo & Khan 
(note 29 above) 570. 
43 Matsebula (note 1 above) 91. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 10. 





It must be noted that English consumer law at this time was at its development stage both on the 
judicial and legislative plane.45 For example, various statutes like the Merchandise Marks Acts 
of 1887; Adulteration of Food and Drink Act of 1860; Adulteration of Food, Drink and Drugs 
Act of 1872, were some of the earliest consumer law statutes enacted in the United Kingdom.46 
Although the importation of English consumer law cannot be said to have been fully-fledged 
because it was still developing, what is abundantly clear is that the English laws of criminal 
procedure, evidence, and insolvent estates were those being applied by the British in the Cape 
Colony during this period.47 From a consumer law point of view it can be concluded that by 
recognizing Roman Dutch law as it applied in the Cape of Good Hope at the time, English law 
consumer law influences were also received. Furthermore, it goes without saying that present-
day mercantile dealings amongst consumers in Swaziland are regulated by legal principles and 
statutes of South African and English law origin.48
The instability of the status of Swaziland as described in this section was not conducive for the 
establishment of a consumer protection framework for two main reasons. First, after the Anglo-
Boer war Swaziland had not yet developed a legal system that could sustain a consumer 
framework.
 It is because the historical link of the 
consumer laws of these countries has an important role in the legal development of Swaziland 
that the present study focuses on consumer protection.  
 
49 The foundation of a competent legal system was only to be introduced in 1907.50 
Secondly, consumer protection was not a practical reality. It is doubtful whether consumer issues 
during this time were a concern in Swaziland because Swazis mainly earned a living through 
agriculture and subsistence farming under the regulation of native authorities.51
 
 In other words, 
no consumer complaints could have arisen so as to warrant a consumer framework.  
                                                          
45 S Smith Atiya’s Introduction to the Law of Contract 6 ed (2005) 12. For example, the following statutes were 
enacted in the mid to late 19th century: Adulteration of Food and Drink Act of 1860, Adulteration of Food, Drink 
and Drugs Act of 1872, Merchandise Marks Acts of 1887. 
46 D W Oughton Consumer Law: Text, Cases and Material (1991) 12. See also P Cartwright Consumer Protection 
and t he C riminal L aw: L aw, T heory and P olicy i n t he U .K (2001) 152, 212; G Howells Comparative P roduct 
Liability (1993) 3. 
47 Havenga (note 32 above) 4-5. 
48 The Swaziland Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969 and the Bills of Exchange Act of 1902 amongst others. 
49 It is common knowledge that consumer protection derives from basic common law principles. Swaziland did not 
have a ‘common law’ but only regulated the affairs of its inhabitants through customary law. 
50 This was to be done through the General Law and Administration Proclamation 4 of 1907. 
51 Matsebula (note 1 above) 36. See also Kuper (note 1 above) 35-36, 137. 
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2.3. The Swaziland Order-in-Council of 25th
Nhlapo
 June, 1903 
52 states that section 5 of the Order-in-Council53 gave the High Commissioner authority to 
legislate by Proclamation in Swazi territory. In exercising his legislative authority, the High 
Commissioner was to respect the native laws and customs within the Swazi territory.54 On the 
other hand, the Sobhuza v Miller and Others55 case maintains that through the Order-in-Council, 
the Crown ordered that the Governor administering the Transvaal exercise all powers and 
jurisdiction of the Crown and do all things in the interest of His Majesty’s service.56 These two 
versions are not in harmony concerning the institution in which authority to legislate was vested 
by the Order-in-Council.57 Perhaps the inconsistency stems from the use of the phrase ‘High 
Commissioner’ by Nhlapo.58 The judgment of the Privy Council delivered in the case of Sobhuza 
v M iller and O thers59 makes reference to the word ‘Governor’. ‘High Commissioner’ and 
‘Governor’ in this context are words that cannot be used inter-changeably because Nhlapo60 
makes no mention whatsoever of a ‘Governor’. The case of Sobhuza v Miller and O thers61
 ‘By Order-in Council dated 1 December, 1906, the powers given to the Governor administering 
the Transvaal were transferred to the High Commissioner for South Africa.’
 on 
the other hand reveals that both institutions of ‘Governor’ and ‘High Commissioner’ existed at 




 (Emphasis added) 
 
63 clarifies the position by stating that the Governor of the Transvaal at that time also 
served as the High Commissioner of South Africa. In other words, the powers of Governor and 
High Commissioner were vested in the same individual.64
                                                          
52 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 10. 
53 Swaziland Order in Council of 1903. 
54 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 10. See also Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above) 518. 
55(note 10 above) 521. 
56 Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above) at 526. 
57 Ibid. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 10. 
58 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 10. 
59 (note 10 above)  527. 
60 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 10. 
61 Sobhuza v Miller and Another (note 10 above) 527. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Matsebula (note 1 above) 92, 94. 
64 Ibid. 
 In 1906 the role of the Governor of 
Swaziland was officially transferred through the Order-in-Council of 1906 to the office of the 
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High Commissioner for South Africa.65
Having traced the nascent stages of legal development in Swaziland, it is important to examine 
the legal system that emanated from the General Law and Administration Proclamation of 
1907.
 The Order-in-Council of 1906 confirmed earlier 
legislative instruments that had recognised Roman-Dutch law as the applicable law in the affairs 
of settlers of foreign extraction and was later to form the base of the common law of Swaziland 
which is examined below. 
 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZI LEGAL SYSTEM 
66 Many African countries retained their ‘received’ colonial laws after the end of 
colonialism in 20th century Africa.67 The customary laws continued to govern the lives of the 
indigenous native population whilst the received laws applied as the general law binding on both 
indigenous inhabitants and foreign settlers.68 Swaziland was no exception to these events, and its 
legal system is characterized by two sets of laws. Thus Nhlapo69
The principal aim of the General Law and Administration Proclamation No.4 of 1907 (the 
reception statute) was, inter alia, to dispense with the ‘monopoly’ the natives enjoyed over rights 
to their land.
 describes the Swazi legal 
system as comprising: 
 
‘…a system which is composed of the Roman-Dutch common law as modified by statute, and 
that complex of traditional rules and practices to which the Swazi have owed allegiance over the 
years, known collectively as Swazi law and custom.’ 
 
The General Law and Administration Proclamation 4 of 1907 commonly referred to as ‘the 
reception statute’ is now examined below. 
 
3.1. The General Law and Administration Proclamation No. 4 1907 
70
                                                          
65 Ibid. See also Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 570; Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above) 527. 
66 Kuper (note 1 above) 29. See also Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above) 526-527. 
67 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 14. 
68 Ibid 6. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Initially referred to as the Swaziland Administration Proclamation No. 4 of 1907. 
 Realising that the passing of this statute was aimed at enabling non-natives to 
access Swazi nation land and curtailing the rights of natives to freely own land, the native 
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inhabitants protested.71 What compounded matters was that the process of land division had 
already commenced three years previously through Proclamation 3 of 1904, which allowed 
settlers to claim large portions of land from the natives through concessions.72
There are three central issues that relate to this particular section. The first issue that will be 
addressed concerns the question whether pure Roman-Dutch law was received in Swaziland.
 The provisions of 
section 3 of the General Law and Administration Proclamation 4 of 1907 provide as follows: 
 
‘(1) The Roman-Dutch common law, save in so far as the same has been heretofore or may 
from time to time hereafter be modified by statute, shall be the law in Swaziland. 
 
(2) Save and except in so far as the same have been repealed or amended the statutes in force in 
the Transvaal on the fifteenth  day of October 1904, and the statutory regulations thereunder 
shall mutatis mutandis, and as far as they may be applicable, be in force in Swaziland.’  
 
73
The reception statute clearly and unequivocally recognised Roman-Dutch law as received from 
the Transvaal as the common law of Swaziland.
 In 
answering this question a brief examination of Roman law, Dutch law, Roman-Dutch law, and 
the influences of English law in the law of South Africa will be undertaken. Although not 
extensively considered, the second issue briefly touches on the position of Swazi customary law 
as a result of the reception of Roman-Dutch law. The last issue to be discussed is whether the 
application of Transvaal statutes was subject to a cut-off date or was meant apply for all future 
time in Swaziland in accordance with 3 (2) of the Proclamation. 
 
3.2. Roman-Dutch Law 
74
                                                          
71 Levin (note 2 above) 47-48. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 11. 
74 S. 3 (1) of the General Law and Administration Proclamation No. 4 of 1907. 
 A discussion of what this entailed should 
begin with an analysis of the nature of the phrase ‘Roman-Dutch law’. The phrase ‘Roman-
Dutch’ has been a subject of debate and scrutiny by many writers.  The phrase derives from 
publications produced by Simon van Leeuwen between 1652 and 1664 where he used the 
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original and accurate Dutch version- ‘Roomsch-Hollandsch Recht’.75 Nhlapo76 and Lee77 
contend that the English definition of the phrase ‘Roman-Dutch law’ is not accurate. They argue 
that in the translation from the original by Van Leeuwen, the word ‘Dutch’ suggests that all of 
the provinces of the United Netherlands are included, when in fact Van Leeuwen referred only to 
Holland, which was a single province.78 Another commentator on the translation ‘Dutch’ was 
Wessels,79 who observed that the term included the Roman law of Justinian, customs and 
statutory law in force in the provinces of North and South Holland during the medieval era. It 
seems fairly settled, however, that this law has its origins in the Netherlands and the exact 




81 observe that the ‘Roman’ component of the phrase does not refer to the pure 
and juristic classical Roman law developed from around the 2nd century AD. Instead, they argue 
that the Roman law referred to is that developed by the emperor Justinian when he codified the 
Corpus Iuris (in particular the Digest) with the assistance of his compilers and further developed 
by the Glossators, the Commentators, the Humanists and the Natural Law school, and even the 
Catholic church during the Medieval period.82 It is apparent that it was a combination of these 
separate and ‘impure’ legal regimens that formed the Roman-Dutch law that was eventually 
adopted in the ‘Reception’ in 1907.83 It is for that reason Khumalo84 asserts that the received 
Roman-Dutch law can be described as mixture of Roman law principles and early Germanic law 
significantly influenced by Dutch law. The already ‘diluted’ Roman-Dutch law was brought to 
the Cape by Jan van Riebeeck along with the Dutch settlers of the Dutch East India Company to 
the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.85
 
  
                                                          
75 RW Lee ‘Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa’ (1924) 41 SALJ 297. See also Chetty (note 32 above) 7; Nhlapo 
(note 7 above) 11. 
75 Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 330, 555. 
76 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 11. 
77Lee (note 75 above). 
78 Ibid 298. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 11. 
79 J Wessels ‘The Future of Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa’ (1920) 37 SALJ 265. See also Chetty (note 32 
above) 7.  
80 Ibid; Nhlapo (note 7 above) 11. 
81 Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 581-582.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. See also Chetty (note 32 above) 7. 
84 Khumalo (note 26 above) 96. 
85Hahlo & Khan (note 29 above) 567. See also Havenga (note 32 above); Brand (note 32 above).  
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Since the Cape was ceded to the British around 1814, the question for determination is whether 
the Roman-Dutch law that had previously been imported from Holland is the same law 
applicable in present-day Swaziland. The cession caused a very strong dose of English law into 
be introduced into the already diluted Roman Dutch law.86 The influences of English law were 
notable in the court structures particularly because the Supreme Court and magistrate’s courts 
structure of Britain replaced the Dutch court setup that had been in existence.87 The court 
structures allowed disputing parties to ventilate their grievances to the extent of filing appeals to 
the Privy Council in London.88 Additionally, the English laws of criminal procedure, evidence, 
and insolvent estates were received and applied as they were.89 Roman-Dutch law, along with its 
developed principles, was subsequently taken further inland during the Great Trek by the 
Voortrekkers.90 The law which the Boers subsequently took with them into the interior of South 
Africa during the Great Trek eventually became a combination of the imported Roman-Dutch 
law and English law.91
In summary, while it cannot be denied that the law imported into Swaziland by the reception 
statute was the Roman-Dutch law as applied in South Africa, legal writers agree that the affairs 
of Boer settlers who came to Swaziland around 1875 were regulated by Roman-Dutch law which 
had English law undertones.
 
 
92 Therefore, the Roman-Dutch law received in Swaziland was 
neither a combination of the classical ‘Roman’ and ‘Dutch’ law nor was it the Roman Dutch law 
as brought by Jan van Riebeeck to the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.  Instead, the received Roman 
Dutch law was that which had been influenced by English law.93
Despite the enactment of the reception statute in 1907, chiefs and other traditional authorities 
could preside over disputes in native courts among Swazis specifically and not the general 
 
 
3.3. Swazi customary law  
                                                          
86 Havenga (note 32 above). 
87 Ibid. Wessels (note 79 above) 272-275. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 576. See also Chetty (note 32 above) 8. 
90 Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 570. 
91 Ibid 567-571. 
92 Ibid 584-585. See also Pearl Assurance Company v Union Government [1934] A.C. 570 (P.C.) at 579; 1934 A.D. 
560 (PC) at 563. 
93 Wessels (note 79 above) 272. See also Hahlo & Kahn (note 29 above) 584-585.  
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population. The authority of the received Roman Dutch law became even more evident with the 
enactment of the Native Courts Proclamation No. 80 of 1950 which later became the Swazi 
Courts Act 80 of 1950.94 This Act provided for the formal composition of customary courts, the 
type of law to be applied (customary law), the procedure to be followed and the limits of the 
court’s jurisdiction over persons.95 Customary law is applied in Swazi National Courts which 
administer the unwritten Swazi law and custom in terms of the Swazi Courts Act of 1950.96 The 
court has criminal jurisdiction over petty common law offences such as theft but may only 
exercise such jurisdiction if the parties to a dispute are indigenous Swazis.97 It is also important 
to note that legal representation is prohibited by the Swazi Courts Act;98 therefore, parties 
personally represent themselves and may not retain counsel.99
The history and evolution of Roman-Dutch law and how it came to be received in Swaziland as 
the common law has been outlined above. What remains now in this discussion is to consider the 
current legal framework in Swaziland and whether the statutes of the Transvaal currently apply. 
Until 2005, Swaziland did not have a written constitution after the independence constitution of 
1968 was abrogated on the 12
 
 
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
THE LAW IN SWAZILAND 
th April 1973.100
King Sobhuza II reigned a period of six decades from 1921 to 1982.
 It is important to uncover the events that led to the 
enactment of the Constitution of 2005. 
 
4.1. The Independence Constitution of 1968 
101 Perhaps this period could 
have seen the rise and development of consumer protection because of the economic activity that 
was prevalent. Immediately after the King ascended to the throne in 1921 the consequences of 
the practice of exchanging land for revenue by King Mbandzeni were realised.102
                                                          
94 Matsebula (note 1 above) 109. See also Nhlapo (note 7 above) 17. 
95 The Native Courts Proclamation 80 of 1950 later became the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950. 
96 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 4-6, 18. 
97 S. 7 (1) of the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950. 
98 S. 23 of the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950. 
99 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 21-22. 
100 Levin (note 2 above) 62. See also The Swaziland Independence Order 1968 (S.I 1968 No. 1377) which contained 
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland of 1968. 
101 Matsebula (note 1 above) 100-101. 
102 Ibid. See also Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above) 521.   
 After the 
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discovery that more than two-thirds of land belonging to native Swazis had been lost to 
foreigners due to concessions, King Sobhuza II initiated a long series of protests aimed at 
regaining land believed to have been illicitly expropriated during the concessions era.103 
However, these endeavours did not yield any positive results. After failed negotiations with the 
British government to reclaim the land and an unsuccessful appeal to the Privy Council in 1926 
case of Sobhuza II v Miller and A nother,104 King Sobhuza resorted to a land buy-back scheme 
which involved every Swazi household.105 To the present day, Swaziland is trying to negotiate 
back certain tracts of land forming part of the present-day South Africa.106 The present king of 
Swaziland, King Mswati III established the Border Restoration Committee whose mandate is to 
bring back ‘Swazi’ territory falling under South African control.107 It is doubtful, however, that 
the Committee will successfully recover the land because international law rules do not promote 
the shifting of colonial boundaries.108
Consumer awareness among Swazis could have commenced in the early 1930s when British and 




Many Swazi workers were also migrating to South Africa after being recruited and offered 
employment in South African mines.110 Swaziland was a British protectorate from 1903 until 6 
September, 1968 when she gained independence from Britain.111 This period also saw the 
introduction of a few manufacturing plants and the expansion of agriculture.112 Furthermore, a 
census conducted revealed the population of Swaziland had significantly increased to an 
estimated 395 294 people in 1966.113
                                                          
103Kuper (note 1 above) 31. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 102-103. 
104 Sobhuza II v Miller and Another (note 10 above). 
105 Kuper (note 1 above) 31. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 103, 108-109; Levin (note 2 above) 50. 
106 ‘Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking’- (2005) 29 International Crisis Group Africa Policy Briefing 10. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid 10-11. 
109 RH Davies et al The Kingdom of Swaziland: A profile (1985) 2-3. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 108. 
110 Bonner (note 3 above) 222. 
111 ‘Focus on Swaziland: A kingdom in Crisis’ (2000) Human Rights Committee Report 6. See also Matsebula (note 
1 above) 120-121. 
112 Matsebula (note 1 above) 108. 
113 Ibid. 
 The ‘Lifa Fund’ that had been formed by King Sobhuza II 
as a buy-back scheme eventually formed the base of Tibiyo TakaNgwane in 1968, a 
conglomerate which, inter al ia, regulated the mineral fees of the companies mining asbestos, 
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diamond and other minerals in Swaziland.114 The resources generated by Tibiyo TakaNgwane 
were able to repurchase some of the land lost during the concessions era and to establish a sugar 
industry on the repurchased tracts of land.115
After his efforts to win independence from the British on the basis of a purely monarchial system 
failed, King Sobhuza II felt the need to form a political party in 1964 in an effort to appease the 
British and formed a party called the Imbokodvo
 Sugar is now the main export industry in 
Swaziland. These are some of the factors that could have influenced the establishment of a 
consumer framework.  
 
116 National Movement (INM).117 The first 
democratic elections were held and the king’s party, the INM, won a landslide victory in the 
house of Assembly.118 The following elections saw the Imbokodvo losing four seats as result of 
stiff competition from opposition like the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), 
Swaziland United Front (SUF) and the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP).119 The independence 
constitution of 1968 put in place a Westminster-type model parliamentary system that provided 
for a Constitutional Monarchy, a Prime Minister and multi-party politics.120 The constitution 
further provided for all aspects of government, civil liberties, the rights and powers of the King 
(Ngwenyama), the role of traditional institutions and a procedure of amending the constitution.121 
A year after the constitution was enacted in 1968 the Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969 was signed 
into law and assented to by King Sobhuza II on 7 May 1969. This Hire Purchase Act was 
possibly the first piece of legislation which sought to protect Consumers who purchased goods 
on hire purchase in Swaziland. After only a year of independence, Swaziland had successfully 
enacted a consumer law statue.122
                                                          
114 Davies (note 109 above) 4-5, 15-21. See also Levin (note 2 above) 50, 57. 
115 Ibid. 
116 ‘Imbokodvo’ means ‘grinding stone’. 
117 Matsebula (note 1 above) 118. See also ‘Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking- Crisis Group Africa Briefing’ (note 
106 above). 
118 Matsebula (note 1 above) 118. 
119 Davies (note 109 above) 8-9. See also Matsebula (note 1 above) 120. 
120 Lucky Nhlanhla Bhembe v The King (note 42 above). See also ‘Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking- Crisis Group 
Africa Briefing’ (note 106 above). 
121 Ray Gwebu and Another v Rex (unreported) Court of Appeal Case No. 19 of 2002 at 2. 
122 This Act protects consumers purchasing goods on hire purchase. 




On the 12th April, 1973 King Sobhuza II issued what was termed the ‘Proclamation to the 
Nation’, effectively repealing the Independence Constitution.123 The major features of the 
Proclamation were that it declared a state of emergency; repealed the 1968 Constitution; gave the 
king supreme power to rule by decree; gave the king power to appoint Cabinet and the Prime 
Minister and banned political parties.124 The relevant provisions of the Proclamation stated:125
A. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland which commenced on the 6
 
 
‘NOW THEREFORE I, SOBHUZA II, King of Swaziland, hereby declare that, in collaboration 
with my Cabinet Ministers and supported by the whole nation, I have assumed supreme power 
in Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and Judicial power is vested in myself and 
shall, for the meantime, be exercised in collaboration with a Council constituted by my Cabinet 
Ministers. I further declare that to ensure the continued maintenance of peace, order and good 
government, my Armed Forces in conjunction with the Royal Swaziland police have been 
posted to all strategic places and have taken charge of all government places and all public 
services. I further declare that I, in collaboration with my Cabinet Ministers, hereby decree 
that:- 
th
B. All laws with the exception of the Constitution hereby repealed, shall continue to operate with 
full force and effect and shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications 
and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them in conformity with this and ensuing 
decrees.’
 September, 1968, 




The justification of the Proclamation was that the 1968 constitution had failed to provide the 
machinery for good government and for the maintenance of good peace and order.127 The king 
asserted that the constitution was the cause of unrest, insecurity and dissatisfaction with the state 
of affairs in the country.128
                                                          
123 ‘Focus on Swaziland: A kingdom in Crisis’ (note 111 above) 7. 
124 King’s Proclamation to the Nation of the 12th April, 1973, Paragraphs 1-14. See also Davies (note 109 above) 42; 
Lucky Nhlanhla Bhembe v The King (note 42 above); Lawyers for Human Rights (Swaziland) and Another v The 
Attorney General and Another (unreported) High Court Civil Case No. 1822/ 2001at  4. 
125 King’s Proclamation to the Nation of the 12th April, 1973 at Para 2.  
126 Ibid. 
127 Lucky Nhlanhla Bhembe v The King (note 42 above). See also Ray Gwebu and Another v Rex (note 121 above) 3; 
King’s Proclamation to the Nation of the 12th April, 1973 Paragraph 1-14. 
128 Levin (note 2 above) 62. See also Ray Gwebu and Another v Rex (note 121 above) 3; S. 2 of the King’s 
Proclamation to the Nation of the 12th April, 1973. 
 He went on to elaborate on his criticism of the Constitution saying it 
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permitted the importation of political practices which were, inter alia, designed to disrupt and 
destroy ‘our own peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political 
activity’.129 Swaziland was from that day without a constitution and the king ruled through 
Proclamations and Orders-in-Council.130 In the interim period between the Proclamation and the 
introduction of a formal government structure in 1978, the king set up a Royal Constitutional 
Review Commission.131 The recommendations of this commission led to the promulgation of the 
Establishment of Parliament Order 23 of 1978, which introduced a Parliament which was no 
longer based on a purely Westminster model but a tinkhundla132 system of government fused 
with the Westminster model. A tinkhundla system is a customary system of governance in terms 
of which the King rules Swaziland through chiefs who exercise authority in chiefdoms.133
Following the enactment of the Hire Purchase Act in 1969, another consumer protection statute 
was passed into law. The Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991 (the Money 
Lending Act) was enacted to so that consumers in the sphere of credit financing and money-
lending were protected.
 The 
tinkhundla system applies to this day under the constitutional dispensation. These are some of 
the legal developments in the consumer protection frame work of Swaziland. 
 
4.2. The constitutional dispensation and the applicability of South African law 
134 The impact of this Act will be discussed fully in chapter 3 where the 
consumer framework of Swaziland is critically analysed. On 26 July, 2005 the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Swaziland Act, 001 of 2005 (Constitution of 2005) became law. In as much as 
this Constitution of 2005 replaced the independence Constitution of 1968, it has changed little of 
the political state of affairs existing post-1973.135
                                                          
129 Ray Gwebu and Another v Rex (note 121 above) 3. 
130 Ibid. 
131 ‘Report of the Promotional Mission to the Kingdom of Swaziland’ (2006) African Commission 2-4, available at 
http://old.achpr.org/english/Mission_reports/Swaziland/swazi%20report.pdf, accessed 14 October 2012; Levin 
(note 2 above) 62; Ray Gwebu and Another v Rex (note 121 above) 3. 
132 This is a system of rule in terms of which the king rules through chiefs who head chiefdoms or tinkhundla areas. 
133 ‘Focus on Swaziland: A kingdom in Crisis’ (note 111 above) 11-12. See also S. 79- S. 92 of the Constitution of 
Swaziland Act 001 of 2005, which entrench the tinkhundla system of government. 
134 See the Long title of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991. 
135 The King retained all legislative, Executive and Judicial powers and is immune from suit or prosecution. There is 
effectively no separation of powers which is one of the cornerstones of a democratic system of government. 
 However, the unpleasant political ramifications 
of Swazi political history are not objective of this study but rather the development of legislation 
for consumer protection. In relation to the development of the law the Constitution of 2005 has 
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made radical changes, especially the application of South African law in present-day 
Swaziland.136 The most significant change in the legal system is that section 3 of the General 
Law and Administration Proclamation 4 of 1907 has been altered. It is appropriate to reproduce 
the section as follows: 
 
‘3. (1) The Roman-Dutch common law, save in so far as the same has been heretofore or may 
from time to time hereafter be modified by statute, shall be the law in Swaziland. 
 
(2) Save and except in so far as the same have been repealed or amended the statutes in force in 
the Transvaal on the fifteenth  day of October 1904, and the statutory regulations thereunder 
shall mutatis mutandis, and as far as they may be applicable, be in force in Swaziland.’  
 
The Proclamation finds resonance and expression in section 252 (1) of the Constitution of 
2005 which provides as follows: 
 
‘Subject to the provisions of this Constitution or any other written law, the principles and rules 
that formed, immediately before the 6th September, 1968 (Independence Day), the principles 
and rules of the Roman-Dutch common law as applicable to Swaziland since 22nd
The above constitutional provision affirms the position that, subject to the Constitution of 2005 
and Swazi statutory law, the South African common law applies as it is in Swaziland.
 February 
1907 are confirmed and shall be applied and enforced as the common law of Swaziland except 




notes that through the reception statute the courts in Swaziland had assumed the 
authoritativeness of South African case law decisions. Nhlapo139
                                                          
136 S. 252 of the Constitution of 2005 omitted section 3 (2) of the General Law and Administration Proclamation of 
1907. 
137 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 15. 
138 JH Pain, ‘The Reception of English and Roman-Dutch law in Africa with Reference to Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland’ (1978) XI CILSA 137, 167 cited in Nhlapo (note 7 above) 13-14. 
139 Nhlapo (note 7 above) 14. 
 takes the argument further and 
opines that not only did South African case law apply in Swaziland but the reception statute 
made it clear that a continued application of Transvaal statutory law was also contemplated. 
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While Nhlapo140 correctly declared the position of the law at that time, that position was 
radically altered by the Constitution of 2005 when the carefully couched wording of section 252 
(1) of the Constitution of 2005 ousted the operation of the Transvaal statutes in Swaziland.141  In 
other words while preserving Roman-Dutch law as provided in section 3 (1), section 252 (1) of 
the Constitution of 2005 steered clear of incorporating section 3 (2) of the reception statute.142 It 
must be remembered that Section 3 (2) of the Proclamation incorporated into the law of 
Swaziland statutes that applied in the Transvaal at the date of reception. As a result, prior to the 
Constitution of 2005 coming into force in 2005, the statutes of Transvaal applied fully in 
Swaziland but only in as far as they were applicable.143 The language of the subsection meant 
that Transvaal statutes worked in tandem with Roman-Dutch law in Swaziland.144 The 
Constitution of 2005, by only retaining section 3 (1) of the reception statute, finally brought to an 
end the debate on the applicability of South African statutory law in Swaziland.145




In view of this provision, the application of South African statutory law in Swaziland would have 
created an inconsistency if Transvaal statutes were to be allowed to be in force in Swaziland. It 
appears from the foregoing that only the South African common law applies in Swaziland, 
subject to exceptions. The question whether the South African common law applies completely 
has been a controversial subject in the courts of Swaziland.147 The issue of the application of 
South African law in Swaziland was at the forefront when the case of Annah L okudzinga 
Matsenjwa v  R  [1970-76] SLR 25 was decided. In this case the accused assailant had been 
charged and convicted with the crime of murder, having stabbed a 17 month old child while 
attempting to stab its mother.148
                                                          
140 Ibid. 
141 S. 252 of the Constitution of 2005 does not recognise Transvaal statutes as was the position before.  
142 Ibid. 
143 S. 3 (2) of the General Law and Administration Proclamation No. 4 of 1907. 
144 The subsection used the word ‘shall’. Therefore, it was mandatory for the former Transvaal statutes to apply. 
 On the conviction for murder, the accused contended that the 
court a quo misdirected itself in finding her guilty of murder and instead of the lesser crime of 
145 By virtue of S. 251 (1) of the Constitution of 2005 omitting Transvaal statutes. 
146 S. 1 (1) of the Constitution of 2005 provides that Swaziland is a unitary, sovereign, democratic Kingdom. 
147 See the cases of Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R [1970-76] SLR 25 and R v Mnisi and Another (unreported) 
High Court case No. 35 of 2004; [2006] SZHC 72. Both cases address the doctrine of versari in re illicita. The 
former case recognizes the versari in re illicita doctrine, while the latter rejects it as part of the law in Swaziland. 
148 At 26. 
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culpable homicide. She also challenged the sentence of life imprisonment as being too 
excessive.149




part of the law of Swaziland.151 The reason why this doctrine came under judicial scrutiny in this 
case was that the doctrine had been invalidated as part of South African law in the case of S v 
Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287 (A).152 The doctrine of versari in re illicita states that a person will 
be held responsible for the unlawful consequences of any unlawful act.153 This doctrine was an 
exception to the trite principle of criminal law that intention is a requirement for a murder 
conviction.154 The accused alleged that she did not have the intention to kill the child but wanted 
to stab its mother. The court a quo had applied this doctrine and had concluded that, as a result of 
an unlawful act of assault, the accused was liable for the consequence of the death of the child 
despite not having intended to kill it. In other words, despite having caused the child’s death 
accidentally, the accused was liable because she was involved in a legally prohibited assault.155 
On appeal, the court had to make the finding whether the doctrine of versari in re illicita, which 
had been abolished in South Africa, was the law in Swaziland.156
‘If this conclusion involves a departure from the law as now established in the Republic of 
South Africa this is to be deplored, for it is much to be desired that the law of Southern Africa 
should in essentials be uniform. But we are obliged to apply what we understand to be the law 
of Swaziland, even if divergence from the law of the foundation member of the South African 
Law Association is the result.’
 The court per Schreiner P 
(Milne JA dissenting) refused to follow the South African approach and confirmed the 
application of the doctrine as follows: 
 
157
                                                          
149 At 25. 
150 BA Garner Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) 1594. See also Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above) 
28. 
151 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above) 28. 
152 At 297-298. See also S v Mtshiza 1970 (3) SA 747 (A) at 751-752 Holmes JA also referred to the versari in re 
illicita doctrine as being ‘an outworn doctrine’ and an ‘outmoded concept’. 
153 CR Snyman Criminal Law 4 ed (2002) 148-150. 
154 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above) 27-28. 
155 Ibid 30. The leading case of S v Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287(A) changed the position in South Africa by 
invalidating the doctrine of versari in re illicita. 
156 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above) 28-29. 





Although the above decision maintained the application of the versari in re illic ita doctrine in 
Swaziland, the position had not been clearly settled. Subsequently, the High Court of Swaziland 
was called upon to decide the application of the versari in re illicita doctrine in Swazi law in the 
case of R v Mnisi and A nother (unreported) High Court case No. 35 /2004. In this case the two 
accused were charged with the crimes of murder and theft of a motor vehicle respectively.158 The 
second accused in this case had shot the deceased when the parties sold each other dagga.159 
During the sale transaction a misunderstanding arose between the parties which led to the second 
accused producing a pistol and fatally shooting the deceased.160 The question whether the versari 
in re illicita doctrine was applicable came to the fore because an unintended death had resulted 
from the illegal sale of a habit forming drug.161 The prosecution had argued, presumably on the 
strength of the Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R 162 case, that the accused were both guilty of 
murder.163 Annandale ACJ, without referring to the case of Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R,164
‘The crucial issue in this trial, in so far as the murder charge goes, is whether the two accused 
persons have been shown to act with a common purpose, showing a joint intent to kill him. 
From the evidence, I have severe reservations as to whether this has been proven. The only 
indicator of a possibility of a common purpose is that the two accused were at the same time 
and same place in the presence of the deceased and that they did partake in an unlawful 
expedition in so far as the dagga goes. Our law does not recognize as valid or proper the 
doctrine of versari i n re illicita. This doctrine imputes on persons involved in or during the 
committal of an unlawful enterprise, a further wrongdoing, which is a result or a consequence of 
the first wrongdoing. In other words, according to this doctrine, because the accused were busy 
with an unlawful dagga transaction and in the process thereof the deceased was killed, they 
would therefore on strength of the doctrine of versari in re i llicita also be held liable on that 
basis. But that is not the case.’
 
refused to recognize the doctrine of versari in re illicita. He stated as follows: 
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158 Para 1. 
159 Para 24. 
160 Para 29. 
161 Para 33. 
162 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above). 
163 Both the accused were alleged to have acted in the furtherance of a common purpose. 
164 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above). 





The court in the above case did not give reasons for deviating from the case Annah Lokudzinga 
Matsenjwa v R.166 Furthermore, it is curious to note that the court, in R v Mnisi and Another,167 
did not cite any authority nor did it provide reasons for its departure from Annah Lokudzinga 
Matsenjwa v  R .168 Indeed, there were no further cases dealing with the doctrine in Swaziland 
until the R v Mnisi and Another.169 It cannot be denied, however, that the decision in Mnisi is in 
harmony with the law in South Africa170 and Botswana,171 where the doctrine no longer applies. 
It is also clear from the contrasting cases of Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R172 and R v Mnisi 
and A nother,173 that the Courts in Swaziland are at liberty to administer laws they deem 
applicable and are not bound to apply South African law.174
Understanding the history and development of the legal system of Swaziland is important for 
purposes of contextualizing the consumer protection framework that that will be examined in 
greater detail under chapter 3. This chapter began by tracing the legal history of Swaziland and 
how it has evolved. An analysis of the dual nature of Swaziland’s legal system was traced from 
the colonial era to the constitutional dispensation. It has also been shown how South African law 
influenced the Swazi legal system. It has been seen that one of the reasons why consumer 
protection law has not developed in Swaziland was the influence of colonialism. After gaining 
independence from her colonial masters, Swaziland failed to develop consumer legislation 
despite a promising start and current consumer legislation has not been improved since gaining 
 Thus under the Constitutional 
dispensation, the courts in Swaziland are neither bound by South African statutory or case law. 
South African case law is only of high persuasive value in assisting the courts in arriving at just 
decisions. It therefore appears safe to submit that the application of South African case law in 
Swaziland is a purely discretionary act by the courts.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
                                                          




170 S v Bernardus (note 155 above). 
171 See the case of Pati v The State (Criminal Appeal No. F. 12 OF 2004) [2006] BWHC 25 (31 March 2006) 
172Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above). 
173 R v Mnisi and Another (note 147 above). 
174 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 147 above) 29. 
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independence in 1968. For example, the Hire Purchase Act of 1969 has never at any point been 
amended or repealed by any other statute and the same applies to the Money Lending and Credit 





GENERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
This chapter focuses on the basic principles underlying consumer protection. The principles to be 
discussed have had similar application in both the legal systems of the United Kingdom (UK) 
and South Africa. Perhaps what is responsible for this state of affairs is the manner in which 
English law has been woven into and has reshaped South African Roman Dutch law as 
highlighted in the previous chapter.1 For example, the principles governing the law of 
‘negligence’ under the Roman Dutch law of delict in South Africa apply in a similar manner 
under the English law of tort.2 In addition, the laws applicable in present-day consumer 
transactions between South African consumers and suppliers were largely influenced by English 
consumer law.3
Consumer protection in general has its roots in the era dating from the pre-industrial revolution 
in the UK.
 It is for this reason that the discussion in the present chapter will be based on 
principles as they apply in both the English and South African law context. Perhaps the only 
point of divergence between these is where some of the principles have been statutorily modified 
to suit consumer needs in South Africa. These statutory developments will also be discussed 
whenever applicable. The ultimate objective is to reveal the inadequacies of the common law 
principles and justify the need for legislative intervention in consumer protection. 
 
2. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
2.1. A brief historical overview 
4
                                                          
1 HR Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 575-578. 
2 J Burchell Principles o f D elict (1993) 247. See also Macquoid-Mason ‘Consumers and Consumerism’ in D 
Macquoid -Mason (ed) Consumer Law in South Africa (1997) 5; A Gibb and Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor & M itchell 
Timber Supply Co. (Pty) Ltd 1975 (2) SA 457 (W) at 463-464. 
3 E Van Eeden A guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 24. See also Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above); A 
Gibb and Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor & Mitchell Timber Supply Co. (Pty) Ltd (note 2 above). 
4 DW Oughton Consumer L aw: Text, Ca ses & M aterials (1991) 11-12. See also R Lowe & GF Woodroffe 
Consumer Law and Practice (1980) 1. 
 During this period shop-owners and guild craftsmen dealt directly with consumers in 
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mercantile affairs.5 For example, consumers were able to individually protect their own interests 
by personally inspecting goods and shunning shop-owners or small businesses which supplied 
defective products or which were of inferior quality.6 It was not until the industrial revolution of 
the 18th and 19th century that technological innovation introduced radically different methods of 
manufacture, distribution and merchandising.7 Industrialization and large scale manufacturing of 
cheap goods not only replaced individual retailers and craftsmen but also introduced a number of 
disadvantages. One of these disadvantages was that manufactured goods could not be easily 
inspected by consumers during and after manufacture resulting in an information gap.8 
Following from this, as technology gained popularity in the 20th century, the concern for 
consumer exploitation increased along with the potential of defective products being produced 
by manufacturers.9 As a result, consumers required protection from harmful products. One of the 
first countries to respond to consumer exploitation was the UK where the ‘Molony Committee’ 
was established in 1959, tasked with specifically looking into consumer problems in order to 
make law reform proposals.10
‘Whereas the consumer of fifty years ago needed only a reasonable modicum of skill and 
knowledge to recognize the composition of the goods on offer and their manner of production, 
and to assess their quality and fitness for his particular purpose, the consumer of today finds it 
difficult if not impossible to do so because of the development of complicated production 
techniques.’




The above excerpt is testament to the fact that common law principles were insufficient and that 
consumers required legislative protection from exploitation. As a result of the committee’s 
findings, the UK introduced a series of consumer protection statutes aimed at protecting not only 
 
 
                                                          
5 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 7. See also Molony Committee Report The Final Report of the Committee on 
Consumer Protection (1962) (Cmnd 1781, 1962) Para 41. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. See also R Cranston Consumers and the Law 2ed (1978) 1. 
8 Cranston (note 7 above). See also Lowe & Woodroffe (note 4 above) 2. 
9 Molony Report (note 5 above) paragraphs 42-43. 
10 P Cartwright Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory and Policy in the UK (2001) 4. 
11 Molony Report (note 5 above). 
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those consumers in a weak bargaining position but also those who were often deliberately misled 
by unscrupulous suppliers in the course of business.12
There are a number of reasons why consumer protection steadily developed in the 20
 
 
2.2. The rationale for consumer protection  
th century. 
First, consumers could no longer easily inspect manufactured goods to identify defects because 
of the complex manner in which they were produced.13 The second reason is suggested by Van 
Eeden14 who notes that there was a spirited consumer movement influenced by economic and 
other forces against old-established and often hallowed principles which did not favour 
consumers.15 The last significant factor which propelled consumer protection into the legislative 
era of the mid-20th century was the influence of criticisms advanced by scholars and legal writers 
alike against the inadequacy of the private law.16 The result was a consumer revolution which 
began in the United States of America, and spread to countries like the UK, Australia, Canada, 
and recently in South Africa where consumer legislation was introduced to meet the demands of 
changing market trends.17
However, the idea of introducing consumer protection legislation by governments was not 
entirely welcomed and received censure for different reasons. The main proponent of the 




18 This school argued for a limitation of government interference and legislative 
regulation in consumer affairs.19 They believed that private law adequately protected consumers 
without statutory intervention and argued that unfair trading practices could be controlled by free 
and open markets.20
                                                          
12 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 4 above) 1.  
13 Ibid 2.  
14 Oughton (note 4 above) 11-14. See also Van Eeden (note 3 above) 1. 
15 Van Eeden (note 3 above) 1. 
16 Cranston (note 7 above) 67. 
17 Van Eeden (note 3 above) 1. 
18 Cranston (note 7 above) 19. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 5. 
19 GG Howells & S Weatherill Consumer Protection Law (1995) 70, 448.  
20 Ibid. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 5-6; Cranston (note 7 above) 19-21. 
 For example, where a supplier sold an unsatisfactory product either due to 
its price or quality, consumers would simply inform each other to refrain from purchasing that 
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product.21 The resulting decline in sales would either force the seller to decrease the cost of the 
product, revise its general appearance, alter production methods, or totally cease manufacturing 
the product.22 They argued that unnecessary restrictive enactments by government would affect 
these market processes and in the end stifle market growth.23
The ideas of the Chicago School of Economists were opposed by those who argued that it was 
illusory to expect consumers to protect themselves from exploitation with the advent of 
industrialization because it was not easy to inspect sophisticated products.
  
 
24 For example, a 
latent defect in a manufactured product could not be detected by a consumer on reasonable 
inspection as was the case before industrialization.25 Therefore, it was necessary that regulation 
be introduced to regulate and protect consumers from incidents of this nature. Cranston26 
observes that a consumer framework without legislative regulation is like a house built on sand. 
Howells and Weatherhill27 also criticize non-legislative consumer regulation as being ‘alluring 
as it is unrealistic’. The above theories are wide and remarkably contentious therefore, the 
motivation of this study is not drawn to the debate on the opposing views. It is clear that without 
state regulation through legislative enactment consumers are at a disadvantage. Swaziland 
exemplifies a legal system without a consumer framework circumscribed by statutory 
parameters.28
                                                          
21 Cranston (note 7 above) 19. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid 20-21. 
24 Cranston (note 7 above) 21. 
25 Ibid. 
26 R Cranston ‘Consumer Protection Law and Economic Theory’ in AJ Duggan & LW Darvall (eds) Consumer 
Protection Law and Theory (1980) 243 cited in Cartwright (note 10 above) 18. See also Howels & Weatherill (note 
19 above) 1. 
27 Howels & Weatherill (note 19 above) 1. 
28 The only relevant statutes being the Hire-Purchase Act 11 of 1969; Fair Trading Act, 2001; Money Lending and 
Credit Finance Act 3 of 1991. 
  
 
Having discussed the development and need for consumer protection it is important to go on and 







2.3. Defining ‘Consumer Protection’ 
Having discussed the development and need for consumer protection, it is important to define the 
term. In an attempt to define consumer protection, Mickleburgh29 asserts that ‘the expression 
“consumer protection” has not yet achieved the full status of a term of art’. It may be that the 
author was simply saying that the phrase has not been clearly defined. Like many definitions, 
‘consumer protection’ is an imprecise notion that cannot be defined with a degree of precision.30 
The term includes those circumstances where the law will intervene to ensure that inequality in 
bargaining power between consumers and suppliers does not prejudice consumers.31
‘“Consumer protection” is an amorphous conception that cannot be defined. It consists of those 
instances where the law intervenes to impose safeguards in favour of purchasers and hire 
purchasers, together with the activities of a number of organisations, variously inspired, the 
object or effect of which is to procure fair and satisfying treatment for the domestic buyer. From 
another viewpoint “consumer protection” may be regarded as those measures which contribute, 
directly or indirectly, to the consumer’s assurance that he will buy goods of suitable quality 
appropriate to his purpose; that they will give him reasonable use, and that if he has a just 
complaint, there will be means of redress.’
 The Molony 






From the above definition it can be deduced that the aim of consumer protection is to achieve 
fair and satisfying treatment for consumers despite the many problems they face. Perhaps 
consumer protection is better defined when considered in tandem with the definition of the term 
‘consumer’ since these two concepts mutually complement each other and cannot be individually 
understood. The term will be discussed below. 
 
2.4. What is a consumer? 
33
                                                          
29 J Mickleburgh Consumer Protection (1979) xi. 
30 Molony Report (note 5 above) Para 21. 
31 Ibid. see also Oughton (note 4 above) 14. 
32 Molony Report (note 5 above) 8 Para 21. 
33 BA Garner Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) 335. 




‘A person who buys goods or services for personal, family, or household use, with no intention 
of resale; a natural person who uses products for personal rather than business purposes.’ 
 
Despite the above definition, attempting to define the word ‘consumer’ has been an endemic 
problem in shaping the law in consumer protection.34 Although academic writers and statutory 
provisions have made attempts to hazard definitions of the term, it refuses to accept a solitary 
definition and it will become evident that the various statutory definitions do not cover all 
aspects of the word in its broader sense.35 Limiting the definition through statute in each 
jurisdiction was probably aimed at attaining a degree of certainty in countries like the UK, 
Canada, Australia and South Africa, all of which resorted to defining the term in context.36
Before an in-depth analysis of the term is attempted, the statutory provisions defining of the 
word ‘consumer’ must be set out. The definitions will be drawn from selected consumer 
protection laws in different countries.
 The 
aim is to identify the common features and divergences inherent in the definitions.  
 
2.4.1. Statutory definitions of ‘consumer’ 
37 The starting point is the South African Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008 (South African CPA of 2008), which defines a consumer as a person 
to whom goods or services are supplied or marketed, including one who has entered into a 
transaction with a supplier in the ordinary course of business.38 This definition is not limited to a 
natural person because it includes a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement39 and other 
juristic persons whose asset value or annual turnover is less than the threshold value.40 The exact 
threshold value is unclear because some authors hold that it the  amount of R 2 million,41
                                                          
34 Cartwright (note 10 above) 2. See also Mickleburgh (note 29 above) 3. 
35 Ibid. 
36 These definitions are contained in consumer legislation of the countries and are discussed in this chapter. 
37 The definitions will be taken from legislation in the UK, Canada, Swaziland, Australia and South Africa. 
38 S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. See also W Jacobs et al ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 (3) PER 302, 309, 313. 
39 S. 1 as read with S. 5 (6) (b)-(e) of the CPA of 2008. 
40 S. 1 & S. 5 (2) (b) of the CPA of 2008. 




others hold that the threshold value is the amount of R3 million.42 This study will proceed on the 
basis of the threshold value being R3 million.43
On the other hand, the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987 defines a consumer as a person 




44 This definition also includes a person who might wish to occupy the accommodation 
otherwise than for the purposes of any business of his.45 In addition, the Consumer Protection 
Act of 1987 is complimented by the English Consumer Protection (Code of Practice for Traders 
on Price Indicators) Approval Order of 198846  which provides that a consumer is anyone 
supplied with goods, services, accommodation or facilities, other than for business use’.47
The Canadian Consumer Protection Act, 2002 defines a consumer in two different sections as an 




definition also includes a person who buys a consumer product from a retail seller but not for the 
purpose of resale or business purposes.49 In Swaziland a consumer is defined in the Competition 
Act of 2007 as any person who purchases or offers to purchase goods otherwise than for the 
purpose of resale.50 The definition also includes a person to whom a service is rendered.51’ In 
Australian consumer legislation a consumer is defined in the Competition and Consumer Act of 
2010. The Competition and Consumer Act of 2010 defines a consumer as a person who has 
acquired goods and the amount payable for those goods does not exceed $40 000 or any greater 
amount that has been prescribed.52 The goods must either be for personal, domestic or household 
use or consumption.53
                                                          
42 T Naude ‘The Consumer’s Right to Safe, Good Quality Goods and the Implied Warranty of Quality under 
Sections 55 and 56 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 336, 338. 
43 GG GN 294 in Government Gazette 34181 of 1 April 2011. 
44 S. 20 (6) of the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987. 
45 Ibid. 
46 (S.I. 1988/ 2078). 
47 Macquoid -Mason (note 2 above) 3. 
48 S. 3 (a) of the Consumer Protection Act of Canada 2002. 
49 S. 39 of the Consumer Protection Act of Canada 2002. 
50 S. 2 (a) of the Competition Act of 2007. 
51 S. 2 (b) of the Competition Act of 2007. 
52 Schedule 2 section 3 (1) (a) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 





Statutory definitions are not an entirely new phenomenon and in some countries, for example 
South Africa, the term was defined in prior statutes before the CPA of 2008 came into force.54 In 
the South African context the CPA of 2008 fused all the definitions from previously existing 
statutory provisions to come up with an all-encompassing definition.55
Nader,
 As highlighted earlier, 
academic writers have also made a number of contributions in as far as defining the word 
‘consumer’. These definitions will be considered below. 
 
2.4.2. Non-statutory definition of ‘consumer’ 
56 who has been described as an American consumer law activist, asserts that a consumer 
is every citizen.57 On the other hand, a consumer was defined by the Molony Committee58 ‘as 
one who purchases (or hire-purchases) goods for private use or consumption’. A consumer has 
also been described as a customer who buys for personal use and not for business purposes.59 
Another view is that a consumer is ‘a person to whom goods, services or credit are supplied or 
sought to be supplied by another in the course of a business carried on by him.60 Cranston,61 
opined that every citizen of England is a consumer, of welfare, benefits, public utilities, health 
services, educational services and so on. Oughton62 states that, ‘it is also the case that the term 
encompasses a person who makes use of the services provided by public-sector bodies or private 
monopolies subject to public control’.63 Mcquoid-Mason64 on the other hand approaches the 
definition of ‘consumer’ from two perspectives- the broad and the narrow perspective. In the 
broad sense, he observes, everybody who makes use of goods or services generally is a 
consumer.65 Consumers under this category are protected by the law of delict because they are 
not party to a contractual relationship with a supplier or service provider.66
                                                          
54 For example, S. 1 of the Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976 (now repealed by S. 121 (2) (e) of the CPA 68 of 2008); 
The Harmful Business Practices Act 71 of 1988; S. 107 of the Water Act 54 of 1956. See also Macquoid-Mason, 
(note 2 above) 2. 
55 S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. 
56 R Nader ‘The Great American Gyp’ (1968) Vol. 11 N.Y Rev. of Books 28, cited in Cranston (note 7 above) 3, 8. 
57 Oughton (note 4 above) 1. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 3; Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 1. 
58 Molony Report (note 5 above) Para 2. 
59 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 4 above). See also Oughton (note 4 above) 6. 
60 Mickleburgh (note 29 above) 3. 
61 Cranston (note 7 above) 8. 
62 Oughton (note 4 above) 1. 
63 Ibid. See also Cranston (note 7 above) 8. 
64 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 1. 
65 Ibid. See also Cranston (note 7 above) 8. 
66 Ibid. 
 In the narrow sense, 
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he states that a consumer can be regarded as any person who directly purchases the goods from a 
supplier.67 Consumers of this class are protected by contractual remedies.68
In this section the analysis of the term ‘consumer’ will be considered as it applies both in the UK 
and South Africa. The common law and statutory definitions discussed above reveal that the 
definition of a consumer essentially encompasses three elements or common denominators.
  
 
The various definitions advanced appear to include persons who purchase or hire goods or 
services for private or domestic use, and those affected by the use of the goods. At this point it is 
necessary to investigate critically the common features in the definitions that have been covered. 
 
2.5. Dissecting the term ‘Consumer’  
69 
The first element or factor is that the consumer must be an individual who does not act in the 
course of business.70 The second factor revealed by the definitions is that only the supplier must 
act in a business capacity and not the consumer;71 and the third and final factor is that the 
consumer must intend to use the goods and services supplied privately.72
This requirement affects companies.
 These key rudiments of 
the term will be analysed below. 
 
2.5.1. The individual consumer must not act in the course of business 
73 In consumer law the word ‘individual’ is not limited to a 
natural person but includes business entities such as sole proprietorships, unincorporated body of 
persons and partnerships.74 These business entities qualify as individuals because the 
management and capital of these entities is invested in the individuals constituting the business.75 
A corporate entity such as a company on the other hand is not an individual and ‘cannot for all 
purposes be equated with a natural person’.76
                                                          
67 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 1. See also Cranston (note 7 above) 7. 
68 Ibid. see also Lillicrapp, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) 475 (A). 
69 Oughton (note 4 above) 2. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 3. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. See also Lowe & Woodroffe (note 4 above) 1. 
73 Oughton (note 4 above) 3. See also R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 
321. 
74 Oughton (note 4 above) 2. 
75 HS Cilliers et al Corporate Law 2 ed (1992) 2. See also Oughton (note 4 above) 2. 
76 Ibid 3. See also JT Pretorius South African Company Law: Through the Cases 6 ed (1999) 7. 
 This limitation has caused problems in consumer 
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law because consumer statutes both in the UK and South Africa recognise certain categories of 
juristic persons as consumers.77 The different jurisdictions are considered next. 
 
In the UK, there are a number of statutes dealing with individual consumers. For example, 
section 189 (1) of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 provides that a consumer must be an 
individual and this includes a partnership and any unincorporated body of persons.
The UK 
78 The Unfair 
Contract Terms Act of 1977 on the other hand provides that a person who neither makes a 
contract in the course of business nor holds himself out as doing so will be considered a 
consumer.79
In deciding whether a company has concluded a contract in the course of business courts have 
held that the transaction in issue must have attained some degree of regularity and be an integral 
part of its business.
 It is necessary to consider the manner in which courts have dealt with the issue. 
 
80 If a degree of regularity has not been made out or the transaction was 
merely incidental then that transaction was not made in the ordinary course of business and a 
corporate entity can be held to have acted as a consumer.81
This test was applied in the case of R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v United Dominions Trust 
Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321. In this case the plaintiff company was a freight forwarding agent that 
had purchased a second hand motor vehicle on credit under a contract of sale which was to be 
used by its directors for both the business and private purposes.
  
 
82 The plaintiff rejected the 
vehicle after discovering that it was not fit for purpose since it had a leaking roof.83 After the 
plaintiff claimed damages in contract the defendants disputed liability by relying on an 
exemption clause embedded in the contract.84 If it was found that the plaintiff company dealt as a 
consumer in terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act85
                                                          
77 For example S. 189 (1) of the UK Consumer Credit Act of 1974, and S. 1 of the South African CPA of 2008. 
78 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 4 above) 238. See also Oughton (note 4 above) 2; Mickleburgh (note 29 above) 4. 
79 S. 12 (1) (a) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 2. 
80 R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd (note 73 above) at 330-331. 
81 Ibid. 
82 At 323-324. 
83 At 325. 
84 At 325. 
85 S. 6 (2) & S. 12 (1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
 then the exemption clause would be 
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ineffective.86 One of the questions for determination was whether the plaintiff company had 
purchased the vehicle in the course of business.87 Dillon LJ stated that the general rule was that 
corporate entities are always acting in the course of business and any non-business ventures 
engaged in would be ultra vires88 and illegal.89 However, the court held that in the context of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act,90 the plaintiff company could be held not to have concluded the 
contract in the ordinary course of business under certain circumstances.91
‘The reconciliation between that phrase and the need for some degree of regularity is, as I see it, 
as follows: there are some transactions which are clearly integral parts of the businesses 
concerned, and these should be held to have been carried out in the course of those businesses; 
this would cover, apart from much else, the instance of a once-off adventure in the nature of 
trade where the transaction itself would constitute a trade or business.’
 The court stated: 
 
92
Applying the above test, Dillon LJ held that the plaintiff did not regularly purchase motor 
vehicles from the defendant on credit.
 
 
93 Since a degree of regularity had not been made out in the 
case, the plaintiff company was held to have dealt as a consumer.94 
 
In the South African context the CPA of 2008 does not state when company is said to be acting 
in the course of business. Instead, the Act provides that an individual consumer includes a body 
corporate, partnership, unincorporated association, as well as a trust in terms of the Trust 
Property Act 57 of 1988.
South Africa 
95 In terms of the Act juristic persons or businesses whose asset value or 
annual turnover is less than R 3 million are also considered individual consumers.96 Van Eeden97
                                                          
86 At 328. 
87 At 328. 
88 ‘Ultra vires’ means an ‘act beyond the legal power or authority of a person or official or body’ etc, see Garner 
(note 33 above) 1559. 
89 At 329. See also Cilliers (note 75 above) 3; Oughton (note 4 above) 3. 
90 S. 12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
91 At 330. 
92 At 330-331. 
93 At 331. 
94 At 330-331. 
95 S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. 
96 S. 5 (2) (b) of the CPA of 2008. See also Bregman (note 41 above). 




suggests that the recognition of juristic persons in the South African CPA of 2008 is ‘somewhat 
surprising’. His view is that the CPA of 2008 was enacted to protect consumers who are natural 
persons and not businesses.98 Nevertheless, it seems that the CPA of 200899 recognises both 
natural persons and a certain category of juristic persons as qualifying to be individuals.  
 
2.5.2. The supplier must act in the course of business  
Given that the individual is regarded as a non-business purchaser of goods and services, the next 
enquiry is to decide as to when exactly a supplier can be said to be acting in the course of 
business.  
 
There is inconsistency surrounding the understanding of the phrase ‘in the course of business’.
The UK 
100 
The reason is that the phrase is interpreted differently in the Trade Descriptions Act101 and in 
sale of goods legislation.102 The House of Lords applied two divergent approaches in respect of 
these statutes when deciding when a supplier can be said to be acting in the course of business.103 
With respect to sale of goods legislation a supplier was held to act in the course of business even 
if trading in the goods was not on a regular basis.104 In other words supplying goods in a once-
off transaction was deemed to be in the course of business.105 In terms of the Trade Descriptions 
Act106 the other hand it was held that supplying goods regularly was a requirement for a 
transaction to occur in the course of business.107
The first approach was considered by Lord Wilberforce in the case of Ashington Piggeries Ltd 
and another v  Christopher Hill L td [1972] A.C. 441 (HL). In this case the appellants’ herring 
died as a result of the presence of dimethylnitrosamine (DMNA) in herring meal supplied to 
 The two approaches are considered below. 
 
                                                          
98 Ibid. 
99 S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. 
100 Oughton (note 4 above) 4. 
101 S. 1 (1) (a) of the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968. 
102 Sale of Goods Act of 1893 and Sale of Goods Act of 1979. See also Oughton (note 4 above) 4. 
103 See the conflicting decisions of Ashington Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] A.C. 441 
(HL), and Davies v Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301 (HL). 
104 Ashington Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd (note 103 above) at 494. 
105 Oughton (note 4 above) 4. 
106 S. 1 (1) of the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968. 
107 Davies v Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301 (note 103 above) at 1305. See also Oughton (note 4 above) 4. 
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them by the respondents.108 The herring meal was an ingredient in a compound of mink food 
ordered on behalf of the appellants under a contract of sale.109 As a result of losing a large 
number of mink the appellants claimed damages against the respondent for having breached the 
implied warranty on description in terms of 14 (1) and (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893.110 
The Act referred to goods of a description which it was ‘in the course of the seller’s business to 
supply’.111
‘I do not accept that, taken in its most linguistic strictness, either subsection bears the meaning 
contended for. I would hold that (as to subsection (1)) it is in the course of a seller’s business to 
supply goods if he agrees, either generally, or in a particular case, to supply the goods when 
ordered, and (as to subsection (2)) that a seller deals in goods of that description if his business 
is such that he is willing to accept orders for them. I cannot comprehend the rationale of holding 
that the subsections do not apply if the seller is dealing in the particular goods for the first 
time…’
 After the respondent had argued that it had not sold the mink food to the appellants in 
the ordinary course of business and breached section 14 (1) and (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 
1893, Lord Wilberforce held as follows: 
 
112
In upholding the appeal, the Judge rejected the respondent’s argument and held that supplying 
goods for the first time may occur in the course of business under section 14 of the Sale of 




The second approach was considered in the case of Davies v Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301 (HL). 
In this case the respondent sold a car he had used to transport films and other related material 




                                                          
108 At 488. 
109 Ibid. 
110 At 472. 
111 At 493. 
112 At 494. 
113 At 495. 
114 At 1303. 
 Before selling 
the car to a car dealer he tampered with the mileage on the odometer of the vehicle and 
misrepresented the distance by applying a false description contrary to section 1 (1) of the Trade 
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Descriptions Act of 1968.115  He did this in order to sell his car at a higher price than its book 
value. The respondent was convicted for his actions after a consumer protection department laid 
a charge against him but successfully appealed his conviction.116 After the appellant prosecutor 
appealed to the House of Lords the court was called upon to decide whether the respondent had 
applied the trade description to the vehicle in the course of business.117
‘The expression “in the course of a trade or business” in the context of an Act having consumer 
protection as its primary purpose conveys the concept of some degree of regularity, and it is to 
be observed that the long title to the Act refers to “misdescriptions of goods, services, 
accommodation and facilities provided in the course of trade”.’




Lord Keith held that there was no degree of regularity because the practice of buying and selling 
vehicles had not been established when the offence was committed. This approach was also 





The inconsistency from the above decisions leaves the law in an uncertain state. 
 
In terms of the CPA of 2008 a supplier is either an individual person, juristic person, partnership, 
trust, organ of state, an entity owned or directed by an organ of state, a person contracted or 
licensed by an organ of state to offer or supply any goods or services or is a public-private 
partnership marketing goods or services.
South Africa 
120 However, the Act does not define what is meant by 
supplying goods ‘in the course of business’.121
                                                          
115 At 1303. 
116 At 1303. 
117 At 1304. 
118 At 1305. 
119 R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd (note 73 above) at 329. 
120 S. 1 as read with S. 5 (8) of the CPA of 2008. 
121 RD Sharrock ‘Judicial Control of Unfair Contract Terms: The Implications of the Consumer Protection Act’ 
(2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 295, 301-302. See also Naude (note 42 above) 337. 
 It is suggested that the CPA of 2008 limits the 
phrase ‘in the course of business’ to the normal transactions of a particular business to the 
42 
 
exclusion of ‘once-off’ transactions that are unusual to the business concerned.122 Naude123
This test derives from a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of South African 
Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v Goede En ń ander 1997 (4) SA 66 (SCA). In this case 
a close corporation providing passenger services and owned by the respondent sureties had been 
granted overdraft facilities by the appellant bank.
 states 
that the test for determining whether a transaction occurs in the course of business is ‘whether  
the contract falls within the scope of that business and whether the transaction is one with 
commonly-used terms that ordinary businessmen would have entered into in the circumstances. 
 
124  The respondents were a teacher and a clerk 
who signed the surety agreement forms without having obtained the consent of their spouses in 
terms of section 15 of the Matrimonial property Act 88 of 1984.125 After the appellant bank 
claimed damages against the respondents for failure to honour the loan the respondents raised the 
defence that they had not obtained the consent of their spouses in terms of the Matrimonial 
Property Act126  when they signed the surety agreement.127 The appellant argued that consent 
was not necessary if the act was performed by the spouse in the ordinary course of his 
‘profession, trade or business’.128 One of the questions was whether the ‘once-off’ transaction 
performed by the respondents was in the course of business.129
The court held the issue was not whether the respondents normally stood as sureties in the course 
of their profession, trade or business but whether the juristic act of standing as surety by the 
respondents had been performed in the ordinary course of business.
 
 
130 In finding that the 
respondents had acted in the course of business, Grosskopf AR held that it was immaterial 
whether the respondents had their individual professions and were not actively involved in the 
running of the passenger business.131
                                                          
122 Sharrock (note 121 above) 302. 
123 Naude (note 42 above) 337. 
124 At 69. 
125 At 69. 
126 S. 15 (2) (h) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
127 At 69. 
128 S. 15 (6) of the Matrimonial Property Act of 1984. 
129 At 75. 
130 At 75 
131 At 77. 
 A single isolated act such as signing the surety agreement 
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qualified the respondents as having acted in the course of business because as ordinary 
businessmen.132 Therefore, it is immaterial whether an act is performed frequently.133
The third and final element in the definition of a consumer is that the goods or services at the 
disposal of that consumer must be for private use or consumption.
 
 
2.5.3. The goods or services must be ‘for private use or consumption’ 
134 Some statutory provisions 
require that goods and services acquired should be intended for non-business or private 
consumer use.135 In terms of this requirement the goods must be intended for the private use of 
the consumer. In order to fulfill this requirement, the goods or services do not necessarily have to 
be exclusively used by the consumer.136 This point appears to raise no material issues, even 
though each case may have to be judged on its own circumstances.137  
 
The requirement that goods must be for private use is recognised in a number of statutory 
provisions. For example, the Unfair Contract Terms Act
The UK 
138 mentions goods supplied for private 
use or consumption. In relation to goods the UK Consumer Protection Act139 also refers to a 
consumer who might wish to be supplied with goods for his own private use or consumption. 
 
In the South African context the position of the law on the requirement is not clear because the 
CPA of 2008 does not make reference whatsoever to goods obtained for private use.
South Africa 
140 The CPA 
of 2008 includes juristic persons as consumers.141 This means that a company consumer is 
entitled to acquire goods for business purposes since private consumption is ordinarily 
inconsistent with corporate entities.142
                                                          
132 At 78. 
133 Sharrock (note 121 above) 302. 
134 Oughton (note 4 above) 5-6. 
135 S. 12 (1) (c) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; and S. 10 (7) and S. 20 (6) of the UK CPA 1987. 
136 Oughton (note 4 above) 6. 
137 Ibid. 
138 S. 12 (1) (c) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
139 S. 20 (6) (a) of the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987. 
140 Sharrock (note 121 above) 300. 
141 S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. 




In as far as case law is concerned it is doubtful whether the case of Standard Credit Corporation 
Ltd v Strydom and O thers 1991 (3) SA 644 (W), can be relied upon. In this case the court held 
that a person who receives credit ‘ceases to be a consumer where he does not intend to use the 
goods himself’.143 However, the modern application of this case is uncertain for two reasons. 
First, the case involved the interpretation of the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 which was a 
consumer credit statute.144
‘Private law’ is defined as the body of law dealing with the relations of private persons and their 
property.
 Secondly, the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 was repealed in 
2005 by the South African National Credit Act 34 of 2005.  
 
This section has dealt with the definitions of the term ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer protection’; it is 
now opportune to investigate the common law protections afforded consumers. 
 
3. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE LAW IN CONSUMER PROTECTION 
145 It is important to properly locate the position of private law, and ultimately, 
consumer protection law within the hierarchy of laws. The law has two main divisions.146 It is 
composed of the international law and national law.147 This chapter is not concerned with 
international law but with national law. In most legal systems, the legal framework basically 
consists of a national law which is divided into private law and public law.148 The present study 
is concerned with private law. Under the private law there are three further divisions: the law of 
persons, mercantile and industrial law, and the law of things.149 The focus of the present study is 
on the law of things which is constituted by the law of property, the law of obligations and the 
law of succession.150 Consumer protection is found under the law of obligations comprising the 
law of contract and the law of delict.151
                                                          
143 At 652. 
144 S. 2 (1) (a) of the repealed Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. 
145 Garner (note 33 above) 1234. 
146 Hahlo & Kahn (note 1 above) 111. 
147 KD Chetty ‘Sources of Law’ in MA Fouché Legal P rinciples of  C ontracts and N egotiable I nstruments 3ed 
(1995) 13. 
148 Ibid 14. 
149 Ibid. See also Hahlo & Kahn (note 1 above) 120. 
150 Hahlo & Kahn (note 1 above) 120, 130. 





In enforcing their rights, consumers often rely on the remedies available in the law of delict and 
contract because there is no branch of consumer law in the hierarchy of private law.152 The law 
of delict is particularly relevant to the consumer because it provides remedies under the aquilian 
action for harm caused by defective products under negligence.153 In order to successfully claim 
damages under negligence a consumer must establish that the harm was caused by the negligent 
manufacture of the goods consumed.154 Under the law of contract on the other hand a consumer 
will be entitled to contractual relief upon establishing that a supplier breached a contractual term 
or failed to fulfill his contractual obligations.155
While the development of the private law as a conduit for consumer protection has received 
statutory recognition in some countries, this branch of the law has been criticised as being 




156 Many legal writers including note that, contrary to popular belief, 
‘private law is an inadequate tool for consumer protection’.157 Unlike legislation, which is self-
implementing, private law requires consumers to assert their rights so as to ensure that they are 
protected against exploitation.158 Van Eeden159
Visser
 holds the same view but maintains that private 
law remains ‘an indispensable part of the legal framework in the consumer market’. In other 
words, he appreciates the blend between legislation and private law as more progressive than the 
total obliteration of private law in consumer protection. The following section will investigate 
this critique. 
 
4. CONSUMERS AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
160
                                                          
152 Ibid 31. See also Cranston (note 7 above) 67. 
153 Van Eeden (note 3 above) 31. 
154 Ibid 31-32. 
155 Howells and Weatherill (note 19 above) 7. 
156 Cranston (note 7 above) 67. 
157 Ibid 413. 
158 Cranston (note 7 above) 79.  
159 Van Eeden (note 3 above) 57. 
160 C Visser et al South African Mercantile and Company Law 8 ed (2003) 9. 




‘A contract is a lawful agreement, made by two or more persons within the limits of their 
contractual capacity, with the serious intention of creating a legal obligation, communicating 
such intention, without vagueness, each to the other and being of the same mind as to the 
subject-matter, to perform positive or negative acts which are possible of performance.’ 
 
The above definition reveals that the foundations of a contract are based on agreement between 
parties who bargain on an equal footing.161 Initially, when the law of contract developed the 
focus of control was upon procedural propriety as opposed to the substantive fairness of the 
contract.162 Throughout history, the law of contract afforded protection to consumers who were 
party to the consumer transaction of those goods or services.163 The same position obtains even 
today except in circumstances where legislation has intervened. The law of contract developed 
along with the notion of freedom of contract.164
‘Faced with this abuse of power- by the strong against the weak…- the judges did what they 
could do to put a curb on it. They still had before them the idol, ‘freedom of contract’. They still 
knelt down and worshipped it, but they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They used 
it to stab the idol in the back. This weapon was called ‘the true construction of the contract’. 
They used it with great skill and ingenuity.’
 This doctrine and how it applies will be 
considered below. 
 
4.1. Freedom of contract  
In the case of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) L td v F inney L ock Se eds Ltd [1983] 2 Q.B 284, 
Lord Denning M.R stated as follows: 
 
165
                                                          
161 Cranston (note 7 above) 67. 
162 PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 404. See also Howells & Weatherill (note 19 above) 
13; Cartwright (note 10 above) 11; S Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (2005) 10. 
163 Smith (note 162 above) 335. 
164 Ibid 10. 
165 At 297. 
 
 
The above words reveal the challenges that courts have had to face in the past concerning the 




Deeply embedded in the law of contract is the old established notion of ‘freedom of contract,’ 
which underpins the fundamental common law right of parties to freely enter into contracts.166 
Freedom of contract recognises the right of people to freely choose with whom they wish to 
contract and on what terms; once parties have entered into a contract, the courts are not 
empowered to consider whether the contract is fair.167
Construed in its historical sense, the doctrine recognised individual autonomy in the affairs of 
merchants and was considered as the most appropriate approach in shaping future principles of 
the law of contract.
 In order to properly understand this 
concept it is necessary to briefly set out the manner in which it developed in the UK.  
 
168 Professor Friedmann169 confirms that the doctrine simply means that 
parties enter into a contract out of their own free will without the influence of external forces. 
The origins of freedom of contract can be traced back to 16th and 17th century commentators and 
legal writers including Grotius, Locke, Hobbes and Mill.170 These pioneers of contractual 
freedom all agree that the right of an individual to contract with another was initially recognised 
as a basic human right that could not be trammeled upon by any person, including the state.171 In 
pursuit of this basic right a person had the choice to regulate his affairs with another person.172 
The right of a person to regulate his own affairs also meant that any contractual relationships 
entered into would be based on consent.173 A corollary of the freedom to regulate one’s affairs 
was minimum state interference.174 Restraining contractual freedom through legislation was 
therefore not acceptable. It was immaterial whether that person stood in a weaker bargaining 
position as long as the agreement entered into was respected.175
                                                          
166 Smith (note 162 above) 9. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 7-8; Printing and N umerical Registering Co. v  
Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462; Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 at 576. 
167 P Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 13-14. 
168 Ibid 1. See also Howells and Weatherill (note 19 above) 19; L Hawthorne ‘The Principle of Equality in the Law 
of Contract’ 1995 (58) THRHR 157, 166. 
169  W Friedmann Law in a Changing Society 1ed (1959) 93, cited by AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 
6 ed (2002) 8. 
170 Aronstam (note 167 above) 1-5. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid 4. 
173 Ibid 3. 
174 Smith (note 162 above) 9. 
175 Aronstam (note 167 above) 3. 
 The only exception to the 
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doctrine was that in the exercise of this freedom, the actions of one party were not to be allowed 
to cause harm to the other party in the contractual relationship.176
As time went by, the 18
  
 
th and 19th century saw the introduction of industrial technology and mass 
production techniques which required legislation to control the manner in which manufactured 
goods circulated in industry.177 However, legislative regulation of business dealings between 
consumers and merchants was opposed.178 The basis for opposing legislative regulation was 
based on the argument that consumers and merchants were able to regulate their own affairs in 
trade and that the industries would equally flourish without regulation.179 The courts also played 
a significant role in galvanizing freedom of contract during this period.180 Among the first 
judicial decisions to recognise freedom of contract in the late 19th
‘If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their contracts 
entered into fairly and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by the courts of 
justice.’
 century was the very old and 
famous high watermark English decision of Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson 
(1875) LR 19 Eq. 462. In this case, Sir George Jessel M.R made the following trenchant remarks 
which resonate to this day: 
 
 181




182 Despite its classical impact, the doctrine over time failed to catch up consumer 
developments and began to decline as a result of the industrial revolution.183 This period saw the 
introduction of mass production in industries, the establishment of railway companies and public 
utilities which consumers had little choice but to use.184
                                                          
176 Ibid 4. 
177 Atiyah (note 162 above) 224. 
178 Smith (note 162 above) 9. See also Aronstam (note 167 above) 5. 
179 Aronstam (note 167 above) 5. 
180 Atiyah (note 162 above) 387. 
181 At 465. 
182 Atiyah (note 162 above) 387. 
183 Ibid 572-581. See also Smith (note 162 above) 11. 
184 Smith (note 162 above) 12. 
 Standard form contracts were also 
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introduced to regulate the commercial activity of these entities.185 The use of standard form 
contracts became common and consumers were supplied with goods and services subject to 
terms that had not been negotiated.186 As a result consumers had little choice but to accept 
whatever terms were contained in the standard form contracts because the necessity of obtaining 
goods ‘was an incidence of living in society’.187
Turning to the development of freedom of contract in the South African context, it can be said 
that the doctrine was judicially recognised when Innes CJ stated in the case of Burger v Central 
South African Railways 1903 TS 571 that reasonableness was not sufficient in releasing a party 
from a contract he had freely and voluntarily concluded.
 The result was that it could not be said there was 
‘freedom’ of contract. 
 
188
‘[T]he spirit of modern jurisprudence is in favour of the liberty of contract, and there is practical 
wisdom in the observations of De Villiers CJ, in Henderson v Hanekom (1903) 20 SC 513 at 
519: “All modern commercial dealings proceed upon the assumption that binding contracts will 
be enforced by law.”’
 Another significant court decision to 
make pronouncements on contractual freedom is the case Osry v  H irsch, L oubser & C o. L td 
1922 CPD 531, where Kotze JP made the following remarks: 
 
189
‘[I]f people must sign such conditions they must, in the absence of fraud, be held to them. 
Public policy so demands.’
 
 
In addition, in the case of Wells v  Sout h A frican A lumenite C ompany 1927 AD 69, Innes CJ 
stated that the harshness of a clause was not a ground for invalidating a contract, as follows: 
 
190
Freedom of contract suffered a temporary setback in the 1939 Appellate Division decision of 
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537. In this case the court dispensed with freedom of contract and 
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coined the proposition that in some instances the courts must disseminate ‘simple justice 
between man and man’ as required by public policy.191 The critical reaction of legal scholars 
against the Jajbhay v Cassim192 judgment is captured by Barnard193
Nevertheless, from the judgment of Jajbhay v  Cassim
 as follows: 
 
‘This decision was however heavily criticised by the doyennes of contract at the time, De Wet 
and Van Wyk, who took it upon themselves to appeal for the restoration of freedom of contract 
to its unqualified position as the central value and primary determinant of public policy in the 
law of contract: “This decision of the Appellate division throws this matter into a boundless 
morass of uncertainty, and that on the grounds of unconvincing considerations[…]It is in any 
event undesirable to make the issue of whether one can reclaim or not dependent on such an 
uncertain test such as simple justice between man and man and the conviction of the court 
whether the eon or the other should be relieved.” This privileging of freedom of contract echoes 
in the court rooms of this country like a hollow warning to those who dare to claim that their 
contract might be unfair.’ 
 
194 onwards, freedom of contract has 
emerged triumphant.195 Considering the opinions of the legal scholars above in tandem with the 
judicial decisions already examined reveals that there are four different approaches to freedom of 
contract.196 First, in entering the contract, there must be freedom of interference from the state or 
its officials; secondly, a party must be free to choose the party with which he contracts; thirdly, 
there must be freedom not to contract; and finally, a contract that has been concluded must not be 
interfered with.197 Freedom of contract therefore forms the basis of refusal by the courts to come 
to the rescue of consumers who enter into contracts and later claim that the agreement runs 
counter to his interests.198
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It is important to consider whether limitations to contractual freedom exist and the extent of their 
application by the courts. The following section deals with this. 
 
4.2. Limitations to freedom of contract  
It cannot be denied that the strict application of contractual freedom sometimes leads to unfair 
results for consumers because strict adherence to the doctrine may lead to the enforcement of 
unfair terms by the courts.199 As a response the courts have attempted to graft common law 
concepts such as equality, public policy and good faith to control contractual freedom.200 These 
values were, however, criticised as ‘abstract notions’ which could not be relied on as 
independent substantive legal rules to curb the enforcement of contracts.201
The concept of public policy has been applied by the courts as a control measure and serves an 
important role in curbing the indiscriminate application of contractual freedom in the sphere of 
contract law.
 A brief analysis of 
how public policy has been used to control freedom of contract in decided cases is presented 
below. 
 
4.2.1. Public Policy 
202 South African courts have on previous occasions held that contractual terms that 
offend public policy will be struck down as invalid.203
‘Now it is a general principle that a man contracting without duress, without fraud, and 
understanding what he does, may freely waive any of his rights. There are certain exceptions to 
that rule, and certainly the law will not recognise any arrangement which is contrary to public 
policy. That is a principle of the Roman-Dutch law as well as of the English law…’
 For example, in the case of Morrison v 
Angelo Deep Gold Mines 1905 T.S. 775, Innes CJ stated as follows: 
 
204
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Circumstances under which courts exercise this power vary and, as a general rule, public policy 
requires courts not to enforce terms that shield a party from liability for injury or harm resulting 
from willful or fraudulent conduct.205
The leading case of Sasfin ( Pty) L td v B eukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) brilliantly illuminates the 
court’s non-recognition of unfair terms in standard form contracts on grounds of public policy. 
This decision dealt with, inter alia, the validity of specific terms in a deed of cession between the 




agreement made the respondent perpetually indebted to the appellant because he had placed his 
professional earnings as security whether or not he was indebted.207 In its attempt to enforce the 
contents of the deed of cession, the appellant applied to court for an order interdicting and 
restraining the respondent from collecting fees from its patients and debts ceded by him to the 
appellant.208 The court a quo  dismissed the application on grounds that the deed of cession 
violated public policy because it left the respondent in a state of perpetual debt.209 On appeal, the 
court had to consider whether the offensive terms in the deed of cession were contrary to public 
policy; and secondly, if it was found that such terms existed, whether they were severable from 
the deed.210 In dismissing the appeal, Smalberger JA confirmed the decision of the court a quo 
and held that courts had the power not to recognize contracts offending public policy.211
‘No court should therefore shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to public policy 
when the occasion so demands. The power to declare contrary to public policy should however 
be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of 
contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of power. One must be careful not to 
 When 
handing down the decision, Smallberger JA sounded a luminary warning that the power to 
invalidate contracts on grounds of public policy was subject to limits, thus: 
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conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms (or some of them) 
offend one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness.’212




213 who suggested that ‘the requirements of public policy are elusive, and the courts 
power must be exercised with care’. Indeed, the warnings were necessary because public policy 
was thereafter abused by litigants as ‘the favourite defence of last resort’214 leading to judicial 
comment that the notion had become so popular such that it was ‘regarded as a free pardon for 
recalcitrant and otherwise defenceless debtors’.215 It eventually became settled law before the 
South African constitutional dispensation came into existence that a contractual provision could 
only be declared contrary to public policy if it was so unreasonable that harm to the public was 
substantially incontestable.216
The post-constitutional era in South Africa introduced a number of legal developments. One of 
the most important changes in the law of contract was that public policy was considered as 




217 Amongst these decisions is the case of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 
323 (CC), which reveals the tensions that simmer when intrusions are contemplated against 
freedom of contract on grounds of public policy. In this case a divided Constitutional Court had 
to determine whether a time-bar clause was enforceable in light of public policy 
considerations.218 The applicant damaged his vehicle beyond repair in an accident and lodged an 
insurance claim with the respondent insurance broking company in terms of his insurance 
policy.219 The claim was rejected by the respondent.220
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the respondent after a period of two years from the date when the insurance claim was made.221 
The respondent alleged that the proceedings were time-barred in terms of a time-limitation 
clause in the insurance policy concluded by the parties.222 The long and chequered history of the 
matter culminated in the court having to grapple with the vexed interface between freedom of 
contract and public policy under the Constitution.223
The Constitutional Court stated that the Constitution is the yardstick for determining public 
policy and any contract term ‘inimical to the values enshrined in the Constitution is contrary to 
public policy and is, therefore, unenforceable’.
 
 
224 The Constitution ‘strikes down the 
unacceptable excesses of freedom of contract’.225 The court went on to state that public policy 
requires contracting parties to ‘comply with contractual obligations freely and voluntarily 
undertaken’.226 Ngcobo J also mentioned that inequality in bargaining between contracting 
parties was a crucial and relevant factor in determining whether a contract term is contrary to 
public policy.227 The Judge found that the time limitation clause did not offend the Constitution 
and was not contrary to public policy because the contract was freely and voluntarily concluded 
between persons with equal bargaining power.228
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The majority judgment sparked what will most probably become one of the most celebrated 
dissenting judgments in modern contract law, delivered by Sachs J. The eminent judge, in a 
carefully scripted and eloquently presented judgment, set out to explain the role of standard form 
contracts and their inter-relation with public policy considerations in South Africa’s 
constitutional dispensation. Moseneke DCJ, a precursor to the dissenting judgment of Sachs J, 
could not conceal his admiration of the reasoning in the dissension and buttressed his opinion 




‘The appropriate test as to whether a contractual term is at odds with public policy has little or 
nothing to do with whether the party seeking to avoid the consequences of the time bar clause 
was well-resourced or in a position to do so.  The question to be asked is whether the stipulation 
clashes with public norms and whether the contractual term is so unreasonable as to offend 
public policy.  In the context of this case, the question to be posed is whether the provision itself 
unreasonably or unjustifiably limits the right to seek judicial redress.  Ordinarily, the answer 
should not rest with the peculiar situation of the contracting parties, but with an objective 
assessment of the terms of their bargain.’229
The above criterion underpinned the dissenting judgment, per Sachs J, who opined that the 




230 In his view the primary question was whether public policy, as informed by the 
constitution, could compel courts to refuse to give legal effect to imposed, onerous, and one-
sided terms in standard form contracts in a constitutional era.231 In answering this question, he 
first analysed the time limitation clause in the contractual context.232 The judge traced the 
consumer protection trail across the globe, from Hong Kong233 in Asia to Brazil in South 
America,234 traversing the European235 consumer landscape in the process. He finally considered 
the opinions of academic commentators and consumer developments in South Africa before 
criticizing the majority decision.236
‘What is needed is a principled approach, using objective criteria, consistent both with deep 
principles of contract law and with sensitivity to the way in which economic power in public 
affairs should appropriately be regulated to ensure standards of fairness in an open and 
democratic society.  More specifically it calls for examination of the “tendency” of the 
provision at issue and the extent to which, in the context of the contract as a whole, it vitiates 
standards of reasonable and fair dealing that the legal convictions of the community would 
 He underscored his approach as follows: 
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regard as intrinsic to appropriate business firm/consumer relationships in contemporary 
society.’237
The above excerpt laid the foundation for addressing the question whether public policy in a 
constitutional dispensation permitted an insurer to rely on a non-negotiated hidden clause written 
in small print in a standard form contract.
 
 
238 The question whether public policy could limit 
freedom of contract was eventually answered in the affirmative.239 The views of Sachs J on 
contractual freedom support the holding in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes240 with the qualification that 
public policy has become a constitutional value. Despite the cautious importation of public 
policy the authorities appear to be ad idem that courts do not have carte blanche discretion to 
invalidate contract terms on grounds of public policy because the doctrine requires finer 
tuning.241 Thus, there remains little doubt that public policy has become firmly established as a 
mechanism of judicial control over freedom of contract.242
The main assault on freedom of contract in consumer law emanates from the unfair bargaining 
position individual consumers often find themselves in when concluding contracts with 
suppliers. More often than not, contracts entered into contain unfair terms against consumers 
usually in the form of exemption clauses.
 
 
4.3. Criticisms against freedom of contract  
243 The general willingness of consumers to accept 
unfair contract terms is usually motivated by the need to acquire products or services offered by 
a business.244 However, due to the rigidity of the doctrine a consumer is prevented from going 
against an unfair agreement.245 At the end of the day the consumer suffers because a bargain 
entered into will be enforced by courts.246
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becomes the prime source of many social inequalities.247 Many countries introduced remedial 
statutes as means of intervention and corrected the unjust state of affairs, thereby presenting a 
significant adaptation to the common law of contract.248 Hahlo249
Jansen JA in the case of Bank of Lisbon and Sou th Africa v Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 
580 (A), also criticised freedom of contract by stating that it was not an absolute value that could 
not be dispensed with,
 critisises freedom of contract 
as follows: 
 
‘Provided a man is not a minor or a lunatic and his consent is not initiated by fraud, mistake or 
duress, his contractual undertakings will be enforced by the letter. If, through inexperience, 
carelessness or weakness of character, he has allowed himself to be overreached it is just too 
bad for him, and it can only be hoped he will learn from his experience. The courts will not 
release him from the contract or make a better bargain for him. Darwinian survival of the fittest, 
the law of nature, is also the law of market-place.’ 
 
250 while Smallberger JA in the case of Sasfin v  Beukes251 held that any 
agreements inimical to the interests of the community ought not to be recognised by the courts 
despite the overpowering effect of contractual freedom. There have been developments in many 
countries including the UK and South Africa where legislation has been introduced to curtail 
freedom of contract.252 Likewise, realizing the need to protect consumers against unfair 
contracts, the South African CPA of 2008 provisions require contracts to have fair contractual 
terms.253 Freedom of contract in modern contract law is no longer applied by the courts in its 
classical sense.254  In limiting the doctrine, the current approach is for the courts not only to 
consider the procedural aspects but also the substance of a contract in deciding whether or not a 
contract is valid.255
 
 In as much as freedom of contract limits in the ability of the law of contract 
to protect consumers, legislation has narrowed the gap. 
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4.4. Standard form contracts 
Having discussed the criticisms directed at freedom of contract it is necessary to consider 
standard form contracts where the doctrine features most prominently. The origins of standard 
form contracts reach as far back as 15th century Europe where standard insurance policies were 
regulated by these forms.256 Standard form contracts had already become complex documents 
when they were later introduced them in 17th century England by Lord Mansfield.257 When 
industrialization permeated the consumer landscape in the 19th century these forms were 
extensively used.258 However, the term ‘standard form contract’ has been difficult to define.259 
Standard form contracts have been defined as those contracts drafted in advance and presented to 
consumers by suppliers on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.260 This means that the conditions in the 
contracts are prepared in advance and are open to acceptance in that form without negotiation.261 
These contracts are sometimes referred to as ‘mass contracts’ or ‘contracts of adhesion’, in terms 
of which there is no room for negotiation because the supplier in the contract imposes the terms 
on the consumer.262 Sales,263 asserts that ‘neither the expression “standard form contract” nor 
any variant of it has acquired the status of a term of art or, indeed, any recognised and distinctive 
meaning….’ This is confirmed by Bright,264 who states that ‘[e]veryone has his own dictionary 
on the subject’ of standard form contracts. The difficulty in defining the phrase, according to 
Aronstam,265 arises from the widespread use of standard form contracts in different types of 
agreements and situations. This makes it is near impossible to attach meaning to a contract 
without a specific definition in context, content or terminology.266
The different justifications advanced in favour of the use of standard-form contracts have 
exacerbated the unrelenting and recurrent practice of including unreasonable and unfair contract 
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terms in agreements.267 In the services sector, standard form contracts are most often 
monopolized by banks,268 insurance companies,269 financing houses,270 by businesses selling 
goods on hire purchase and public utilities entities that often have no competition in the 
provision of services.271 For example, public sector entities that provide essential services like 
water and electricity often do not have competitors in the provision of those services.272 Applied 
in this sense, consumers have no freedom to negotiate the terms that will govern the contractual 
relationship because the terms have already been pre-determined in the standard form.273 This 
effectively leaves room for exploitation through the inclusion of oppressive terms in the 
contract.274
While it sometimes happens that standard contracts are imposed by law the main reason for the 
use of standard form contracts is said to be convenience, particularly to dispense with the 




‘Preoccupation with the evils of standardised contracts from the point of view of the offeree 
must not allow their admitted virtues to be over looked. By saving time and trouble in 
bargaining, simplifying internal administration and facilitating planning, they reduce 
administrative costs to an extent which must benefit both parties. They have, it is said, a lulling 
effect induced by the knowledge that one is signing “what everyone else has signed”. They also 
reduce risk to a calculable quantity and, perhaps most important of all, have the potential, if 
drawn up in an enlightened manner, of becoming a wide code, governing intra- or extra-trade 
relations of a business group”.’
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Hopkins278 aligns himself with the above view and asserts that standard form contracts provide 
advantages for both contracting parties, especially mitigating costs, thereby making economic 
sense in the process.279
There is some truth in the opinions that have been expressed; however, it cannot be denied that 
standard form contracts often contain terms that consumers are unable to negotiate with suppliers 
and this results in unsympathetic consequences for consumers.
  
 
280 Christie,281 for instance, 
acknowledges the noble beginnings of standard form contracts but goes on to say that what 
started off as a ‘legitimate aid to planning and costing became an expensive trap for the unwary 
consumer’ through the imposition of unfair terms which oust the consumer’s common law 
remedies. The observation was made by  Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier282 that standard form 
contracts ‘contain a common stock of contract terms that tend to be weighted heavily in favour of 
the supplier and operate to limit or exclude the consumer’s normal contractual rights and the 
supplier’s contractual obligations and liabilities’.283
From a business perspective, standard form contracts benefit the lawyers and experts who author 
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 expressed this view in the 
following way: 
 
‘The weaker party, in need of goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around 
for better terms, either because the author of the standard contracts has a monopoly (natural or 
artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a 
subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose 




Suppliers form small groups and organize themselves in order to monopolize trade.286 The 
engine of trade often used is the standard form contract which introduces standard conditions that 
apply uniformly across a trading group.287
‘All commercial men with capital are acquainted with the ordinary expedient of sowing one 
year a crop of apparently unfruitful prices, in order by driving competition away to reap a fuller 
harvest of profit in the future.’
 This practice was expressed by Bowen LJ in Mogul 
Steamship Co. Limited v McGregor, Gow & Co & others (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 598, as follows: 
 
288
Perhaps it must be considered how standard form contracts, coupled with their non-negotiable 
import, impose unfair contract terms on consumers. Such concerns are raised especially because 
standard form contracts systematically oust the negotiation of terms and inevitably compromise 




‘In the ordinary way, the customer has no time to read [the standard terms], and, if he did read 
them, he would probably not understand them. If he did understand and object to any of them, 
he would generally be told he could take or leave it. And if he went to another supplier the 
result would be the same. Freedom of contract must surely imply some choice or room for 
bargaining.’
 Lord Reid, commenting on the lack of freedom of 
contract in standard form agreements, pointed out the following in the English case of Suisse 




It must be noted that standard contracts are inherently arbitrary and have the potential of 
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Bank v Sparta Construction Co. 1975 (1) SA 839 (W) where he made the following trenchant 
remarks: 
 
‘It is undesirable that this form of [contracting]…should be developed without adequate 
safeguards in law to protect those members of the public who are in need of this type of finance. 
They should not find themselves in a position where they have to rely on the honesty and sense 
of fair dealing of the financier. One can point to a number of undesirable features of these 
printed agreements. If a [person] could read and understand them, he might very well not find 
the agreement, as a whole, acceptable to him. The time has arrived when a proper investigation 
into this form of [contracting] should be made and, if found desirable and feasible, legal 
provisions which a re fair to both parties should then be enacted to regulate their peculiar 
relationship.’292
The above excerpt reveals that, in the absence of reading and understanding the contents of 




293 Furthermore, bargaining on terms which the consumer is unaware and specifically has 
no information about negates free-will on his part.294 Jansen JA in Bank of  L isbon and Sou th 
Africa v  Ornelas and A nother295 observed that freedom of contract had come under attack for 
various reasons, one of them being the large-scale use of standard form contracts. It is somewhat 
startling and remarkable that the courts have had considerable difficulty in intervening on behalf 
of consumers in order to dispel the tensions created by freedom of contract through standard 
form contracts.296 Sachs J. in Barkhuizen v Napier297
‘Prolix standard-form contracts undermine rather than support the integrity of what was actually 
concluded between the parties. It may be said that far from promoting autonomy, they induce 
automatism.’
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And further that: 
 
‘In my view, to treat mass-produced script as sanctified legal Scripture is to perpetuate 
something hollow and to dishonor the moral and philosophical foundation of contract law.’299
‘The person who is unable to pay cash for a valuable article such as a motor-car, often finds his 
freedom of contract very limited, because so many trading firms have adopted standard forms of 
contract which the purchaser has to sign or remain without the article. Theoretically the 
prospective purchaser is free to offer terms and reject counter-offers, but in practice he usually 
has to sign the seller’s printed form of contract in order to obtain the desired article. Such 




In the case of Linstom v Venter 1957 (1) SA 125 (SWA), Claassen JP disapproved standard form 
contracts containing unfair contract terms, stating:  
 
300




unfortunate situation is that consumers often have no option but to accept the standard form 
contract with its attendant unfair provisions.302
In order to arrest the problems accompanying standard form contracts legislative regulation was 
considered the ideal solution.
  
 
303 In the UK contract terms in standard form contracts are 
controlled by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999, while the CPA of 2008 governs same in South Africa.304 Besides statutory 
regulation judicial control has also played an important role.305
                                                          
299 Ibid. 
300 At 127. 
301 Howells & Weatherill (note 19 above) 17-18. See also Smith (note 162 above) 12; Aronstam (note 167 above) 
16. 
302 Linstom v Venter 1957 (1) SA 125 (SWA). 
303 T Naude & G Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses- A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’ Vol. 122 
(2005) SALJ 441. 
304 Sharrock (note 121 above) 297-298. 
305 Turpin (note 213 above) 146. See also Howells & Weatherill (note 19 above) 20-25, 306-310; Lowe & 
Woodroffe (note 4 above) 97-104. 
 In a jurisdiction such as 
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Swaziland, where there is no legislation controlling contract terms in general, it is more plausible 
for courts to protect bargains that have not been subject to negotiation between parties.306
Caveat subscriptor is a maxim that loosely translates, ‘let the signer beware’, and is a common 
law principle stating that a party will be bound by the terms of a contract he signs.
 
 
4.5. Caveat subscriptor 
307 This maxim 
is disadvantageous because a consumer who signs an agreement cannot later contend that he did 
not read the document if the terms turn out to be unfair.308 Courts will not release a ‘foolish 
improvident contractant who has willingly but unwisely signed a contract’.309 This principle 
finds expression in the leading case of Burger v  Central South A frican R ailways310
‘[O]ur law does not recognise the right of a court to release a contracting party from the 
consequences of an agreement duly entered into by him merely because that agreement appears 
to be unreasonable.’
 where the 
court was of the view that it could not protect a party from a contract he had willingly entered 




 ‘It is a sound principle of our law that a man, when he signs a contract, is taken to be bound by 
the ordinary meaning and effect of the words which appear over his signature. There are, of 
course, grounds upon which he may repudiate a document to which he has put his hand.’
 
 
He further stated that: 
 
312
The above decision became authority for many subsequent judgments. The most notable is that 
of George v Fairmaid (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) where the court held that, when people sign 
 
 
                                                          
306 Ibid. 
307 Turpin (note 213 above) 150. See also Aronstam (note 167 above) 11; Christie (note 281 above) 174-175. 
308 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 518 (C) at 524. See also M Havenga et 
al General Principles of Commercial Law 7 ed (2011) 111; MA Fouche ‘Consensus (continued) Factors Influencing 
Consensus’ in Fouché (note 147 above) 64.  
309 Aronstam (note 167 above) 11. 
310 Burger v Central South African Railways (note 166 above). 
311 Ibid at 576. 
312 Ibid at 578. 
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documents, their intention is simply to indicate that they agree with the words that appear above 
their signatures in the document in question.313 In this case the appellant lost his clothing and 
personal effects while lodging as a guest at a hotel.314 The appellant had signed a register without 
acquainting himself with a clause indemnifying the hotel from claims arising from, but not 
limited to, theft.315 Despite his pleading mistake, the court held that this was not a reasonable 
plea.316
‘When a man is asked to put his signature to a document he cannot fail to realise that he is 
called upon to signify, by doing so, his assent to whatever words appear above his signature.’
 In refusing to set aside the contract that had apparently not been read by the plaintiff, 
Fagan CJ held as follows: 
 
317
‘So now he knew that he was signing a document which contained terms of his contract. Just 
below the items he had filled in, but above the space for his signature, he saw what he himself 
described as “a long passage”. The merest glance at it would have shown him that it 
commenced with the words “I hereby agree”. But “he did not bother to read it”. Yet he signed… 
[H]e knew that he was assenting to something, and indeed to something in addition to the terms 
he had himself filled in. If he chose not to read what that additional something was, he was, 
with his open eyes, taking the risk of being bound by it. He cannot then be heard to say that his 
ignorance of what was in it was a justus error.’
 
 
And further that: 
 
318
In dismissing the appeal, the court came to the conclusion that the liability of the respondent had 
been excluded by the contract. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this doctrine. Courts have 
held that where one party misleads another to enter into and sign a contract, they would intervene 




                                                          
313 At 472. 
314 At 468. 
315 Ibid. 
316 At 471. 
317 At 472. 
318 At 472-473. 
319 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands (note 308 above) at 524. 
 This is an 
exception to and constitutes one of the grounds under which the doctrine of caveat subscriptor 
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will fail. In the case of Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 
518 (C) the court effectively refused to allow a motor repair company to rely on an exemption 
clause contained in a job-card.320 The customer had signed the job-card after being told that her 
signature was needed before repair-work could commence on her motor vehicle.321 In other 
words, the customer appended her signature while labouring under the impression that she was 
authorizing the repair work on her vehicle.322 She was not informed of the exemption clause 
written in small print at the bottom of the card which absolved the garage from liability for loss 
of any nature, including loss arising from the company employees’ negligence.323 After loss 
eventuated, the customer sought the court’s intervention. The court came to the conclusion that 
the customer was under the impression that she was signing a document for the limited purpose 
explained to her, namely- repair-work on her vehicle.324 Further, the court found that there was 
no reasonable basis on which the company’s employees could be entitled to accept that the 
customer had read the job-card and was aware of the existence of the exemption clause.325
The caveat subscriptor principle could not assist the second defendant in the case of Fourie N.O 
v Hansen and Another 2001 (2) SA 823 (W), where several co-workers attended a sporting event 
using a microbus hired by their employer.
 As a 
result the caveat subscriptor principle did not apply and the garage was held liable. 
 
326 The vehicle had been delivered to the home of first 
defendant who signed a rental agreement while labouring under the impression that he was 
signing a document for accepting delivery of the vehicle.327 The agreement contained an 
exemption clause absolving the second defendant from liability for, among other things, injury 
caused by the vehicle.328 The court held that in order for the doctrine of caveat subscriptor to 
apply, the offensive clause should have been drawn to the plaintiff’s attention.329
                                                          
320 At 527. 
321 At 521-522. 
322 At 526. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. 
325 At 527. 
326 At 827. 
327 At 829. 
328 At 827. 
329 At 834. 
 In the absence 
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of drawing the existence of the clause to the plaintiff’s attention, the caveat subscriptor principle 
was inapplicable.330
Other exceptions that serve as defences to the caveat s ubscriptor principle are duress, fraud, 
misrepresentation, undue influence and illegality of the agreement.
 
 
331 Additionally, justus error 
or mistake also operates as a bar to the caveat subscriptor principle if it can be shown that the 
signer of the document had been misled as to the nature, purport and content of the document 
signed.332 Christie333
It has been demonstrated that the principle of caveat subscriptor generally applies in contractual 
relations between parties save where the recognised exceptions find application. In other words, 
whether or not a contractual provision is unfair is of little concern to the courts.
 bluntly states that if one party sets a trap by tricking another into signing a 
contract hastily without drawing attention to certain provisions, courts will not apply the doctrine 
of caveat subscriptor. 
 
334 In fact, the 
authorities examined above reveal that the courts are generally not concerned with the question 
whether contractual terms are at variance with consumer interests. Instead, they are more willing 
to sacrifice consumer rights in order to uphold the hollowed doctrine of contractual freedom on 
the ground that a contract has been freely and voluntarily concluded.335
Having demonstrated the manner in which standard form contracts support contractual freedom 
it is important to consider caveat emptor, a common law principle under which freedom of 
contract thrives. This principle has its origins in 17
  
 
4.6. Caveat emptor 
th century England where it was pronounced 
upon in the very old case of Chandelor v Lopus (1603) Cro. Jac. 4, 79 E.R. 3.336
                                                          
330 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) at Para 33. 
331 Christie (note 281 above) 177. See also Havenga (note 308 above). 
332 Dlovo v  B rian P orter M otors L td t /a P ort M otors Newlands (note 308 above) at 524. See also George v  
Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 471. 
333 Christie (note 281 above) 178. 
334 Aronstam (note 167 above) 13. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Atiya (note 162 above) 178-179. 
 The maxim of 
68 
 
caveat em ptor simply means that purchasers buy goods at their own risk.337 In terms of this 
principle, consumers are required to carefully examine goods and exercise extreme caution when 
they purchase goods.338 If a buyer ‘is not aware’; he may lose his right of recourse in law against 
products that were badly manufactured.339 The point being made is that the almost sovereign 
slogan and age-old business expression, ‘the customer is always right’, has no place when caveat 
emptor is invoked. Goldring,340
In the case of Kruger v  P izzicanella & another 1966 (1) SA 450 (C), the question whether a 
lease agreement on certain immovable property contained the full and correct terms of an 
agreement had to be decided in the context of the caveat em ptor doctrine.
 commenting on the role of caveat e mptor in consumer 
transactions, states: 
 
‘In consumer transactions unfair practices are widespread. The existing law is still founded on 
the principle known as caveat emptor- meaning ‘let the buyer beware’. That principle may have 
been appropriate for transactions conducted in village markets. Now the marketing of goods and 
services is conducted on an organized basis and by trained business executives. The untrained 
consumer is no match for the businessman who attempts to persuade the consumer to buy goods 
and services on terms and conditions suitable to the vendor. The consumer needs protection by 
law.’ 
 
341 In this case the 
defendant lessee occupied a piece of land that had been recently purchased by the plaintiff. The 
land previously belonged to a certain seller who was a landlord to the defendant.342 The seller 
and defendant had concluded a lease agreement which was subsequently varied orally so that the 
rental paid by the defendant lessee on the premises would be reduced.343 When the plaintiff 
purchased the property from the seller he was not informed about the oral variation of the written 
lease agreement.344
                                                          
337 C Hemphill The Consumer Protection Handbook: A Legal Guide (1981) 3. See also Oughton (note 4 above) 13; 
Garner (note 33 above) 236. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Howells and Weatherill (note 19 above) 14. 
340 J Goldring Consumer Protection Law 5 ed (1997) 2. See also J Goldring ‘Consumer Protection and the Trade 
Practices Act (1974-1975)’ 6 Federal Law Review at 228. 
341 At 454. 
342 At 451. 
343 At 451. 
344 At 452. 
 The plaintiff challenged the amendments but was held bound to them under 
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the doctrine of caveat emptor and it was held that a duty rested upon him to ascertain whether 
existence of any amendments on the document.345 In allowing the amendments to stand the court 
held that the plaintiff ought to have enquired from the seller if any amendments had been made 
to the agreement and any fraudulent misrepresentations would have entitled him to a remedy.346
Fraudulent misrepresentation as a limitation to caveat e mptor was considered in the case of 
Jones v  Mazza & a nother 1973 (1) SA 570 (R). In this case the plaintiff landlord reduced a 
monthly rental of $ 190 after rentals the defendants had fraudulently misrepresented the fact that 
they could not afford it.
 
 
347 The plaintiff reduced the monthly rental to $ 145 for a period of 5 
years believing that defendants would be deprived of their means of livelihood.348 The question 
whether the misrepresentation was material was decided in light of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor. The court referred with approval to the often cited dictum of Kotzé J in the case of 
Corbett v Harris 1914 CPD 535349
‘When a man offers a farm or anything else for sale, it is not every statement made by him, 
which subsequently turns out to be untrue, that will justify either a rescission of the contract or a 
diminution of the purchase price. Simple puffing and mere commendation in describing the 
thing offered for sale are not actionable. In such a case the maxim caveat emptor applies, and 
the purchaser will have to content with his bargain.’
 as follows: 
 
350
Goldin J found the caveat emptor doctrine inapplicable in this case because the defendants had 
not merely puffed but had fraudulently misrepresented facts.
 
 
351 It was held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to the outstanding balance.352
From the above discussion on the role of the law of contract in private law, it is evident that the 
under each principle the courts have attempted to shield consumers from unfair trading practices 
  
 
                                                          
345 At 454-455. 
346 At 455. 
347 At 570. 
348 At 570-571. 
349 At 543. 
350 At 572. 




engaged in by suppliers. The law of contract in general has been substantially developed both in 
the UK and South Africa through legislative regulation.353
The basic function of the law of delict is to place the victim of injury in the state that existed 
prior to the harm eventuating so as to restore the status quo ant e.
 However, the same cannot be said of 
Swaziland. It is necessary to consider below the extent to which the law of delict affects 
consumer relationships. 
 
5. CONSUMERS AND THE LAW OF DELICT 
354
‘A delict is any unlawful culpable act whereby a person (the wrongdoer) causes the other party 
(the person prejudiced) damage or an injury to personality, and whereby the prejudiced person 
is granted a right to damages or compensation, depending on the circumstances.’




The standard of wrongfulness is determined by the legal convictions of the community or the 
boni mores, while culpability requires proof of intention or negligence.
 
 
356 Van Eeden357 defines 
negligence as ‘conduct of carelessness, thoughtlessness or imprudence because by giving 
insufficient attention to his actions the wrongdoer failed to adhere to the standard of care 
required of him’. A consumer who suffers bodily injury or harm as a result from defective 
products from a manufacturer may have a claim under the acquilian action in terms of which he 
must prove that the harm was caused by the wrongful and culpable conduct of the 
manufacturer.358
The definition of the word ‘consumer’ examined earlier in this chapter may have created the 
impression that a consumer relationship is limited only contracting parties. However, this is not 
so. There is another class of consumers which has a non-contractual relationship with suppliers 
  
 
                                                          
353 In the UK there are several statutes regulating contracts including the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, while 
in South Africa contracts are regulated in S. 48- S. 51 of the CPA of 2008. 
354 Cartwright (note 10 above) 15. 
355 Havenga (note 308 above) 36. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Van Eeden (note 3 above) 63. 
358 Ibid. See also Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (2) All SA 
167 (SCA) at Para 17; Christie (note 281 above) 497. 
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commonly referred to as ‘third party consumers’.359
It has been stated above that contracting parties only include those persons bound under a 
contractual agreement.
 Third-party consumers are considered 
below. 
 
5.1. Third parties in consumer contracts  
360 In other words, third parties are usually not party to the contract 
because they are excluded by the doctrine of contractual privity.361 In the strict contractual sense, 
third parties only become parties to a contract either, (a) under a contract for the benefit of a third 
party (stipulato alteri); (b) assignment; (c) cession; or (d) delegation.362 The common law has 
been responsible for a number of important rules which have been adopted as consumer 
protection measures. In delict it has now been established that an agreement between the supplier 
and the ultimate consumer of the goods or services is not an ingredient for liability to arise.363 
The sanctions imposed on a manufacturer arise from a duty of care owed to consumers of 
manufactured products.364 Thus, consumers may claim damages for personal injury or death 
resulting from defective products.365
In the United States of America development commenced in 1916 after the New York Court of 
Appeals held in Macpherson v  B uick M otor C o 217 NY.382 III N E 1050 (1916) that a car 
manufacturer had to compensate an injured third party for injury caused by defective 
manufacture. The plaintiff was a third party since the motor vehicle had been purchased from a 
dealer and not directly from the manufacturer. The court had to decide whether a duty of care by 
the manufacturer extended to third parties.
 The ability of a consumer to proceed against manufacturers 




                                                          
359 Smith (note 162 above) 13. See also Howells and Weatherill (note 19 above) 31-32; Oughton (note 4 above) 7, 
129; Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 5. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 MA Fouché ‘Parties to a Contract’ in Fouché (note 147 above) 116. 
363 Smith (note 162 above) 13. 
364 A Gibb & Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor & Mitchell Timber Supply Co. (Pty) Ltd (note 2 above) at 462. See also Cape 
Town Municipality v Paine 1923 A.D 207 at 216-217; Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C 562 at 580. 
365 Ibid. 
366 JS Ashworth Product Liability Case book (1984) 4. 
 In arriving at his decision, Cardozo J held that the 
consumer had been injured as a result of a defect that arose during manufacture which could 
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have been discovered by the manufacturer on reasonable inspection.367
In the UK, up until 1932, the position of the law was that third parties had no right of claim 
against manufacturers because no contractual relationship between the parties.
 The court concluded that 
the manufacturer was liable to the plaintiff consumer.  
 
368 The right to 
recover damages for personal injury was confined to parties in a contractual relationship.369 The 
Law Lords in the well-known Scottish case of Donoghue v  St evenson [1932] A.C. 562 
recognised third parties in consumer transactions and Lord Atkin laid the rule that a 
manufacturer owes a duty of care to such third parties.370 In this case Mrs. Donoghue, the 
appellant, suffered physical harm as a result of drinking ginger-beer containing the decomposed 
remains of a snail.371 The appellant suffered from shock and severe gastro-enteritis as a result of 
a decomposed snail in ginger beer she had consumed.372 She alleged that the manufacturer had a 
duty to provide an efficient system of inspecting ginger beer bottles before them with ginger-
beer; that he had failed in discharging these duties; and as a result the manufacturer was liable 
for negligence to the appellant.373 Being aware that her claim against the manufacturer was 
barred by privity of contract, the appellant contended that the manufacturer owed a duty of care 
to ensure that the products its products did not harm third party consumers.374 Privity of contract 
also barred the appellant from claiming damages against the café because the drink had been 
purchased by her friend.375
Indeed, the appellant, Mrs. Donoghue, was struggling in a sea of adverse authority because all 
the legal authorities, but one, were against the claim she pursued.
 
 
376 Lord Atkin, realising that an 
injustice loomed large between third party consumers and manufacturers, took it upon himself to 
grapple with the authorities.377
                                                          
367 Ibid. 
368 Smith (note 162 above) 13. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 364 above) at 580. 




375 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 364 above) at 568, 597. 
376 At 584. 
377 At 579. 
 He experienced a bitter struggle and was occasionally tossed 
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upon the rocks by the stormy currents of the unsympathetic case law.378 The learned judge 
however, was intent in coming to the aid of the appellant who was destitute of a remedy.379 In a 
very narrow majority decision, he navigated the hostile case law and arrived safely at his ruling, 
curtailing the doctrine of privity of contract in the process. The court formulated a principle that 
had no previous existence and which set out the criteria for determining when a duty is owed to a 
third party based on foreseeability of harm.380
 ‘The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your 
neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You 
must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would 
be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be 
– persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question.’
 Confirming the existence of the alleged duty of 
manufacturers towards third parties, Lord Atkin formulated the ‘neighbour principle’ as follows: 
 
381
This case was classical in consumer law simply because it laid the foundation for the now 
established proposition that a manufacturer owes consumers a duty of care to third parties in the 




The neighbour principle was later applied in the famous Australian case of Grant v  Australian 
Knitting Mills [1936] A.C. 85. In this case the appellant consumer was a medical practitioner 
who purchased from a retailer defectively manufactured underwear which contained excess 
chemical irritant-free sulphites which resulted in him contracting dermatitis.383 The court held 
that he was entitled to sue the manufacturer as a third party irrespective of the fact that he had 
not purchased the underwear from the manufacturer but from the retailer.384
                                                          
378 Decisions like Longmeid v Holiday (6 Ex. 761.) and Langridge v Levy (4 M.W. 337; 2 M.W. 519) did not assist 
Lord Atkin. 
379 At 583. See also G Cameron Law Basics: Delict (2002) 6. 
380 At 582-583. See also Cameron (note 379 above) 7. 
381 At 580. 
382 Cameron (note 379 above) 7. See also Cartwright (note 10 above) 15.  
383 At 89-90. 





In the South African case of Blore v Standard General Insurance Co. Ltd 1972 (2) SA 89 (O) the 
plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle that had a defective steering mechanism.385 The 
motor vehicle in which the plaintiff was travelling in was involved in a collision and the plaintiff 
got injured in the process.386 It turned out that the vehicle had been negligently serviced by an 
employee in a garage. The plaintiff, as a third non-contracting party, was awarded damages 
against the garage which was held liable to the plaintiff.387 Similar considerations were taken 
into account in the case of Anna E lizabeth J acomina Wagener v  P harmacare L td; C uttings v  
Pharmacare L td [2003] 2 All SA 167 (SCA). In this case the court recognized that the 
manufacturer, while not under a contractual duty to the appellant, was under a legal duty in delict 
to avoid harm to the appellants.388 The appellant suffered personal injury in a hospital as a result 
of a defective anesthetic injection called ‘regibloc’.389
‘This matter concerns the extent to which a manufacturer can be strictly liable in delict for 
unintended harm caused by defective manufacture of a product where there is no contractual 
privity the manufacturer and the injured person.’
 The appellant was a third party towards 
the manufacturer who had contracted with the hospital in the procurement of the anesthetic 
injection. Despite the absence of a contractual relationship between the appellant and the 
respondent, Howie P acknowledged third party consumers as follows: 
 
390
The court then considered whether the manufacturer breached its duty of care towards the 
appellant by supplying the defective injection.
  
 
391 The appellant was not successful because the 
claim had not based on the aquilian action but on common law strict liability which does not 
exist in South African law.392
                                                          
385 At 89. 
386 At 90. 
387 At 99. 
388 At Para 7. 
389 At Paragraphs 1-2. 
390 At Para 1. 
391 At Para 7. 
392 At Para 38. 
 While the ultimate consumer principle requires manufacturers to 
take consumer interests into account during production of goods, it is insufficient in safeguarding 
consumers. It is for this reason that some countries have enacted legislation that imposes strict 




Having discussed the basic concepts that underpin the law of delict it is important to go on and 
identify the inherent weaknesses and consider the criticisms leveled on the law of delict in 
consumer law. 
 
5.2. Criticisms against the law of delict  
The weakness of the law of delict in protecting consumers lies in requiring consumers to prove 
fault either in the form of negligence or intention on the part of the manufacturer.393 The 
contention is that fault is extremely difficult to establish.394 Proving fault is difficult because 
consumers do not have access to information on the manufacturing processes and the general 
workings of manufacturers which would assist them in reinforcing claims.395
While common law rules have had some influence in consumer protection, it is also true that in 




396 It is for that reason that in recent years the position of the non-contractual 
consumer has been recognized, especially through the enactment of legislation in both the UK 
and South Africa. Third parties in the UK find refuge in the Consumer Protection Act of 1987397 
as read with the Product Safety Regulations 1994, while South African third party consumers are 
protected from harm caused by defective goods under the CPA of 2008.398 The task facing the 
injured consumer is not an easy one, especially proving that harm resulted from defective 
manufacturing processes.399 The requirements are not easy to establish. For this reason, some 
statutes have introduced strict liability in terms of which a party need not necessarily prove 
fault.400
                                                          
393 Van Eeden (note 3 above) 65. See also Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 5; A Gibb & Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor & 
Mitchell Timber Supply Co. (Pty) Ltd (note 2 above) 461, 463. 
394 Ibid. See also Anna E lizabeth J acomina W agener v  P harmacare L td; C uttings v  P harmacare L td (note 358 
above) at Para 10. 
395 Cranston (note 7 above) 4-7. 
396 Ibid 67. 
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One of the conclusions to be drawn from this chapter is that the definition attached to the word 
‘consumer’ may be understood in different contexts, with the potential of attracting different 
results. No specific definition is completely correct, neither is there one held to be completely 
wrong. It has been demonstrated that consumers are not limited to contracting parties. A 
consumer includes the ultimate user of goods and services. This chapter has also revealed that 
freedom of contract under the law of contract militates against consumer protection if not 
carefully monitored. 
 
There is no perfect approach to consumer protection to ‘guard against every wile or adjust every 
trifling injustice’.401
                                                          
401 Molony Report (note 5 above) Para 896. 
 The law in modern consumer parlance protects the consumer from many 
different injustices in different ways. The common law concepts discussed in this chapter form 
the basis of the chapters that follow. Each of the chapters to be considered will constantly make 
reference to the concepts discussed in this chapter. In line with this approach, the next chapter 
will discuss consumer protection in Swaziland against the background of the principles examined 





CONSUMER PROTECTION IN SWAZILAND 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced and defined the concepts of ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer 
protection’, and the manner in which they have been interpreted and applied in other 
jurisdictions. The fundamental consumer protection principles under the common law were also 
discussed. Moving from a focus on other jurisdictions, this chapter will examine the situation 
with regard to consumer protection in Swaziland. While there are numerous areas in the 
consumer landscape of Swaziland that require urgent attention, the analysis will restrict itself to 
unfair contract terms and product liability. In addition to a discussion of these two areas the 
chapter will include an analysis of legislation dealing with consumer issues. Legislation to be 
considered includes the Hire-Purchase Act 11 of 1969, Money Lending and Credit Finance Act 3 
of 1991 and the Fair Trading Act, 2001. It will be demonstrated that although not expressly 
protecting consumers, these pieces of legislation are the only statutes that go anyway at all in an 
attempt to safeguard consumer interests. 
 
2. THE CONSUMER FRAMEWORK IN SWAZILAND 
The economic market of Swaziland is mainly constituted by imported goods.1 There are a 
number of challenges posed by goods of foreign origin. One of the challenges is that competition 
between vendors and suppliers in the distribution of imported goods raises product quality 
concerns because such goods are not subject to product-compliance tests.2 The reason is that 
there are currently no laboratories in Swaziland to conduct quality tests on imported products.3 
Instead, South African product quality standards under the South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS)4 and the South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) apply in Swaziland.5
                                                          
1 ‘Swaziland’ available at http://www.sadt.int/files/2013/0277/8289/Swaziland.doc, accessed on 25 September 2012. 
2 ‘Kingdom of Swaziland’- Tralac Trade Law Centre, available at http://www.tralac.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/TPR2009annex_5_swaziland_201003.pdf, accessed on 25 September 2012.  
3 Ibid. see also ‘Swaziland’ (note 1 above). 
4 Established in terms of the South African Standards Act 29 of 1993. 
5 ‘Swaziland’ (note 1 above). See also ‘Kingdom of Swaziland’ (note 2 above).  
 
This raises a serious problem because the SABS standards are regulated by the South African 
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Standards Act 29 of 1993. In other words, the SABS standards as they apply in Swaziland are 
subject to a South African statute.6 This situation is unfortunate because Swaziland is a 
sovereign country that has the capacity to formulate and apply its own statutory law.7 The Fair 
Trading Act of 2001 also offers no assistance as it only prohibits the importation of goods 
bearing false trade descriptions or trade marks.8 The importance of regulating imported goods 
cannot be over-emphasised, especially because Swaziland it is yet to acquire membership of 
international standards bodies like the International Organisation of Standardization (ISO), 
African Standardization Organisation (ARSO), International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), and the International Laboratory Accreditation Forum (IAF).9




10 However, certain contract terms are regulated by statute.11 For 
example, hire purchase agreements are regulated by the Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969, while 
money lending agreements are regulated under the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 
of 1991. As will be seen later in the chapter, courts in Swaziland have demonstrated zeal in 
protecting consumers of credit in most instances.12
                                                          
6 The South African Standards Act 29 of 1993. 
7 S. 1 (1) of the Swaziland Constitution of 2005. 
8 S. 19 (1) - (3) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
9 ‘Kingdom of Swaziland’ (note 2 above).  
10 Development and Savings Bank v Diversa Holding Corporation (unreported) High Court Civil Case 3624/ 2005 
Para 1-2. 
11 For example, hire purchase agreements are regulated by the Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969. 
12 See the cases of Paulos Simelane v Bonisile Magagula and another In re: Bonisile Magagula v Paulos Simelane 
(unreported) High Court Civil Case 948/ 2005. See also Mandla James Dlamini v Select Management Services (Pty) 
Ltd and others (unreported) High Court Civil Case No. 3381/ 2009; Reckson Mawelela v Mbabane Association of 
Money Lenders & Another (unreported) Civil Appeal Case No. 43/ 99, amongst others. 
 However, other consumer areas have been 
neglected and courts have been slow in developing consumer jurisprudence this regard. To 
illustrate this point, a case which presented the court with an opportunity to develop consumer 
law jurisprudence will be analysed. This case reveals that courts are not only aware that 
consumers require protection, but that consumer protection itself is a very important issue. The 
case in issue is that of Meshack Kunene v Swaziland Electricity Board (unreported) High Court 
Civil Case 849/ 2007. In this case the applicant sought and order to reconnect electricity into his 
home after the respondent electricity company had disconnected and removed its power line on 
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allegations that the applicant had tampered with electricity connections.13
‘This application before court is concerned with the very important issue of the protection of 
consumer rights where the Applicant a simple landowner at Nkwalini Zone 4 had his electricity 
disconnected by the Respondent being Swaziland Electricity Board on account that he had 
fraudulently tampered with the supply of electricity to the sum of E 4, 903-27.’
 The opening remarks 
of the court were as follows: 
 
14
Despite this promising introduction, the judge eventually shied away from addressing the 





It is generally accepted that freedom of contract forms the basis of all contractual relationships.
 The ability to identify the issue of consumer protection yet the 
failure to address it reflects the challenges experienced by the courts in Swaziland. Nevertheless, 
this chapter will consider the alternatives available to the courts in ensuring that consumers in 
Swaziland. 
  
Having highlighted the some of the challenges in the current consumer framework, it is 
necessary to consider the issues affecting consumers in more detail. 
 
3. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN SWAZILAND 
16
                                                          
13 At Para 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 At paragraphs 9 and 11. 
16 Gugu F akudze an d anot her v  P rincipal Se cretary i n t he M inistry of  E nterprise and E mployment and O thers 
(unreported) High Court Civil Case No. 2485/ 2008 at paragraphs 37, 42. See also M Havenga et a l General 
Principles of Commercial Law 7 ed (2011) 48. 
 
This section will consider the effects of contractual freedom under three types of clauses which 
are often used to exploit consumers. These are the exemption clause; the non-variation clause; 
and the voetstoots clause. The analysis will suggest that statutory regulation of these clauses is 
imperative because they are susceptible to abuse by suppliers and service providers against 





3.1. The exemption clause 
An exemption clause limits or excludes the liability of a party in a contract.17 The origin of 
exemption clauses is traced to the European industrial revolution of the mid-18th century when 
mass production of goods was introduced.18 The clauses were introduced by manufacturers in 
order to avoid lawsuits since the risk of producing defective goods in large quantities was high.19 
Over time, exemption clauses were no longer used by manufacturers to protect their economic 
interests, but became traps to exploit consumers, who were in a weaker bargaining position.20 
Except in exceptional circumstances, courts often refused to release consumers from oppressive 
exemption clauses in recognition of contractual freedom.21
There is not much case law on exemption clauses in Swaziland save for the case of Nonhlanhla 
Tsabedze v The University of Swaziland (unreported) High Court Civil Case 3432/ 2010 which 
dealt with relevant principles. In this case a prospective student was provisionally offered a place 
to study in the University of Swaziland after successfully applying for admission.
 It must now be considered how courts 
in Swaziland have dealt with exemption clauses. 
 
22 After 
accepting the offer, but before registration, the university realised that she did not meet the 
qualification requirements.23 The university later refused to register her as a student despite 
having initially accepted her.24 As a result, the prospective student then moved an urgent 
application in court seeking admission.25 The question for determination was whether the 
applicant was entitled to an order for specific performance.26
 
 However, the learned judge was 
drawn to consider a different issue. Accordingly, the court felt there was a need to address a 
certain stipulation in the letter offering the prospective student a place to study which read: 
                                                          
17 AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 427-428. See also PN Stoop ‘The Current Status of the 
Enforceability of Contractual Exemption Clauses for the Exclusion of Liability in the South African Law of 
Contract’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 496.  
18 D Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts 2 ed (1982) 1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hotels, Inns and Resorts SA (Pty) Ltd v Underwriters at Lloyds and Others 1998 (4) SA 466 (C) at 477. See also 
CJ Pretorius ‘Exemption Clauses and Mistake: Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 SCA’ (2010) 73 
THRHR 491. 
21 Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 at 578. 
22 At Para 3. 
23 At Para 3. 
24 At Paragraphs 3-5. 
25 At Para 6-8. 
26 At Para 13. 
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‘The University reserves the right to withdraw the offer in the event it is found to have been 
made in error or obtained fraudulently.’27
What must be noted at this point is that the court, throughout the judgment, was referring to the 
document containing the above clause as ‘a letter of offer’.
 
 
28 After referring to authority and in 
dismissing the application, the court held that the above excerpt was, in fact, an exemption clause 
embodied in a contract.29 It is submitted, nevertheless, that the court did not consider three 
important questions. The first question is whether or not a contract existed between the 
university and the prospective student.30 The second question is whether the court was dealing 
with a reservation clause or an exemption clause, and the third question is whether public policy 
was material in coming to a just decision.31
Concerning the first question, the court had to determine whether the written document 
constituted a contract so as to warrant the application of contractual principles.
 These questions are addressed below.  
 
32 It is trite that, 
when a document purporting to contain contractual terms is in issue, a court must first consider 
whether the document is a contract.33 In order for a document to be considered a contract, it must 
be shown that the contracting parties accepted the document in the belief that they were 
concluding a contract.34 In instances where the true nature of a document is in issue, the court 
has a duty to decide whether the document purporting to be a contract is in fact a contract or 
not.35 It is cannot simply be concluded that the document in issue was a contract because certain 
considerations militate against it being deemed a contract. One of the reasons for this uncertainty 
concerning the question of whether the document was a contract is that throughout the case the 
court referred to the document as ‘a letter of offer’.36
                                                          
27 At Para 14. 
28 For example, at paragraphs 3, 13, 14 and 15. 
29 At paragraphs 41-42. The court stated that the issue of specific performance was simply being dealt with for the 
sake of completeness since it had already made a finding on the case as whole. 
30 S Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract 6 ed (2005) 136. 
31 These issues were not adequately discussed in the judgment. 
32 Smith (note 30 above) 139. 
33 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 194. See also J Mickleburgh Consumer Protection 
(1979) 321. 
34 Smith (note 30 above) 139. 
35 Ibid 136. 
36 At paragraphs 3, 13, 14 and 15. 
 Furthermore, the court recognised the 
existence of a contractual relationship between the parties on the one hand, while acknowledging 
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the absence of such a relationship on the other.37
‘I should also say obiter that it would appear to me that the contractual relationship is fully 
consummated and made effectual at the stage of registration of the student concerned. This 
would suggest to me that the applicant was a prospective student because she is not registered as 
a student and by means of this court’s process, sought an order for her registration. She, it 
would appear, was offered a place as a student but did not consummate that position because 
registration did not eventuate. This, as I have said is a side issue.’








The issue to be considered is whether it was appropriate for the court to decide the case on 




That the court constantly referred to the document as a ‘letter of offer’, coupled with the non-
recognition of a contractual relationship between the parties militates against the letter of offer 
being considered a contract. The mere fact that the letter was a written document does not 
ultimately mean that it is in contractual form.41 The underlying principle is that the parties to an 
agreement must know or reasonably contemplate that the document in issue is contractual before 
it can actually be considered a contract.42
‘What must not be allowed to sink into oblivion is that there is the principle of freedom of 
contract which allows a person in the Respondent’s position, to stipulate terms on which it can 
deal with other parties, including terms that are designed to exclude, limit or exempt it from 
liability. Where those clauses are inserted, it would appear to me that in appropriate case, it is 
the duty of the courts to scrutinize the same and to ensure that they are fair and do not 
  This fact was not established by the court. 
Nevertheless, it can be held that the court decided the case on the basis that a written contract 
existed between the parties as gleaned from the following comments: 
 
                                                          
37 Paragraphs 8 and 32 of the judgment. 
38 At Para 32. 
39 At Para 32. 
40 P Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 26. 




contravene public policy and do not operate unduly harshly on other persons, particularly those 
who bargain from a position of relative weakness.’43
‘In an equally compelling argument, Mr. Sibandze submitted to the contrary. He submitted that 
the term at the end of the offer reserving the Respondent’s right to withdraw the offer it made in 
error or one made fraudulently, removed the instant case from the realms of those cases to 
which the general rule referred to above applies.’
 
 
If it is accepted that the document was indeed a contract, the second question arises. The 
question is whether the clause interpreted by the court was an exemption clause or a reservation 
clause. This question is raised by two defining paragraphs in the judgment which state: 
 
44
‘Reverting to the clause in question, it would appear to me the clause was inserted to reserve 
the Respondent’s r ight to withdraw an offer made to a prospective student in error or one in 
which the offer was made as a result of fraud…In this wise, the clause acts as both a shield and 
a sword. A shield to protect the Respondent from the normal consequences of an error it may 
have made. As a sword to attack fraudster students or prospective students who attempt to throw 
dust into its eyes, to have the offer withdrawn after registration.’
 (Emphasis added) 
 
And further that: 
 
45
It is abundantly clear from the above quotations that the letter of offer contained a reservation 
clause which empowered the respondent to revoke an offer made erroneously or as a result of 
being fraudulently induced by a prospective student. However, after stating that a reservation 
clause was in issue the court went on to deal with the clause embodied in the letter of offer as 
though it was a an exemption clause.
 (Emphasis added) 
 
46
                                                          
43 At Para 24. 
44 At Para 18 
45 At Para 33. 
46 At Para 30. 




‘The question to answer would, in the circumstances be whether the exemption in question was 
arbitrary, unfair or unduly oppressive and secondly, whether it was operated in a manner that is 
unfair.’47
In stating this, the judge equated the reservation clause contained in the letter with an exemption 
clause in a contract. This observation is drawn form failure by the court to justify why principles 
applicable to exemption clauses should also be applied to clauses reserving the rights of a party 
in an agreement, namely reservation clauses. The court simply grafted principles applying to 
exemption clauses into the sphere of the reservation clause that was in issue. This approach led 
the court to consider case law dealing with exemption clauses under the law of contract on a 
document it had not pronounced to be a contract.
 (Emphasis added) 
 
48 The court did not embark on a discourse to 
reconcile the two types of clauses, nor did it state the reasons for treating two substantially 
different clauses similarly under the law of contract. An exemption clause is a contractual 
stipulation that limits or excludes the liability of a party to a contract in the event of defective 
performance, while a reservation clause simply retains rights of a party perform certain acts.49 
The point being made here is that the clause failed to qualify as an exemption clause for two 
reasons. First, a reservation clause cannot simply be deemed an exemption clause because the 
two types of clauses serve different purposes as already indicated. Secondly, the clause in 
question was contained in a letter as opposed to a valid and binding contract.50
The respondent in this case did not have to adduce evidence to establish that the clause in issue 




51 The court had raised the issue of its own accord but did not make this 
determination.52
                                                          
47 At Para 30. 
48 At Para 19-29. 
49 BA Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 8 ed (2004) 1334. 
50 See paragraphs 3, 13, 14 and 15 of the judgment. See also Yates (note 18 above) 56. 
51 At Para 15. 
52 Ibid. 
 If, however, it is accepted that the letter was a contract containing an exemption 
clause, then the third and final question must be answered. The question is whether the findings 
of fairness and public policy imported by the court in determining the matter were necessary, and 
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if so, whether they were properly applied.53 The finding by Masuku J that the clause was fair and 
supported by public policy can be assailed on several grounds.54 First, courts sparingly resort to 
considerations of public policy and only do so in the clearest of circumstances in order to afford 
relief to consumers against unfair contract terms.55 Secondly, while relying on the South African 
decisions of Breedenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa and Another 2009 (5) SA 
304 (GSJ) and Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), the court did not apply criteria set 
out in these cases which recognise the constitution as the cornerstone of public policy.56 It is now 
well-established that any clause purporting to offend public policy is tested against constitutional 
provisions by the courts.57 It is further accepted that courts will refuse to enforce an agreement 
that is contrary to public policy since that contractual undertaking is considered disadvantageous 
to social expedience.58
Harms DP in the South African Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank of South Africa and Another
  
 
59 also upheld this approach. The appeal in this case concerned 
the right of the bank to close the account of its client.60 The appellant’s accounts were closed by 
the respondent bank because he was listed and designated a supporter of Zimbabwe’s regime 
under President Robert Mugabe.61 In order to preserve its reputation with the United States of 
America where the bank had financial interests, the bank ceased the appellant’s accounts. 62  The 
appellant attacked the closure of the bank account on constitutional grounds.63 The court used 
the constitution as a yardstick to determine whether the clause was contrary to public policy.64
                                                          
53 At Para 29-30, 38. 
54 At Para 38. 
55 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (AD) at 9. 
56 At Para 27. See Breedenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa and Another 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) at 
315. 
57 See the cases Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
58 See the cases of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 55 above); Botha v Finanscredit 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) at 783; 
Barkuizen v Napier (note 58 above). 
59 Breedenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa and Another (note 56 above). 
60 At Para 6. 
61 At paragraphs 12-14. 
62 At paragraphs 13-14. 
63 At Para 9. 





It is suggested that Masuku J in the case of Nonhlanhla T sabedze v T he U niversity of  
Swaziland65 also had the opportunity to explore this approach. Swaziland exists in a 
constitutional dispensation and it is assumed that public policy is deeply rooted in the 
constitution.66 The judge fell short of highlighting the importance of section 20 and section 151 
(2) (a) of the Constitution Act of 2005 which vest the High Court with the responsibility of 
ensuring that equality of all persons before the law is enforced in the spirit of the Bill of Rights. 
Perhaps this contribution could have been valuable in the development of consumer law in 
Swaziland. The point being made is that the court had the opportunity to introduce constitutional 
inroads in determining whether or not the clause in issue was enforceable. Since Masuku J raised 
the issue of the clause in the letter at his own instance, he ought to have also dealt fully with 
public policy.67
‘The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, however, be exercised 
sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result 
from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of power. One must be careful not to conclude that a 
contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms…offend one’s sense of propriety 
and fairness.’
 The judge should have taken into account the warning of Smallberger JA in the 
case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (AD) where he stated: 
 
68
‘[T]he doctrine [of public policy] should only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the 




Similar sentiments had earlier been expressed in the United Kingdom by Lord Atkin in the old 
case of Fender v St John-Mildmay [1937] 3 All ER 402 that: 
 
69
Perhaps Masuku J did not heed the above warnings. If properly interpreted and applied, 
exemption clauses serve a useful purpose in the law of contract an outlawing them would 
  
 
                                                          
65 Nonhlanhla Tsabedze v The University of Swaziland (unreported) High Court Civil Case 3432/ 2010. 
66 S. 20 of the Swaziland Constitution of 2005 recognises the right to equality. 
67 At paragraphs 13-15 & 30. 
68 At Para 31. 
69 At 407. 
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diminish consumer choice.70 Courts in Swaziland should limit the clauses only in so far as they 
are abused to obtain unfair results. It is apparent from the above discussion that the necessity of 
introducing legislation to regulate exemption clauses cannot be emphasised, particularly because 
other countries like South Africa and the UK have enacted legislation in this regard.71
In Swaziland the strength of the non-variation clause under the law of contract finds expression 
in the common law ‘parol evidence’ rule.
  
 
3.2. The non-variation clause 
72 As an underlying percept of contractual freedom, the 
parol evidence rule requires agreements concluded in writing to be similarly varied in writing.73 
The rule provides that no evidence tending to explain the terms of a written agreement is 
admissible in court.74 In the case of Rucci Supermarket (Pty) Ltd v Swaziland National Housing 
Board (unreported) High Court Civil Case 25 of 2012, the court considered the parol evidence 
rule in the context evidence on affidavit.75 In this case the appellant was ejected by the 
respondent from its premises after a lease agreement between the parties had terminated.76 In 
arguing the appeal, the appellant attempted to introduce evidence through an affidavit to explain 
the terms of the lease.77 Ota J held that it was established law under the parol evidence rule to 
exclude extrinsic evidence tending to prove the terms of a written agreement.78
‘It follows therefore, that the applicable position of the law of the Kingdom is that , where 
parties have reduced their intention in a written document, non (sic) of the parties is entitled to 
lead evidence tending to prove anything contrary to the express terms of the agreement.’
 The court stated:  
 
79
                                                          
70 T Woker ‘Consumers and Contracts of Purchase and Sale’ in D Macquoid-Mason (ed) Consumer Law in South 
Africa (1997) 32. See also Howells and Weatherill Consumer Protection Law (1995) 306. 
71 The UK enacted the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, while South Africa regulates exemption clauses in S. 48- S. 
51 of the CPA of 2008. 
72 Rucci Supermarket (Pty) Ltd v Swaziland National Housing Board (unreported) High Court Civil Case No. 25 of 
2012. 
73 E Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 71. See also Christie (note 33 above) 192. 
74 Christie (note 33 above) 192-194. 
75 At paragraphs 51-52. 
76 At paragraphs 3-4. 
77 At paragraphs 51-61. 
78 At Para 51.  





After making the above observations, the court refused to admit the evidence.80 The refusal to 
admit extrinsic evidence affecting the terms of an agreement was also expressed in the case of 
Busaf (Pty) L imited v  V usi E mmanuel K humalo (unreported) High Court Case 2839/ 2008. In 
this case the plaintiff sold two buses to the defendant under a written agreement.81 After initially 
paying deposit on the buses, the defendant subsequently failed to pay the outstanding balance.82 
The defendant challenged the terms of the agreement arguing that the buses were overpriced, had 
inherent mechanical faults, and that the plaintiff had made certain fraudulent misrepresentations 
regarding their value when the agreement was signed.83 Masuku J held that the defendant was 
not entitled to question the validity of the terms of the agreement.84
‘It will be apparent from reading the papers filed by the defendant that he now seeks to question 
the validity of certain terms of the agreement signed by both parties. Should he be allowed to do 
so? In particular, the Defendant now seeks to say that the vehicles he purchased were in a faulty 
mechanical condition and further contends that the Plaintiff made certain representations about 
the fitness of the vehicles and how they would raise good money, so to speak.’
 He stated: 
 
85
‘The import of the foregoing on the case is that because the parties to the agreement, namely, 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant decided to embody all the terms of the agreement in a single 
memorial, the Defendant may not seek to lead evidence tending to prove anything contrary to 




And further that: 
 
86
From the above, it is abundantly clear that the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of 
evidence which attempts to explain the terms of a written agreement.
 (Emphasis added) 
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80 At paragraphs 51-61. 
81 At Para 2. 
82 At Para 5. 
83 At Para 12. 
84 At Para 14. 
85 Ibid. 
86 At Para 17. 





It must be noted, however, that the position expressed above is not unassailable because certain 
exceptional circumstances may warrant departure from the rule.88 Christie89
‘One does not need a very fertile imagination to see how, necessary as the rule is, it can lead to 
injustice if vigorously applied, by excluding evidence of what the parties really agreed. It has 
therefore been the constant endeavour of the courts to prevent the rule being used as an engine 
of fraud by a party who knows full well that the written contract does not represent the true 
agreement…Perhaps the best way to look at the rule is to it as a backstop which comes into 
operation only in the absence of some more dominant rule.’
 holds that freedom 
of contract perpetrates injustices through the instrumentality of the parol evidence rule. Thus: 
 
90
‘Now the general rule is clear: a party to a written instrument cannot vary its terms by parol 
evidence. But a party to such a writing, which it is sought to use against him, may lead evidence 
to show that the document in question is not a contract at all, that it was not intended by the 
signatories to operate as such, but was given for another purpose. And when he has thus got rid 
of the writing, he may, if he can, establish another verbal contract as the true agreement. The 
law upon this point was clearly stated… Such a case is always difficult to establish; but it may 
be attempted, provided the pleadings are so framed as to raise it.’
 
 
These observations find support in the case of Beaton v Baldachin Bros 1920 AD 312 where the 
Appellate Division adverted to certain circumstances that warrant departure from the parol 
evidence rule. Innes CJ stated: 
 
91
The court was explaining that not only will the document purporting to be a contract be 
interrogated, but extrinsic evidence may be introduced to determine the existence of subsequent 
 
 
                                                          
88 Ibid 194. See also Havenga (note 16 above) 113-114; Van Eeden (note 73 above) 72. 
89 Christie (note 33 above) 194. See also Swaziland Development and Savings Bank v Diversa Holding Corporation 
(note 10 above) at Para 28. 
90 At 194. 
91 At 315. See also Aronstam (note 40 above) 37-38. 
90 
 
or prior agreements which may have varied a contract.92 In the case of Richer v  Bloemfontein 
Council 1922 A.D 57 it was stated as follows:93
‘Extrinsic evidence is only admissible to explain the construction of a document where words 




Over and above explaining ambiguous contract terms, the utility of extrinsic evidence is also 
necessary whether the conclusion of an agreement was influenced either by illegality, mistake, 
fraudulent misrepresentation or duress.
 
 
95 In this respect, a court will go behind the terms of the 
agreement in order to defeat the terms of a written contract.96 Consumers are thereby protected 
since the parol evidence rule does not affect evidence relating to the conclusion or subsequent 
variation of an agreement.97 Likewise, proof of a condition precedent to the conclusion of the 
disputed document is not subject the rule.98 Evidence challenging the very nature of the contract 
is also not subject to the parol evidence rule which only applies to evidence tending to prove the 
terms of the contract.99
The above position was also acknowledged by Masuku J in the case of Swaziland Development 
and Sav ings B ank v D iversa H olding C orporation (unreported) High Court Civil Case 3624/ 
2005 where he considered a non-variation clause in light of the parol evidence rule. This case is 
interesting because a well-recognised plaintiff banking institution ‘got the short end of the stick’ 
against an equally scrupulous business concern, contrary to the belief that consumers in a weaker 




                                                          
92 Christie (note 33 above) 194. See also Havenga (note 16 above) 113; Van Eeden (note 73 above) 72. 
93 Cited with approval in the case of Standard Bank of Swaziland Limited v Ashley Friedman (unreported) High 
Court Civil Case 918/ 2001. 
94 At 5. 
95 Swaziland Development and Savings Bank v Diversa Holding Corporation (note 10 above) at Para 20. 
96 Ibid at Para 18. See also Christie (note 33 above) 194-195; Havenga (note 16 above) 113; Van Eeden (note 73 
above) 72. 
97 Havenga (note 16 above) 114. 
98 Christie (note 33 above) 197. 
99 Ibid. see also Havenga (note 16 above) 114. 
100 Throughout this study it apparent that most complaints in consumer transactions are brought forth by individual 
consumers who are often in a weaker bargaining position. However, in the present case a banking institution was 
shortchanged by a scrupulous seller. 
 The plaintiff bank purchased 
certain immovable property from the defendant under a deed of sale containing a non-variation 
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clause after an advertisement of the property was published by the defendant in a daily 
newspaper.101 While labouring under the belief that it was purchasing land with two warehouses 
the plaintiff discovered after purchase that there was only one warehouse.102 The plaintiff then 
sued the defendant for damages alleging that the defendant had made negligent representations 
during the course of the sale.103 The question for determination was whether the court could 
admit extrinsic evidence tending to prove the terms of the deed of sale agreement in light of the 
non-variation clause.104
 ‘It is fitting that I should mention at this juncture that fraud is not the only basis upon which the 
Court may go behind the terms of a written agreement, with a view to ultimately defeat the 
terms of a written deed or contract. Extrinsic evidence regarding issues such as illegality, 
mistake, misrepresentation or duress will always be admitted in order to defeat the terms of a 
written contract. I mention en passant that the Plaintiff does not rely on any of the above 
variables for the relief it seeks and therefore stands to be non-suited.’
 Masuku J stated: 
 
105
Indeed, the court was justified in refusing to grant the plaintiff’s claim since the requisite 




‘[T]o countenance the plaintiff’s claim in the present circumstances, would be tantamount to 
doing serious violence to the freedom of contract and would also result in a serious and 
unnecessary negation of the parole evidence rule, particularly considering that this case does not 
fall within the rubric of any of the exceptions to the parole evidence rule mentioned earlier.’
 However, the 
strong influence that contractual freedom has in directing the operation of the parol evidence rule 
is gleaned from the concluding remarks of the court, which were as follows:  
 
107
While the parole evidence rule is necessary, it cannot be denied that its application sometimes 
leads to unjust results because contracting parties are at liberty to alter the terms of their 
 
 
                                                          
101 At Para 3-4. 
102 At Para 5. 
103 At Para 5-6. 
104 At paragraphs 7-8. 
105 At Par 20. 
106 At Para 26. 
107 At Para 31. 
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agreement at any time.108 For example, one of the parties may seek refuge under the rule to 
enforce a written agreement which he knows was consensually altered to the detriment of the 
other party.109 Courts realise that the fear of admitting valuable evidence of potentially true 
statements agreed to by contracting parties and vindicating them through cross-examination was 
misplaced and unjustified.110 Nevertheless, the general rule still applies and consumers will be 
bound by the written terms of the contracts they conclude. If the concluding remarks of the court 
above are anything to go by, then the exceptions to the parol evidence face a serious challenge 
against freedom of contract in Swaziland. It is probably necessary to control non-variation 
clauses through statutory regulation in the same way as countries like South Africa and the UK 
have limited their effect in consumer transactions.111
Contracts sometimes contain clauses for the sale of goods on an ‘as is’ basis, commonly referred 
to as voetstoots clauses.
 
 
3.3. The voetstoots clause  
112 This type of clause exempts a seller in a sale transaction from the 
implied common law warranty against latent defects.113 In defining a latent defect, Woker114 
states that the defect in question must be such that ‘the feature in question must be one which 
destroys or impairs the usefulness of the things for everyone and not just the particular 
purchaser’. A voetstoots clause in a contract of sale is only included by express agreement and its 
absence may expose a seller to liability for any latent defects in goods sold.115 It is therefore 
common practice for sellers to protect themselves from liability against latent defects by 
including voetstoots clauses in sale agreements.116
In the case of Selby Dlamini v Fred Ostergetel and another (unreported) High Court Civil Case 
No. 2087/ 2001, the validity and enforcement of an oral voetstoots clause had to be determined 
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109 Ibid. 
110 Van Eeden (note 73 above) 72. 
111 In the UK this has been done through the Consumer Protection Act of 1987 and Unfair Contract Terms of 1977, 
while in South Africa unfair contract terms are regulated by the CPA of 2008 from S. 48- S.51. 
112 MA Fouché ‘The Contract of Sale’ in Fouché Legal Principles of Contracts and Negotiable Instruments 3 ed 
(1995) 160. 
113 Ibid. See also Havenga (note 16 above) 156. 
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by the court. The plaintiff buyer purchased a second hand motor vehicle from the defendant 
seller.117 The defendant falsely represented to the plaintiff that the motor vehicle had been fitted 
with a new engine.118 However, it was later discovered that the engine had serious mechanical 
defects.119 In his defence, the defendant relied on an oral voetstoots clause and the court had to 
consider whether the clause could be upheld.120 The court found that there was evidence to 
support the plaintiff’s claim, and accepted the defendant’s version that the sale was indeed 
subject to the oral voetstoots clause.121 As a result, the common law warranty against latent 
defects was held not to be applicable.122
In the case of Herbert Ndzabukelwako v Sinkhwa Semaswati t/a Mister Bread (unreported) High 
Court Civil Case 899/ 2007, the defendant sold a vehicle without an engine to the plaintiff.
   
 
123 
The sale was subject to a voetstoots clause under a deed of sale signed by the parties.124 The 
cause of complaint was that the plaintiff had not received the motor vehicle registration 
documents from the defendant which could enable him to facilitate transfer of ownership of the 
vehicle.125 As a result the plaintiff suffered damages due to failure to register the vehicle.126 The 
defendant argued that the sale was subject to a voetstoots clause, and therefore, the vehicle 
registration documents were not part of the agreement.127 In deciding the matter the court 
clarified that the deed of sale did not refer to the sale of a ‘motor vehicle’.128 The object sold was 
a vehicle without an engine, and that, as such, it could not be classified as a ‘motor vehicle’.129
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‘The agreement of sale specifically states that the vehicle has no engine. An engine is a motor. 
A vehicle is any carriage or conveyance that may be used on land. The parties were alive to 
these facts about the merx and did not refer to it as a motor vehicle.’130




 131  The court held that since the vehicle was without its ‘motor’, there was no duty 
under law on the seller to furnish the buyer with the registration documents for purposes of 
change of ownership.132 Perhaps the plaintiff assumed that the voetstoots clause did not preclude 
the accompanying documents common in ‘motor vehicle’ sales. The above case reveals a highly 
technical application of voetstoots terms in contracts which led to the plaintiff only acquiring a 
bare vehicle shell.  Under these circumstances it is imperative that statutory regulation is 
introduced to regulate voetstoots clauses because unfair results like the above will continue to 
affect consumers.133
This section considers whether the exceptio doli generalis doctrine applies in Swaziland despite 
its invalidation in South Africa. Historically, the exceptio doli generalis doctrine was a defence 
based on good faith against a party to a contract who had acted in bad faith.
 
 
Having discussed the unfair results consumers have been subjected to under the most common 
contract clauses in Swaziland, it is necessary to consider the common law concept of the exceptio 
doli generalis. 
 
3.4. The validity and enforcement of the exceptio doli generalis in Swaziland 
134  Good faith in this 
context refers to honesty in the conclusion of agreements and has its origins in Roman law.135
                                                          
130 At Para 5 
131 S. 21 (2) (c) of the Road Traffic Act 6 of 1965 imposes a duty on a seller of a motor vehicle to surrender to the 
new owner of the motor vehicle the registration book, the motor vehicle licence and clearance certificate of 
roadworthiness in respect of the vehicle. 
132 At Para 6. 
133 In the South African context the clauses are regulated in S. 56 of the CPA of 2008, while in the UK the Sale of 
Goods Act of 1979 and the CPA of 1987 have a similar effect. 
134 Aronstam (note 40 above) 169. See also Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 
580 (A) at 611; FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The 
Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71, 73. 
135 Ibid. 
 
‘Bad faith’ on the other hand has been described as ‘acting in a manner contrary to the standards 
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regarded by society as acceptable in the given circumstances’.136 The notion of good faith as 
underpinning the exceptio doli generalis was developed and eventually became a central pillar in 
maintaining equitable relations between parties in contractual relations.137
The operation of the exceptio dol i ge neralis was twofold. First, it provided a remedy against 




138 South African courts applied the exceptio dol i generalis maxim until the late 
20th century.139
‘All things considered, the time has now arrived, in my judgment, once and for all, to bury the 
exceptio doli generalis as a superfluous, defunct anachronism. Requiescat in pace.’
 The doctrine was, however, invalidated in the case of Bank of Lisbon and South 
Africa v Ornelas and Another1988 (3) SA 580 when Jourbert J.A stated: 
 
140
It must be noted that like all common law principles applicable in South Africa under the Roman 
Dutch law, the exceptio dol i ge neralis doctrine was also recognised in Swaziland before the 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another
 
 
141 decision.142 Nathan CJ referred to the 
doctrine in the case of Photo Agencies (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner of Swaziland Royal Police 
and another1976-1980 S.L.R 398,143 where he refused to entertain an application for the release 
of an arms consignment on grounds that the applicant had approached the court with unclean 
hands.144 This case, however, is not relevant in the current discussion because the doctrine was 
not examined.145
                                                          
136 AJ Kerr ‘The Defence of Unfair Conduct on the Part of the Plaintiff at the Time the Action is brought: The 
Exceptio Doli Generalis and the Replicatio Doli in Modern Law’ (2008) 125 SALJ 241. 
137 Brand (note 134 above). 
138 Christie (note 33 above) 12. 
139 At 607B. See also Brand (note 134) 73-74. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another (note 134 above). 
142 EIS Marketing (Pty) Limited v Swaziland Sugar Association (unreported) Civil Appeal Case 51/ 2006. In Photo 
Agencies (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner of Swaziland Royal Police and another 1976-1980 S.L.R 398, the court 
referred to the exceptio doli generalis. The applicant had used a false address in Swaziland in order to overcome and 
circumvent the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council against the Republic of South Africa. 
143  At 407. 
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The question is whether consumers in Swaziland can raise the defence that a party to a contract 
has acted in bad faith, namely the exceptio doli generalis. This question poses a serious 
challenge both for consumers and the courts in Swaziland. The challenge arises in two ways, 
namely, whether consumers can raise the defence and, if it is raised, whether the courts will 
recognise it as applicable in Swaziland.146 There are two opposing views to be considered in 
addressing this issue. On the one hand, it may be contended that courts in Swaziland have 
followed the decision in Bank of Lisbon and Sout h Africa v Ornelas and Another147 and do not 
recognise good faith as a defence. On the other hand, it may be contended that good faith is a 
defence and that the exceptio doli generalis doctrine was left intact since courts in Swaziland are 
not bound to follow South African decisions.148
South African courts have recognised good faith as a ground for invalidating unfair contract 
terms despite the decision in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and another.
 These contentions are now considered. 
 
149 In the 
very same case Jansen JA held that the exceptio doli generalis was not an empty shell and that to 
deny the defence a place in the law would leave a vacuum.150 The same approach was adopted 
by Olivier JA in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Eerste Nasionale van Suidelike Afrika 
Bpk v Saayman 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) where he also held in his dissenting judgment that the 
notion of good faith was useful in dealing with unfair contract terms.151 In this case the 
respondent curatrix bonis sought to set aside a deed of suretyship signed by her mother whose 
capacity to sign the suretyship was in issue.152 Olivier JA held that good faith can be used to 
invalidate established rules of contract.153
Again, Van Zyl J in the case of Janse van Rensburg v  Grieve Trust CC 2001 (1) SA 315 (C) 
followed the approach of Olivier JA in holding that courts were empowered to vary the well 
  
 
                                                          
146 The case of Sipho Fernandez Dludlu v Philani Clinics (Pty) Ltd and others (note 144 above) at Para 24 referred 
to Photo Agencies (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner of Swaziland Royal Police and another (note 142 above) when it 
mentioned the doctrine, without considering its application. The problem is that invalidation of the doctrine in South 
Africa does not mean it is invalidated in Swaziland because courts in Swaziland apply what they deem to be the law 
in Swaziland. See Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (unreported) [1970-76] SLR 25 at 29. 
147 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another (note 134 above). 
148 Annah Lokudzinga Matsenjwa v R (note 146 above). 
149 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another (note 134 above). See also Brand (note 134 above) 78. 
150 At 616. 
151 At 321, 322, 326, 331. 
152 At 304. 
153 At 326. 
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established legal principles on grounds of good faith.154 Ntsebeza AJ In the case of Miller and 
another N NO v  D annecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) also expressed the value of good faith in 
invalidating established principles.155 In this case the defendant had purchased franchise rights 
from a seller in respect of a guest house.156 After the seller reneged on certain oral terms that the 
parties had agreed upon, the court held that public policy prevented a party to a subsequent oral 
contract based on a written agreement from turning back on his word.157 Hutchison158 agrees 
with the outcome of the decision in Miller and another NNO v Dannecker,159 and contends that 
the concept of good faith has a key role in determining the enforcement of contractual clauses.160
There is a series of decisions where courts have held that the concept of good faith cannot be 
used to invalidate unfair contract terms.
  
 
All the above views recognise the notion of good faith in limiting unfair contract terms which 
operate to a consumer’s disadvantage. It is now necessary to consider the opposing argument 
which rejects good faith as a principle capable of invalidating contractual terms. 
 
161 The majority decision in the case of Bank of  Lisbon 
and Sout h A frica v O rnelas and A nother162 laid down this proposition. While this majority 
decision has been criticised for being over-scholarly and out of touch with the role of the courts 
in dispensing justice, Christie163 holds a different view and agrees with the judgment. He says 
that it would be undesirable to bring back the exceptio doli generalis because ‘the half-life of the 
exceptio from 1925 to 1988 showed it to be so entangled in its history that it was not a 
satisfactory instrument for modern courts to use’.164
                                                          
154 At 325-326. See also Brand (note 134 above) 79. 
155 At 938. 
156 At 931. 
157 At 937. 
158 D Hutchison ‘Non-variation Clauses in Contract: Any Escape from the Shifren Straitjacket?’ (2001) 118 SALJ 
722. 
159 Miller and another NNO v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C). 
160 Hutchison (note 158 above). 
161 See the cases of Brisley v Drotsky (note 57 above); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 57 above); Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another (note 134 above), amongst others. 
162 Bank of  L isbon a nd South Africa v  O rnelas an d A nother (note 134 above) at 605. See also Brand (note 134 
above) 78. 
163 Christie (note 33 above) 13. 
164 Ibid. 
 Subsequent decisions that followed this line 
of reasoning include the case of BOE Bank  Bpk  v  Van Zyl 2002 (5) SA 165 (C), where the 
defendant had signed as a surety for his son-in-law in favour of the plaintiff bank which 
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eventually sued on the agreement.165 On appeal, the court refused to accept the defence that the 
plaintiff had not acted in good faith.166 In the case of Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the 
court dismissed the defence of good faith and held that the dissenting judgment of Olivier JA in 
the case of Eerste Nasionale van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman167 was the opinion of ‘a single 
judge’.168 The court held that good faith was not an independent substantive rule.169 In the case 
of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom2002 6 SA 21 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
good faith was not a ‘free-floating basis’ for invalidating contracts,170 while in the case of South 
African Forestry Co. Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA), it was held that good faith 
could only to be applied as a procedural aid in explaining established rules of contract law.171
The above contending views are captured by the conflicting opinions of Kerr
 
 
172 and Brand173 on 
the interpretation of the Constitutional Court decision of Barkhuizen v  Napier.174 Arguing that 
good faith is not a legal concept capable of invalidating a contract, Brand175 holds that Ngcobo J 
in Barkhuizen v Napier176 laid down this position when the latter stated that good faith is not a 
‘self-standing rule, but an underlying value that is given expression through existing rules of 
law’. He argues that by incorporating the abstract values of reasonableness and fairness, the court 
was not recognizing good faith as an independent ground for interference with contractual 
relationships.177 He concludes that resorting to principles like good faith may lead to uncertainty 
and ‘palm-tree’ justice.178
                                                          
165 Brand (note 134 above) 79. 
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On the other hand, Kerr179 argues on the strength of the decision in Barkhuizen v Napier,180 the 
case of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another181 and the later case of Brisley v 
Drotsky182 were wrongly decided. He contends that by recognizing fairness, good faith and 
reasonableness as constitutional values, the court in Barkhuizen v Napier183 gave these concepts 
a wide field of operation and a ‘more prominent place in the law than they had held in the years 
before the constitution was adopted’.184 He holds that by recognizing good faith under the 
constitution the Constitutional Court revived the exceptio doli generalis doctrine.185 Thus, the 
Constitutional Court, as a higher Court, overruled the Appellate Division decision of Bank of  
Lisbon and Sout h A frica v  O rnelas and A nother.186 In conclusion he says that all courts are 
bound by the Constitutional Court decision of Barkuizen v  N apier,187 and that ‘those who 
thought that the Bank of  L isbon [decision] was correct are now obliged to note that it can no 
longer be considered’.188
Without a doubt the above contention will cause problems in Swaziland because consumers 
cannot be certain whether good faith under the exceptio doli generalis doctrine can be applied as 
a defence against contracts imposing unfair contract terms. Courts will have similar difficulty 
because they will first have to determine whether the exceptio dol i ge neralis applies in 
Swaziland taking into account that it has been invalidated in South Africa.  If the doctrine 
applies, then consumers may invoke it to deflect unfair contract terms. However, if courts adopt 
the decision of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas and Another
 
 
189 and conclude that the 
doctrine is invalid in Swaziland, they will be faced with the task of grafting on the constitutional 
developments alluded to in the case of Barkuizen v Napier.190
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Having discussed the relevant issues affecting consumers under the law of contract, it is 
necessary to move to a consideration of product liability in Swaziland. 
 
4. PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THIRD PARTY CONSUMERS 
Wright191 defines product liability as ‘the civil liability of a manufacturer or distributor for 
damage or injury caused by a defect in the product’. Walker192 on the other hand defines product 
liability as the basis and extent to which ‘a manufacturer or supplier of some product should be 
liable to the ultimate consumer or user for harm done by reason of a defect in design or 
manufacture’. Both these definitions limit liability for defective products to manufacturers. 
Howells193
Manufacturers of products owe a duty of care to the end-users of the products they produce.
 has a broader view of product liability and extends the scope of the concept to 
liability imposed on producers, distributors, importers, retailers and other suppliers of products 
which cause death, injury or damage to property as a result of their use. This section considers of 
the liability of manufacturers towards third party consumers in Swaziland under negligence. 
 
4.1. Product liability under negligence 
194
‘By putting into circulation potentially harmful things…the manufacturer is not merely 
exercising a legal right but encroaching upon the rights others not to be exposed, when going 
about their lawful occasions and when accepting the implied general limitation to acquire and 
use such commodities, to danger without warning and without their having a reasonable 
opportunity to become aware of such danger before use. In other words, it is an encroachment 
upon the rights of others to set hidden snares for them in exercise of their own rights. To refrain 
from doing so is a duty owing to the world at large.’
 
The duty of care owed by manufacturers towards third parties was expressed by Van der Heever 





                                                          
191 CJ Wright, ‘Product L iability: T he L aw and i ts I mplications f or R isk M anagement’ (1989) 3, cited in D 
Macquoid-Mason ‘Consumers and Product Liability’ in D Macquoid-Mason (note 70 above) 64. 
192 DM Walker The Oxford Companion to Law (1980) 1005. 
193 G Howells Comparative Product Liability (1993) 1. 
194 A Gibb & Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor & Mitchell Timber Supply Co. (Pty) Ltd 1975 (2) SA 457 (W) at 462. See 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C 562 at 580. 
195 At 486-487. 
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The question whether a supplier was negligent for defective products in Swaziland was dealt 
with in the case Wandile Ndzinisa v  S teers Fast Foods and R estaurant t /a St eers (unreported) 
High Court Civil Case 1457/ 2004.196 In this case the plaintiff purchased from the defendant 
specialist fast food seller a take away meal which contained snails.197 While eating he realised 
that the meal consisted of snails and this caused him to vomit and thereafter to suffer from 
trauma whenever he thought about what had transpired.198 In determining negligence and the 
quantum of damages, Ebersohn J considered a number of decisions, two of which were the case 
of Donoghue v  St evenson [1932] A.C. 562 and the case of Kroonstad Westelike B oere 
Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha 1964 (3) SA 561 (A).199
In the case of Donoghue v  St evenson
 It is necessary to consider how and 
why the court applied these decisions.  
 
200 the question was whether a manufacturer of products 
which could not be inspected by both the distributor and end-consumer was under a legal duty to 
the end-consumer for any harm suffered as a result a defectively manufactured product.201  It was 
held that manufacturers of food, medicine and related products were liable for any defect which 
was detrimental to the health of the end-consumer.202 In applying the case of Donoghue v  
Stevenson203 the court in the case of Wandile Ndzinisa v Steers Fast Foods and R estaurant t/a 
Steers204 did not determine whether the defendant was a manufacturer or a merchant seller. The 
principles in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson205 apply only to manufacturers and their duty to 
end-consumers or third parties, not to merchant sellers.206
The second case that the court applied was the case of Kroonstad Westelike Boere Kooperatiewe 
Vereniging v  B otha 1964 (3) SA 561 (A) where the appellant cooperative had sold a toxic 
  
 
                                                          
196 At paragraphs 1-11. 
197 At 2. The meal comprised two pieces of chicken, a 340 ml cold drink and some lettuce. 
198 Ibid. 
199 At Para 26. 
200 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 194 above). 
201 At 578. 
202 At 582-583 
203 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 194 above). 
204 Wandile Ndzinisa v Steers Fast Foods and Restaurant t/a Steers (unreported) High Court Civil Case 1457/ 2004. 
205 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 194 above). 
206 Ibid 578. 
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metasystox pesticide to the respondent farmers.207 The pesticide was intended to destroy lice on 
kaffircorn cultivated by the farmers, but it actually destroyed the respondents’ crops due to an 
inherent latent defect.208 The respondents alleged that the appellant had breached the warranty of 
fitness for purpose and sued for the amount of R48 150.209 The question for determination was 
whether the appellant was liable to the respondents for consequential damage caused by the 
pesticide having a latent defect.210 It was held that a merchant seller could not be held liable for 
manufacturing faults of products he sold because a retailer could not possibly be aware of such 
defects.211 The only exception to this rule is that a retailer who professes some expert knowledge 
or attributes of skill in the product in question will be held liable if the goods prove to be 
defective.212 The court further held that where a merchant seller was found to have professed 
such skill and knowledge in supplying defective goods, a consumer had remedies under the actio 
quanti minoris or the actio redhibitoria.213 These remedies only apply in the law of sale.214
Returning to the judgment of Ebersohn J, it is not clear which principles the court applied from 
the two decisions examined above. The case of Donoghue v St evenson
 
 
215 dealt with 
manufacturers, while the case of Kroonstad W estelike B oere K ooperatiewe V ereniging v  
Botha216 dealt with the consequential liability of merchant sellers. The principles enunciated in 
these two cases are different. On a reading the judgment of Ebersohn J in its entirety it is clear 
that the court did not make a finding of negligence on the part of the respondent. The problem 
with the manner in which the court disposed of this matter is such that it was never decided 
whether liability attached to the respondent as a manufacturer in line with the principles set out 
in Donoghue v Stevenson,217 or attached to the defendant as a merchant in accordance with the 
principles set out in Kroonstad Westelike Boere Kooperatiewe Vereniging v  Botha.218
                                                          




211 At 571. 
212 Ibid. 
213 At 566. 
214 Zulman & Kairinos  (note 115 above) 167, 170. 
215 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 194 above). 
216 Kroonstad Westelike Boere Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha 1964 (3) SA 561 (A). 
217 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 194 above). 
218 Kroonstad Westelike Boere Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha (note 216 above). 
 Another 
issue is that Ebersohn J did not consider the contractual relationship of sale that existed between 
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the plaintiff and defendant seeing that the plaintiff consumer had purchased the take-away from 
the defendant.219 It must be remembered that the defendant was a fast food retailer, not a 
manufacturer.220
‘[R]etailers…are liable in contract: so far as they are concerned, no question of negligence is 
relevant to the liability in contract. But when the position of the manufacturer is considered, 
different questions arise: there is no privity of contract between the appellant and the 
manufacturers: between them the liability, if any, must be in tort, and the gist of the cause of 
action is negligence.’
 Perhaps Ebersohn J should have considered the principle set out in the 
Australian case of Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1936] A.C. 85, a case he also highlighted, 
where it was stated: 
 
221
It is submitted that if the above comments were considered by the court, then it would have been 
obvious that the case of Donoghue v  Stevenson
  
 
222 was inapplicable and the case of Kroonstad 
Westelike Boere Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha223
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the decision in Kroonstad Westelike B oere 
Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha
 was more to the point since it dealt with 
the liability of merchant sellers towards consumers. 
 
224 was criticised by Shutz J.A sitting in the Appellate Division 
in Langeberg Voedsel Bpk v Sarculum Beordery Bpk 1996 (2) SA 565 (A). This case also dealt 
with consequential damages for goods with latent defects.225 The appellant canner and processor 
of fruit and vegetables supplied defective seed to the respondent and the result was that the 
respondent’s crop did not yield. Despite recognizing its authority, the reasoning in Kroonstad 
Westelike B oere K ooperatiewe V ereniging v B otha226
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226 Kroonstad Westelike Boere Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha (note 216 above) at 569-570. 
 was criticised by the court and it was 
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stated that it fell to be reconsidered because it was out of touch with the realities of the modern 
age of commerce.227 The court went on to accordingly dismiss the appeal.228
It is submitted that Ebersohn J in the case of Wandile N dzinisa v  St eers F ast F oods and 




The liability of foreign manufacturers for harm caused by defective products they produce is one 
of the problematic areas of consumer law in Swaziland. Howells
 ought to have, at least, discussed the significance of the criticism of 
Shutz J.A. Perhaps this approach could have had the desired effect of assisting both the courts 
and litigants in future case where product liability matters fall to be determined. 
 
These are some of the challenges faced by courts in dealing with product liability issues in 
Swaziland. Statutory regulation may assist the courts in dealing with product liability issues 
Product liability legislation will make the law in this area more certain. 
 
4.2. The liability of foreign manufacturers 
230
‘A common lacuna in consumer protection law is the inability to regulate or sue manufacturers 
outside the jurisdiction.’
 states the problem thus: 
 
231
It is important to highlight the rather strange situation in Swaziland where most of the products 




For example, manufactured products like textiles and sugar are exported to European Union 
countries and the United States of America, while coal is exported to South Africa.233 Swaziland 
Fruit Canners (SFC) is the only grower and processor of fruits in Swaziland whose goods are 
sold to consumers in Swaziland.234
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233 Ibid. 
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 The Republic of South Africa is the main import partner of 
Swaziland and about 95.6% of imported goods come directly into Swaziland from South 
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Africa.235 Furthermore, all fuel consumed in Swaziland is imported from South Africa and about 
80% of Swaziland’s electricity is supplied by South Africa’s electricity giant ESKOM, while 
Mozambique provides 10% of the electricity supply.236 Other imported goods include 
machinery, motor vehicles, transport equipment, foodstuffs, petroleum products and 
chemicals.237
It is inevitable that the high importation ratio may lead problems for consumers. The question is 





(a) The product was made by the manufacturer; 
 In order for liability to attach and for a consumer to successfully 
recover damages, the party cited must be the one best-suited to prevent the injury or harm from 
eventuating from the defect inherent in the supplied product. What is central here is whether it is 
in the interests of fairness and equity to hold importers, distributors and retailers of these 
imported goods liable for manufacturing defects of which they themselves are unaware. In order 
for a manufacturer to be held liable under negligence, a third party consumer must establish that: 
 
(b) The product was defective; 
(c) A reasonable person in the position of the manufacturer would have foreseen the 
likelihood of the product being defective and causing harm to the plaintiff; 
(d) A reasonable person in the position of the manufacturer would have taken reasonable 
steps to prevent the product being defective and causing harm to the plaintiff; 
(e) The manufacturer did not take reasonable steps to prevent the product being defective 
and causing harm to the plaintiff; and 
(f) The defective product caused harm to the plaintiff. 239
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The consumer’s claim will succeed if the duty of care owed by the manufacturer is proved to 
have been breached through his negligence.240 Without a doubt, consumers who suffer personal 
injury or harm as a result of defective imported goods in Swaziland face an uphill task in 
establishing the above elements against foreign manufacturers. The crucial feature to note about 
the decision of Donoghue v  St evenson241
The only crucial factor in ascertaining the liability of foreign manufacturers is considering where 
the cause of action arose in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction.
 is that the case was decided in the context of 
manufacturers carrying on business within a country’s borders. This case applies only 
infrequently in Swaziland because, as seen above, most of the goods consumed are imported 
from neighbouring countries. It is now necessary to determine the delictual jurisdiction of courts 
in Swaziland. 
 
4.2.1. Jurisdiction of the courts in respect of foreign manufacturers 
242 It must be noted that 
there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper forum for determining liability of foreign 
manufacturers especially because the criteria used to determine the locus of a delict in different 
countries has not always been identical.243 It will be shown below that the problem of foreign 
manufacturers is not peculiar to Swaziland but the approaches to this problem are different for 
each country.244
The Privy Council in the case of Distillers C o (Bio-Chemicals) L td v  T hompson and anot her 
[1971] 1 All ER 694 (PC) explored three avenues in determining the place where the cause of 
action arose so as to vest a court with jurisdiction over foreign manufactured goods.
 
 
245 In this 
case the plaintiff sought an order to serve a writ of summons to the defendant English 
manufacturer having its registered offices and carrying on business in Britain.246
                                                          
240 Ibid 93. 
241 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 194 above). 
242 Macquoid-Mason (note 239 above) 95. See also Thomas v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (note 238 above) at 125; 
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244 Ibid. 
245 At 699. 
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 The defendant 
produced pharmaceuticals, including ‘Distval’, a sedative and sleep-inducing drug containing 
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thalidomide which was exported to New South Wales in Australia by a the second defendant 
distributor.247 The defective nature of the drug resulted in the plaintiff being born with defective 
eyesight and without arms as a result of the drug taken by its mother while pregnant in New 
South Wales, Australia.248 The question for determination was whether the plaintiff had, as 
against the defendant, a cause of action which arose within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales.249
The court stated that in determining whether a cause of action was foreign or local a court was to 
consider and apply a theory based on the three determinant factors.
  
 
250 The proper court was the 
one where either; (i) every ingredient of the delict occurred; or (ii) the last ingredient of the delict 
occurred; or (iii) the act of the defendant which gave rise to the cause of complaint occurred.251 
This test is referred to as the ‘substance test’ and was later considered in South Africa,252 
Australia253 and Canada.254 While generally accepting the test, Lord Pearson criticised the first 
factor of the theory as ‘too restrictive for the needs of modern times’, and the second as 
‘wrong’.255 The judge stated that in determining which country’s courts have the jurisdiction to 
try an action the degree of connection between the cause of action and the country concerned 
should be the determining factor.256 Lord Pearce held that ‘it is manifestly just and reasonable 
that a defendant should have to answer for his wrongdoing in the country where he did 
wrong’.257 In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to claim relief 
ion New South Wales since the act giving rise to the cause of complaint occurred there.258
In the Canadian case of Abbott-Smith v  Governors of  University of  Toronto 45 DLR (2d) 672 
(NSSC) an oral polio vaccine negligently produced in Toronto caused harm to the appellant in 
 
 
                                                          
247 At 696. 
248 Ibid. 
249 At 695. 
250 At 698-699. 
251 The last factor followed the rule laid down in Jackson v Spittali (1870) L.R 5 C.P 542, where it was held that the 
question whether a cause of action is to be decided as local or foreign is to be answered by ascertaining the place of 
‘the act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint.’ 
252 Thomas v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (note 238 above). 
253 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd & another (1990) ALR 124 (HC of A). 
254 Abbott-Smith v Governors of University of Toronto 45 DLR (2d) 672 (NSSC). 
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Nova Scotia. When it had to be determined which court between the two provinces had the 
necessary jurisdiction, it was held that a court with jurisdiction was one where all the elements of 
the delict occurred.259 However, this case was overturned by the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
case of Moran et al v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd 43 DLR (3d) 239. In this case the appellant’s 
husband who was an electrician was fatally injured in the province of Saskatchewan while 
removing a spent lightbulb negligently manufactured and assembled by the respondent in 
Ontario.260 The appellant claimed that the respondent was negligent in the manufacture and 
construction of the bulb and failed to provide safety checks to prevent the defective bulb from 
leaving the manufacturing plant for distribution.261 The issue was whether the defendant, which 
had its assets and business in Ontario, could be served with summons for an alleged tort 
committed in Saskatchewan.262 Dickson J departed from both the cases of Abbott-Smith v  
Governors of University of Toronto263 and Distillers Co (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd v Thompson,264
‘Generally speaking, in determining where a tort has been committed, it is unnecessary, and 
unwise, to have resort to any arbitrary set of rules. The place of acting and the place of harm 
theories are too arbitrary and inflexible to be recognised in contemporary jurisprudence.’
 and 
stated as follows: 
 
265
The learned judge went on to discard the first factor of the substance test as a ‘draconian theory’ 




266 He formulated a new rule applicable to the ‘careless manufacture’ thus:
‘[T]he following rule can be formulated:  where a foreign defendant carelessly manufactures a 
product in a foreign jurisdiction which enters into the normal channels of trade and he knows or 
ought to know both that as a result of his carelessness a consumer may well be injured and it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the product would be used or consumed where the plaintiff used or 
  
 
                                                          
259 Thomas v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (note 238 above) 123. 
260 At 241. 
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consumed it, then the forum in which the plaintiff suffered damage is entitled to exercise 
judicial discretion over that foreign defendant. This rule recognises the important interest a state 
has or injuries suffered by persons within its territory. It recognises that the importance of 
negligence as a tort is to protect against carelessly inflicted injury and that the predominating 
element is damage suffered. By tendering his products in the market place directly or through 
normal distributive channels, a manufacturer ought to assume the burden of defending those 
products wherever they cause harm as long as the forum into which the manufacturer is taken is 
one that he reasonably ought to have had in his contemplation when he so tendered his goods. 
This is particularly true of dangerously defective goods placed in the interprovincial flow of 
commerce.’267
The court was simply saying that manufacturers will be liable for goods they disseminate for 
public consumption either inside or outside of a county’s territorial borders. The court allowed 




In the South African context the liability of a foreign manufacturer was exhaustively dealt with 
by Van Reenen J in the case of Thomas v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1996 (2) SA 106 (C). The 
plaintiff in this case sued the defendant in Cape Town; the defendant’s principal place of 
business was in Gauteng.
  
 
269 The plaintiff was injured because the defendant manufacturer was 
responsible for a manufacturing defect in a cruise control mechanism of a motor vehicle the 
plaintiff had purchased from a dealer in Cape Town where he also lived.270 As a result of the 
defect, the motor vehicle vehicle’s cruise control mechanism forced the vehicle to accelerate and 
swerve off the road onto a fence by the roadside, thereby causing him bodily injury.271 The 
plaintiff sued the defendant in Cape Town where he had purchased the vehicle and where the 
accident had occurred.272 The question for determination was whether the court in Cape Town 
had jurisdiction over the matter in view of the fact that the defendant was based in Gauteng.273
                                                          
267 At 250. 
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273 At 111. 
 In 
the South African context a plaintiff may be an incola of one province and the defendant a 
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peregrinus of that province (but an incola of the Republic of South Africa generally) as was the 
situation in this case.274
The court recognised that choice of law problems arose when delictual jurisdiction over foreign 
manufactured goods had to be exercised.
 In deciding the matter Van Reenen J considered the delictual liability of 
foreign based manufacturers in different jurisdictions.  
 
275 The underlying factor is that there is no ‘hard and 
fast’ rule in determining the liability of foreign manufacturers especially because the criteria 
used to determine the locus of a delict in different contexts are not always identical.276 The court 
explained that if the ‘act and effect’ of the delict occur in different countries, the law of one of 
these countries was to apply to the exclusion of the other.277 The problem lay only in 
determining the locus of the delict.278 This issue is crucial because the cause of action determines 
which court has jurisdiction between two countries.279 Van Reenen J rejected the first element of 
the substance test that all elements of a delict must have occurred in a court’s jurisdictional area 
for it to assume jurisdiction.280 Instead, he formulated a test that was to apply in South African 
law.281
‘As already stated, the duty of care the defendant is alleged to have owed the plaintiff in the 
instant case is the duty to lawful users of vehicles manufactured and/or distributed by the 
defendant, including the plaintiff, to take all reasonable steps to ensure that such vehicles and 
their component parts are free from defects in design, quality and/or manufacture that might 
cause serious injury or death to such users in the event of their malfunctioning when being used. 
That duty, save that it is limited to lawful users, has been formulated without any restriction as 
regards territory, time or identity of the persons whom it is owed. It s apparent from the 
admitted documentation…that, although the defendant manufactures vehicles in Gauteng, they 
are intended for distribution throughout the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, the Kingdoms 
of Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as Namibia. In the circumstances, it is likely to have been in 
 Thus:  
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the reasonable contemplation of the defendant that defectively manufactured vehicles would be 
supplied and/or used, inter alia, in the jurisdiction of this court and that mishaps and injuries 
resulting from such defects might occur and result in damages there. Accordingly, the defendant 
owed the plaintiff a duty of care in this courts jurisdiction.’282
The conclusion reached by the court, which also appears to have been accepted as the position of 
South African law, is that for jurisdictional purposes the locus of a delict will be determined in 




Therefore, it is not necessary for all the ingredients of the delict to have happened within the 
court’s proximity for a court to be vested with jurisdiction.284
In Swaziland, perhaps the question on the liability of foreign manufacturers ought to have been 
considered by the court in the case of  Lungile Ndzinisa v  M cCarthy S waziland ( Pty) L td t /a 
Savells F urnishers (unreported) High Court Civil Case 3305/ 2003. This case concerned a 




The refrigerator in question had developed severe cracks on its corners, doors and edges after 
being used by the applicant for only nine months.286 It became apparent during the course of the 
case that the cracks may have been the result of a manufacturing defect or ‘factory fault’, as the 
applicant put it.287 When evidence was presented in court it was further revealed that one witness 
had previously purchased a similar refrigerator which developed the same problem.288 Despite 
returning the refrigerator to have it repaired or replaced by the respondent, the applicant was 
unsuccessful in her endeavours which then prompted her to invoke legal processes for 
cancellation of the hire purchase agreement.289 In deciding the matter, Mabuza J limited her 
decision to the contractual relationship between the parties as governed by the hire purchase 
agreement and found in favour of the applicant purchaser.290
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 While the question of foreign origin 
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of the refrigerator was not canvassed by the court, the court alluded to South African law in its 
finding.291
‘The use of South African legislation in Swaziland is illegal and not applicable. Swaziland has 
its own Hire Purchase Act. What then becomes of an agreement such as the one before court? 
My considered view is that it is void. What then governs the contract between the parties? Their 
contract is subject to the common law. However, I was not asked to make a finding on the law 




It is not a far-fetched conclusion from the reference to South African law in the excerpt above 




Perhaps the court should have made general comments about the liability of foreign 
manufacturers who supply defective goods. Nevertheless, if the reasoning of the court in Thomas 
v BMW South Africa294 is anything to go by, then foreign manufactures may be held liable in the 
courts of Swaziland within the confines of the test formulated by that court.295 Furthermore, the 
Canadian decision of Moran e t al  v  P yle N ational ( Canada) L td,296
                                                          
291 At Para 31. 
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293 Although Swaziland does export refrigerators (see ‘Economy of Swaziland’ available at 
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 already examined above 
seems to vest courts where the delict occurred with jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers. 
However, it is unclear what position the courts in Swaziland would adopt in dealing with harm 
caused by imported goods which cause physical harm as a result of negligent manufacture in 
view of the tests applied in the different countries as seen above. The question is left for the 
courts to decide whether they have the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate on a claim brought by 






5. THE HIRE PURCHASE ACT 11 of 1969  
5.1. Definition and scope  
‘Hire purchase’ is an agreement for the sale of goods where the purchase price is paid in 
instalments and ownership in such goods does not transfer to the purchaser until payment of the 
last instalment is made.297 When a consumer buys goods on hire purchase, his bargaining power 
is substantially reduced because he is tempted to purchase goods he cannot afford, while the 
seller on the other hand is usually in a dominant bargaining position because he supplies both the 
goods and the credit required. 298 As a result, the consumer may be susceptible to abuse.299 The 
potential of consumer exploitation in hire purchase sales has led some countries to introduce 
statutory regulation in hire purchase selling.300 For example, South Africa enacted the Hire 
Purchase Act 36 of 1942301 while the UK enacted the Hire Purchase Act of 1938.302
‘[T]he mischief of poor persons being enticed into shops and being sold goods of more or less 
value at prices which they can ill-afford to pay and on terms which are harsh and 
unconscionable, and it was intended to give protection to such persons against their own 
improvidence and folly.’
 In the case 
of Smit and Venter v Fourie and another 1946 SA 9 (WLD), Millin J explained the rationale for 
the now repealed South African Hire Purchase Act as follows: 
 
303
‘I think it is clear that the Hire Purchase Act, 36 of 1942 and the clauses therein, relevant to the 
present enquiry, were passed with the view to protecting purchasers of goods under hire-
purchase agreements against their own misplaced optimism in their ability of keeping up with 
the payments of the instalments and so becoming owners of the goods, and of avoiding being 
 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by De Villiers JP in the case of National Motors v Fall 1958 
(2) SA 570 (E) as follows: 
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compelled to return goods and forfeit all instalments paid, even where the total instalments are 
very little short of the full purchase price.’304
Sellers often reserve ownership through a suspensive condition (sometimes referred to as a 
reservation clause or pactum reservati dominii) contained in a hire purchase agreement.
 
 
The above excerpts reveal that hire purchase legislation was intended to protect consumers. In 
Swaziland, the Hire Purchase Act of 1969 was also introduced as a regulatory measure to control 
sales concluded through hire purchase agreements. 
 
5.2. The contract of sale in hire purchase agreements 
305 The 
effect of including a suspensive condition in a hire purchase sale is that the transfer of ownership 
to the purchaser is temporarily delayed and remains vested in the seller until the last instalment is 
paid by the consumer.306
The above excerpt implies that a hire purchase agreement is a contract of sale because it is an 
agreement in terms of which ‘goods are sold’. If that is the correct position, the conclusion is that 
a hire purchase agreement is, in fact, a sale. It is a well-established principle of the Roman Dutch 
law of sale that a sale is complete or perfecta when three requirements have been satisfied.
 Suspensive conditions are common in hire purchase statutes and in 
Swaziland it is found in section 2 of the Hire Purchase Act which provides as follows: 
 
‘“hire-purchase agreement” means any agreement whereby goods a re s old subject to t he 
condition that t he ow nership in such good s s hall not p ass merely by the transfer of the 
possession of such goods, and the purchase price is to be paid in instalments, two or more of 
which are payable after such transfer; and includes any other agreement which has, or 
agreements which together have, the same import, whatever form such agreement or agreements 
may take.’ (Emphasis added) 
 
307
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order for a sale to exist there must be consent of the parties to enter into the sale agreement;308 
the subject-matter or object (merx) of the sale must be determined or readily ascertainable by the 
parties;309 and the purchase price must have been fixed or definite.310 If all these elements exist 
then legal duties follow immediately, but if one of these elements is missing, there is no sale.311 
That the items purchased have been delivered does not imply that ownership in the goods has 
passed to the consumer.312 The passing of ownership is not a requirement that brings a sale into 
existence but only the agreement constitutes the sale.313
‘[The] word “sale” is used with various meanings. To lawyers discussing it from an academic 
point of view it means the time when the parties have arrived at a valid and binding agreement, 
apart from any question whether the purchase price has been paid or whether there has been 
delivery of the thing sold.’
 In the case of Nimmo v  K linkenberg 
Estates Co Ltd 1904 TH 310, it was stated: 
 
314
While section 2 of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969 states that a hire purchase agreement is an 
agreement where goods are sold, it has been held that such an agreement is not a sale under 
the law of hire purchase.
 
 
315 This conflicting view was enunciated in the very old case of 
Quirk’s T rustees v A ssignees of  L iddle & C o. (1885) 3 SC 322. In this case, Liddle’s 
assignees entered into a contract with Quirk for the sale of hotel furniture.316 The purchase 
price of the furniture was the amount of £ 650 .00 which Quirk agreed to pay in four 
instalments within a period of twelve months. It was further agreed that ownership in the 
furniture would pass to Quirk only upon payment of last instalment. The furniture was 
subsequently delivered and Quirk failed to pay the amount as agreed.317
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 The question for 
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determination was whether ownership in the goods had passed to Quirk. Lord Chief Justice 
De Villiers stated that the very existence of a suspensive condition in a contract intended to 
be one of sale was inconsistent and repugnant to the nature of sales in general.318 The court 
concluded that since contracts of sale do not generally contain suspensive conditions, the 
agreement concluded was not one of sale.319




320 and adopted the position set out in Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of Liddle & 
Co.321 that suspensive conditions are inconsistent with contracts of sale. Chief Justice Innes 
explained why the court in Quirk’s T rustees v  Assignees of  L iddle & Co.322 came to the 
conclusion that a contract of sale was suspended until the suspensive condition was 
fulfilled.323 Based on the above decisions and other judgments that followed this line of 
reasoning, it may be said that there is no contract of sale between a consumer and a supplier 
in hire purchase agreements until payment of the last instalment is made by the consumer.324
This position is clearly contrary to the wording of section 2 of the Hire Purchase Act of 
Swaziland which states that a hire purchase agreement is a sale.
  
 
325 The courts seem to make 
much of the suspensive condition, which they consider as the dividing line between a 
contract of sale and a sale on hire purchase. In other words, if a contract of sale contains a 
suspensive condition on the passing of ownership, then that contract is one of hire purchase 
and not of sale.326 There are later decisions that followed this line of reasoning.327
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However, all the decisions following the approach set out in Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of 
Liddle & Co.328  have been criticised.329 The criticism derives from the question whether the 
suspensive condition suspends the whole contract of sale until payment of the last 
instalment, or whether the contract of sale comes into existence but only the transfer of 
ownership is suspended pending the payment of the last instalment.330 There is no definite 
answer to this question.331
‘The question whether the condition in a hire purchase agreement reserving ownership in the 
article sold in the seller until the whole purchase price has been paid has the effect of 
suspending the whole contract, or whether the contract of sale comes into existence but only the 
delivery of the article into the hands of the purchaser is conditional, is a matter which does not 
appear to have been finally settled in our law.’
 In the case of Forsdick Motors Ltd v Lauritzen 1967 (3) S.A 247 







‘What is the legal effect [on the contract] of a pactum reservati dominii? Does the clause 
suspend the whole contract or merely the passing of the ownership, or, to put the question 
differently, is the whole contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition, or is it a completed 
sale with a term making only the passing of ownership conditional?’
 approach the issue in the following way: 
 
334
The consequences of the two interpretations expressed above are two-fold.
 
 
335 If the suspensive 
condition suspends the sale in its entirety then risk in the goods does not pass to the consumer 
when the hire purchase agreement is concluded.336
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 On the other had, if a sale comes into 
existence but only transfer of ownership is suspended then risk passes immediately the hire 
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purchase agreement is concluded.337 It has been demonstrated that case law adopts the former 
position rather than the latter. However, the issue sparked a jurisprudential debate among South 
African legal scholars and writers who adopt different views. The reason why there was 
considerable debate on the topic is because the definition of ‘hire purchase agreement’ in section 
1 of the repealed South African Hire purchase Act conflicted with the judgments examined 
above.338 The debate is relevant in Swaziland because section 1 of the repealed South African 
Hire purchase Act contained a similar definition of ‘hire purchase agreement’ as contained in the 
Hire Purchase Act339 of Swaziland. It is for that reason that the judgments and the debates on the 
South African section 1 apply fully in the context of Swaziland. A legal scholar who agrees with 
the decisions examined above is Belcher,340 who asserts that the courts are correct in saying a 
contract of sale does not come into existence in hire purchase agreements until the payment of 
the last instalment by the consumer. It is interesting to note that this author does not clearly state 
the kind of relationship that exists between a consumer and a seller in a hire purchase agreement 
if the contract is not that of sale.341 He says that it is ‘a very real and definite contractual 




343 on the other hand contend that a contract of sale comes into existence 
when goods are sold on hire purchase and hold the view that only the passing of ownership is 
suspended. Mackeurtan344 shares the same views and argues that the Cape Supreme Court in the 
decision of Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of Liddle & Co.345 was untenable and wrong in holding 
that a suspensive condition in a hire purchase agreement negates the agreement as being one of 
sale.346
                                                          
337 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 13. 
338 Belcher (note 307 above) 140-143, agrees with the courts’ views, while B O’Donovan Mackeurtan’s Sale of 
Goods in South Africa 4 ed (1972) 154, and Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 13, reject the decision in 
Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of Liddle & Co. (note 315 above). 
339 S2. Hire Purchase Act of 1969. 
340 Belcher (note 307 above) 137-143. 
341 Ibid 140. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 14, 19. 
344 O’Donovan (note 340 above) 96-99. 
345 Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of Liddle & Co. (note 315 above). 
346 O’Donovan (note 340 above) 96-99. See also Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 15. 
 The only requirements for a sale to exist is if the parties have agreed on the goods to be 
sold (the merx), the price to be paid (the pretium), and they have the intention that one will be 
exchanged for the other (animus vivendi et emendi); and once these conditions are in place then 
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the sale is complete.347 The common thread in the arguments of Mackeurtan,348 Diemont and 
Aronstam349 is that a contract of sale arises upon the fulfilment of these three elements and that 
in hire purchase agreements they are in existence. Therefore, whether or not a suspensive 
condition suspends the transfer of ownership does not affect the sale because it is already 
perfecta upon conclusion of the hire purchase agreement.350
It appears that the difficulties are difficult to resolve.
  
 
351 Nevertheless, this debate ended in South 
African law when the South African Hire Purchase Act was eventually repealed in 1980. While 
the views expressed by Diemont and Aronstam352 are quite logical, the law appears to be that 
expressed in Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of L iddle & Co.353  and all the subsequent cases that 
followed this decision.354 A more recent case on this issue is that of Diggers Development (Pty) 
Ltd v  C ity of  M atlosana and A nother [2011] ZASCA 247 (1 December 2011). This case 
concerned the sale of immovable property between a municipality and a company which was 
subject to a deed of sale which contained suspensive conditions.355 Although not discussing hire 
purchase sales, Cloete JA, after citing a number of authorities, held that that no contract of sale 
comes into existence until the final instalment is payable in a sale subject to a suspensive 
condition.356
However, the cases already discussed raise serious practical issue for consumers. If there is no 
contract of sale in existence between a consumer and a seller under a hire purchase agreement, it 
follows that that consumer cannot invoke the aedilitian remedies against the seller until payment 
of the last instalment.
 It cannot be gainsaid that such judicial pronouncements remain law.  
 
357
                                                          
347 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 18. See also Fouché (note 112 above) 154.  
348 O’Donovan (note 340 above) 96-99. 
349 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 18. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Forsdick Motors Ltd v Lauritzen (note 330 above). 
352 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 14-20. 
353 Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of Liddle & Co. (note 315 above). 
354 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 119-122. 
355 At Para 6. 
356 At paragraphs 23- 24.  
357 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 132-133. See also Belcher (note 307 above) 140. 
 The aedilitian remedies either under the actio qua nti m inoris, or the 
actio redhibitoria shield consumers from sellers who supply defective goods under a contract of 
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sale.358 However, since no contract of sale exits, the inexorable conclusion is that consumers 
have no remedies under the law of sale.359 Diemont and Aronstam360 suggest that in order for a 
consumer to invoke these remedies he must first bring a contract of sale into existence by paying 
all the instalments upfront. In this way the last instalment will have been paid and the sale comes 
into existence.361 The problem with this approach is that the consumer may not have the money 
to pay the money in full, and if he does have the money, paying the full purchase price may 
render him susceptible to the defence of waiver by the seller if the consumer does invoke the 
aedilitian remedies.362
The enquiry on hire purchase agreements may never again see the light of day in South African 




Besides controlling unscrupulous sellers the Hire Purchase Act also ensures that consumers who 
cannot afford to pay the cash price in a single transaction obtain the goods they seek through 
piecemeal payments.
 The courts in Swaziland ought to 
take the baton and develop the law on hire purchase because the Hire Purchase Act of Swaziland 
is still in force. Perhaps the development will be in line with the South African decided cases 
which do not recognise a contract of sale in hire purchase agreements. Until the problem is 
effectively dealt with by the Courts in Swaziland, it will persist. 
 
5.3. The selling price 
364 In order to achieve this objective section 7 of the Hire Purchase Act 
prescribes mandatory stipulations for all hire purchase agreements one of which is the selling 
price. It will be seen below that the issue of the selling price is confusing to most consumers, 
irrespective of social standing. While popular belief is that the poor are the most exploited in hire 
purchase agreements because of their weak bargaining power, it is suggested that the in-built 
provisions of section 7 of the Hire Purchase Act affect even the affluent consumers in society.365
                                                          
358 Fouché (note 112 above) 160. 




363 Ibid 123. 
364 Ibid 32. 




The selling price can either be the ‘cash price’ and the ‘purchase price’ of goods.366 A distinction 
must be drawn between the two. 
Section 7 (1) (a) is to be read together with section 2 and section 5 (1) of the Act. Section 5 (1) of 
the Act requires the seller to inform the buyer in writing of the cash price before a hire purchase 
agreement is entered into between the parties. When these sections are read together it is 
apparent that a consumer purchaser must be made aware of the cash price in writing before 
entering into the agreement and, if he enters into the agreement, the cash price must be included 
in the agreement itself.
Section 7 (1) (a) and (b) embodies provisions on the ‘cash price’ 
and ‘purchase price’ respectively. Section 7 (1) (a) provides that every agreement shall contain ‘a 
statement of the price with which the goods may be purchased by the buyer from the seller for a 
cash amount in money’. In order to place the section in its proper context it is essential to define 
‘cash price’. Section 2 of the Hire Purchase Act defines a cash price as follows: 
 
‘“cash price”- in relation to any goods, means the price stated in respect of those goods under 
section 7 (1) (a).’ 
 
367 Section 7 (1) (b) on the other hand requires the ‘purchase price’ to be 
included in the agreement. This section states that every agreement shall contain ‘a statement of 
the amounts which are included in the purchase price and each such amount shall be separately 
specified opposite the matter in respect of which it is payable’.368
When comparing the above provisions it appears that a purchase price consists of other amounts 
in addition to a cash price.
 Section 2 defines a purchase 
price as follows: 
 
‘“purchase price”- the total sum payable under any agreement to the seller by the buyer, 
exclusive of any sum payable in terms of the agreement as a penalty or as damages for the 
breach thereof or by way of interest upon instalments  which are in arrear.’ 
 
369
                                                          
366 S. 7 (1) (a) & (b) of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969. 
367 S. 7 (1) (a), S. 5 (1) & S. 2 of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969.  
368 S. 7 (1) (b) of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969. 
369 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 86. 
 They include ancillary finance charges, maintenance fees, 
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accessories fees, licence fees, insurance fees, service fees, delivery fees, instalment fees, etc.370 
The additional amounts included must be those readily ascertainable at the time of entering into 
the agreement and do not include any subsequent amounts arising during the subsistence of the 
contract.371 Any amounts, though incidental to the agreement, which are not definite during the 
conclusion of the hire purchase agreement, do not form part of the purchase price and are not to 
be included in the agreement.372
The cash price and purchase price was also considered in the leading case of Van der Wath v  
Pienaar 1948 (1) SA 587 (T). In this case the plaintiff seller and the defendant purchaser had 
entered into a hire purchase agreement for the sale of certain equipment, including a three stamp 
battery belonging to the plaintiff.
  
 
373 The agreement provided that if the defendant failed to pay 
the instalments the goods would be auctioned and the plaintiff would be paid from the proceeds 
of the auction conducted on the goods.374 In finding that the agreement did not comply with 
section 5 (1) (a) of the now repealed South African Hire Purchase Act, the court held that the 
Legislature had not intended the purchase price to be the cash price of goods sold on hire 
purchase.375
‘There is a clear indication that the Legislature did not intend the purchase price stipulated in a 
hire purchase agreement to be the price at which the goods sold could be purchased for a cash 
amount in money.’
 Section 5 (1) (a) of the South African Hire Purchase Act was similar to section 7 (1) 
(a) of the Hire Purchase Act of Swaziland in that it required the cash price to be stipulated. 
Therefore, the judgment is relevant for Swaziland.  Commenting on section 5 (1) (a) and (b) of 
the repealed South African Hire Purchase Act Neser J, made the following pronouncement: 
 
376
The court further expressed the view that the purchase price was more than the cash price 




                                                          
370 Ibid. See also S. 2 of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969. 
371 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 86. 
372 Ibid. 
373 At 589. 
374 At 588. 
375 At 590-591. 





This view is supported by Belcher378 who asserts that a cash price cannot exceed the purchase 
price and that if that if this were to happen it would be contrary to the provisions of the South 
African Hire Purchase Act. Section 16 (b) of the Hire Purchase Act of Swaziland also lends 
support to the view that the cash price is less than the purchase price because it makes provision 
to the effect that if the purchase price is paid in full before the due date, it may be reduced.379 
The courts in Swaziland are likely to adopt the approach adopted by South African courts when 
faced with an interpretation of section 7 of the Hire Purchase Act of Swaziland.380 The 
provisions of the Act also do not indicate the contrary. Comparatively, the purchase price 
exceeds the cash price because of the additional fees and charges it includes.381
Consumers are not usually aware of this difference in amounts until the last minute when they 
enter into the agreement, especially because the hire purchase agreement itself contains the 
figures. The general failure by consumers to differentiate between the cash price and the 
purchase price which contains additional costs and charges will not only unsettle the poor and 




The purpose of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991 (Money Lending Act) is 
to regulate the micro-lending industry by protecting consumers in need of financial assistance 
through monetary loans from unscrupulous lenders.
 The consumer must be made 
aware of both selling prices at the earliest convenience so as to properly decide whether or not to 
purchase goods on hire purchase.  
 
6. THE MONEY LENDING AND CREDIT FINANCING ACT 3 of 1991  
383 The motivation for examining Money 
Lending Act is driven by the often high interest rates consumers in Swaziland are subjected to 
when they have to repay loans offered by money lenders.384
                                                          
378 Belcher (note 307 above) 173. 
379 S. 16 (b) of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969. 
380 The fact that S. 5 of the South African Hire Purchase Act of 1942, was judicially considered in South Africa may 
assist courts in Swaziland whenever S. 7 of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969 is in issue.  
381 S. 2 (1) of the Hire Purchase Act of 1969. 
382 Diemont & Aronstam (note 298 above) 32. See also Belcher (note 307 above) 166. 
383 See the Long title of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991. See also Reckson Mawelela v MB 
Association of Money Lenders & Another (note 12 above) at 10. 
384 Paulos Simelane v Bonisile Magagula and another In re: Bonisile Magagula v Paulos Simelane (note 12 above); 
Reckson Mawelela v Mbabane Association of Money Lenders & Another (note 12 above); Afinta Financial Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Luke Malinga T/A Long Distance Transport (unreported) High Court Civil Case No. 123/ 2001. 
 The urgent need for further 
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protection is illuminated by Annandale A.C.J., who launched as scathing attack on money 
lenders charging exorbitant interest at the expense of disadvantaged consumers in the case of 
Paulos Simelane v Bonisile Magagula and another In re: Bonisile Magagula v Paulos Simelane 
(unreported) High Court Civil Case 948/ 2005. He stated as follows: 
 
‘Shylock, micro money lender or loan shark- William Shakespeare immortalized the ruthless 
exploitation of indigent borrowers of money at exorbitant costs in the ‘Merchant of Venice’. To 
satisfy a debt, the shylock had to extract his pound of flesh without causing a drop of blood to 
spill in the process. A likewise scenario has developed in Swaziland where moneylenders seek 
to extract their ‘pounds of flesh’ but not carrying how much misery, hardship and unlawful 
exploitation the impecunious but imprudent and unsuspecting borrowers are caused to suffer in 
the process…It is a malpractice that causes misery to many Swazis who are bamboozled and 
cajoled into financial serfdom by moneylenders who charge unlawful enormous amounts of 
interest, which the borrowers ingratiatingly agree to, with the principal sum of money 
multiplied many times over by the time the borrower eventually regains financial freedom.  The 
courts of the land have adversely commented on the scourge of this infamous exploitation but 
the legislature is yet to enact a regulated micro money lending industry. It must be done sooner 
rather than later if the lot of the common man and woman, the average citizen, is of any concern 
to those in the halls of power. The receiver of revenue may also stand to gain in the form of tax 
collection.’385
The Money Lending Act
 
 
386 does not define a ‘moneylender’ and the definition of ‘money 
lending transaction’ is unhelpful in seeking guidance on the exact nature of the legal relationship 
between parties to such agreements. It must be pointed out that the Money Lending Act does not 
apply to any transaction to which the Hire Purchase Act applies.387
 
 Court decisions dealing with 
the money lending have predominantly focused on the in duplum r ule. This rule will be 
discussed with reference to case law below. 
 
 
                                                          
385 At paragraphs 2-3. 
386 S. 2 of the Act only defines a ‘money-lending transaction’. 
387 S. 10 (d) of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991. 
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7.1. Analysis of case law with regard to the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991 
In Afinta Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Luke Malinga T/A Long Distance Transport (unreported) 
High Court Civil Case 123/ 2001 the Money Lending Act388 was in issue. This case was an 
urgent application moved by the applicant motor vehicle financing company for the cancellation 
of a vehicle rental credit agreement and the repossession of its 30 seater bus form the respondent 
transport operator. 389 The respondent had failed to pay the agreed monthly instalments in terms 
of the agreement. Among other issues to be decided was whether the applicant had been charged 
excessive interest contrary to section 3 (1) (b) of the Money Lending Act.390
The respondent alleged that the applicant had charged an interest of 14% on the principal debt 
contrary to the above provision. Any credit transaction or lending agreement contrary to the 
provisions of the Act is null and void and as such unenforceable.
 Section 3 (1) (b) of 
the Act of the Act provides as follows: 
 
‘3. (1) Where in respect of any money-lending or credit transaction the principal debt: 
(b) exceeds E500 or such amount as may be prescribed from time to time, no lender shall charge 
an annual interest rate of more than 8 percentage points, or such amount as may be prescribed , 
above the rate for discounts , rediscounts and advances announced from time to time by the 
Central Bank of Swaziland Order, 1974.’ 
 
391 The court found that the 
interest in issue was not on the principal debt but was interest on arrear charges.392 In the case of 
Reckson Mawelela v M.B. Association of Money Lenders and Another (unreported) Civil Appeal 
Case 43/ 1999 the appellant in this case sought an order to set aside a default judgment that had 
been granted in favour of the respondent.393 The appellant had pledged his motor vehicle and 
borrowed from the respondent the amount of E5 000- 00 charged a monthly interest of 30% on 
the loaned sum.394
                                                          
388 S. 3 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991. 
389 At 1. 
390 At 1. The judgment constantly refers to section 4. This section does not regulate interest rates but deals with 
disclosure of such interest and stipulations that ought to be included in credit agreements. 
391 S. 6 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991. 
392 At 6. 
393 At 1. 
394 At 2. 
 After making payments of E1 300 and E6 300- 00 respectively, the appellant 
was informed by the respondent that the balance due and outstanding in terms of the loan was the 
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amount of E9 923- 68.395 The appellant failed to pay the amount claimed and the respondent 
obtained an order against him which also declared the vehicle executable for the recovery of the 
loaned amount.396 In granting the appeal, Tebbutt JA explained that the common law in duplum 
rule has its origins in Roman law and further states that ‘no interest runs- and is therefore 
claimable- after the amount of interest is equal to the capital’.397 For example, interest on a 
principal loan amount of E3 000-00 ceases to run if it equals the outstanding principal debt E3 
000- 00. In Swaziland, the in duplum rule is reaffirmed and entrenched in the Money lending 
Act398 which states that no lender shall recover from a borrower of credit an amount exceeding 
the sum of the principal debt owed.399
Another important decision on the Money Lending Act is that of Paulos Si melane v B onisile 
Magagula and anot her In r e: B onisile M agagula v  P aulos Si melane.
  
 
400 The plaintiff money 
lender sought to recover an amount of over E20 000- 00 from a debt of E2 000- 00 loaned and 
advanced to the defendant who earned a meager salary of E2 326- 00.401  The 30% interest 
charged on the principal debt of E2 000 mutated into a claim for the amount of E15 373- 00 
against the defendant for a loan agreement that was to run for three months.402  The question for 
determination revolved around the validity of the loan agreement between the parties in view of 
section 3 and section 6 of the Money Lending Act.403 The court easily came to the conclusion 
that the interest rate of 30% was above the statutory minimum prescribed by section 3 of the 
Act.404
                                                          
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid. 
397 At 9. See also Union Government v Jordaan’s Executor 1916 TPD 411 at 413; Van Coppenhagen v Van 
Coppenhagen 1947 (1) SA 567 (T) at 581-582.  
398 S. 3 as read with S. 6 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Paulos Simelane v Bonisile Magagula and another In re: Bonisile Magagula v Paulos Simelane (note 12 above). 
401 At paragraphs 2-4. 
402 At paragraphs 4-5. 
403 At Para 13.  
404 At  Para 22. 
 Section 3 bars moneylenders from recovering an annual interest of more than 8% 
annually. In this case the creditor set the interest at 30% per month. The court reasoned that this 




The in dupl um rule was also considered by Dlamini J in the case of Bhokile E lliot Sh iba v 
Swaziland Development and Savings Bank and Others (unreported) High Court Civil Case 1716/ 
2006. The applicant in this case moved a rescission application to nullify an order of court 
granted in favour of the respondent under an acknowledgment of debt the parties has signed. The 
applicant had contended that the amounts claimed violated the in duplum rule. In dismissing the 
application, the court highlighted that the rule finds resonance in section 3 (1) (b) and section 6 
(1) of the Money Lending Act.405 Dlamini J further opined that while interest does not lose its 
character it ought not to offend the rule.406 What must be noted is that the in duplum rule as it 
applies under the common law does not substantially have the same effect under the Money 
Lending Act.407 Section 3 (1) (b) prohibits a money lender from setting interest above 8% of a 
rate set by the Central bank to the detriment of consumers. For example, if the central bank set 
the interest rate at 15%, a money lender was to set its interest at any rate whose maximum would 
not exceed 8%.408 This means the total interest that may be set by a money lender should not 
exceed 23% and similarly, if the Central bank sets the interest rate at 5%, a money lender would 
not be at liberty to charge any interest over the total of 13%.409  That the common law in duplum 
rule is qualified under the Money Lending Act was explained by Hlophe J in some of his 
decisions.410 Hlophe J. introduced this factor which courts and litigants alike had glaringly failed 
to take into account when pursuing their claims under the Money Lending Act.411
In the recent case of Swaziland D evelopment F inance C orporation v  M zuzu C onstruction and  




                                                          
405 At Para 66. 
406 At Para 63. 
407 Swaziland Development Finance Corporation v Mzuzu Construction and others (unreported) High Court Civil 
Case 20/ 2011 At Para 16. 
408 At Para 16. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Swaziland Development Finance Corporation v Mzuzu Construction and others (note 407 above); Dandi 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Frederick J. Hawley (unreported) High Court Civil Case 90/ 2012. 
411 For example, see the cases of Reckson Mawelela v Mbabane Association of Money Lenders & Another (note 12 
above); Afinta Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Luke Malinga T/A Long Distance Transport (note 384 above); Paulos 
Simelane v Bonisile Magagula and another In re: Bonisile Magagula v Paulos Simelane (note 12 above). 
412 S. 3 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991. 
 was once again 
in issue. In this case, the plaintiff loaned and advanced to the first defendant the amount of E200 
000- 00 as working capital for the defendant’s construction company while the other three 
defendants had signed surety agreements undertaking to pay the sum if the first defendant failed 
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to fulfill the loan agreement.413 In terms of the loan agreement the amount was repayable in 
instalments to be paid within forty two months at an annual interest rate fixed at ‘Prime plus 
4.5%’, which was at the time of concluding the agreement fixed at 16% per annum.414
The court was faced with the question whether it could declare an undisputed debt on the 
strength of section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. Hlophe J. explained the importance of the last part of 
section 3 (1) (b), which was of significant importance because the Central Bank of Swaziland 
does from time to time adjust the interest rate. In the present case it had been set at 11.5% when 
the agreement was concluded.
 The 
plaintiff issued a summons after defendant had failed to pay the amount owing. The defendants 
did not defend the substantive claim but simply attacked the validity of the loan agreement, 
contending that it was null and void because it offended section 3 (1) (b) of the Money Lending 
Act. 
 
415 The plaintiff did not apply the statutory maximum interest of 
8%, but a lesser 4.5% which added up to 16%.416 The court clarified that the levying of interest 
and the 8% maximum as provided in section 3 (1) (b) of the Money Lending Act served to 
qualify the in duplum rule.417  Not only does interest top running when it equals the principal 
loan amount, but the amount of interest charged in terms of a money lending agreement always 
depends on the rates for discounts, rediscounts and advances announced by the Central Bank of 
Swaziland from time to time.418 The rate of discount (or repo rate) is the rate at which 
commercial banks can borrow money from the Central Bank which periodically fixes the rate on 
economic considerations.419 The prime rate on the other hand is the rate at which commercial 
banks lend out money to their clients and this rate is usually higher than the repo rate because 
banks have to make profit.420 Therefore, if for example, interest is set at 4.5% above a prime 
interest rate of 14.5%, the total interest required would be 19%.421
                                                          
413 At paragraphs 2-3. 
414 At Para 3. 
415 At Para 16. 
416 Ibid. 
417 At paragraphs 19-26. 
418 S. 3 (1) (b) of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991 as read with the Central Bank Order of 
1974. 
419 Swaziland Development Finance Corporation v Olive Mhlobo Sikhondze t/a Mntimandze Flats (unreported) High 
Court Civil Case 2196/ 2010, at Para 9. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid. 
 The above case introduced an 
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existing but often ignored dimension in money lending agreements. As already stated above 
Hlophe J introduced a factor which previous courts and litigants alike had glaringly failed to take 
into account when pursuing their claims under the Money Lending Act. 
 
Hlophe J was once again called upon to explain the operation of the in duplum rule under the 
Money Lending Act in the case of Dandi I nvestments (Pty) L td v Frederick J. Hawley 
(unreported) High Court Civil Case 90/ 2012. In this case the applicant borrowed a sum of E40 
000- 00 and pledged his vehicle to the respondent.422 The respondent loaned and advanced to the 
applicant an amount of 32 000- 00 with, the balance of E8 000- 00 being set-off as interest.423 
After a while the loan mutated into the sum of E91 800- 00 which the applicant failed to pay.424 
Having failed to pay the amount coupled with the fact that the respondent was now using the 
pledged vehicle, the applicant sought the court’s intervention in cancelling the loan agreement.425 
The court clarified the position of the in dupl um rule under the Money Lending Act426
‘I can only mention in passing that in terms of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act no 






 In this case, because the court could not ascertain the prime interest rate set by the Central bank 
at the time the agreement was concluded, and since the parties had not agreed on any fixed 
interest, the applicant was directed to pay the outstanding loan with the mora
 (Emphasis added) 
 
428 interest of 9%.429
The common thread running through the cases examined above is that the most money lenders 
exploit consumers by charging high interest in contravention of sections 3 and 6 of the Money 
  
 
                                                          
422 At Para 5. 
423 Ibid. 
424 At Para 14. 
425 At Para 13. 
426 S. 3 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act of 1991. 
427 At Para 5. 
428 ‘Mora’ is a Latin word meaning ‘willful delay or default in fulfilling a legal obligation’. See Garner (note 49 
above) 1030. In this context, mora interest is default interest expected from a debtor. 
429 At Para 31. 
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Lending Act which entrench the in duplum rule. Having examined the Money Lending Act, it is 
necessary to go on and consider the Fair Trading Act of 2001.  
 
8. THE FAIR TRADING ACT, 2001 
This Act came into force on the 5th of November 2001 and provides for the standard code of 
trading conduct.430 Part II of the Fair Trading Act is one of the most important parts because it 
regulates misleading, deceptive and unfair practices in the supply chain.431 The application of the 
Fair Trading Act is wide-ranging because not only does it apply in within Swaziland’s borders, 
but it also applies to persons engaged in business outside of Swaziland provided they are resident 
or ordinarily carry out their business in Swaziland.432 Goods bearing false trade descriptions are 
prohibited in Swaziland and cannot be imported from other countries.433 It must be highlighted 
that in prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct, the Fair Trading Act uses peremptory 
language and subjects violations of its provisions to penalties.434 Persons are prohibited from 
contravening the provisions of Part II of the Fair Trading Act unless they can establish that the 
contravention was either a mistake, or due to reliance on information supplied by another person, 
or caused by another person after but steps were taken to avoid it.435
The Act prohibits bait advertising which is often used by sellers in luring or inducing consumers 
into purchasing goods other than those advertised.
  
 
436 The advertising of goods that will not be 
supplied at the advertised price or quantity as stated in an advertisement is also prohibited.437 
Where goods are advertised, the person who makes the advert must ensure that the goods are 
available and supplied as advertised particularly when it comes to the price and quantity.438
                                                          
430 S. 1 and the Long Title of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
431 S. 4- S. 19 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
432 S. 3 (1) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
433 S. 19 (1) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
434 Part II as read with S. 25 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
435 S. 25 as read with S. 21 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
436 S. 13 (1) (a) of Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
437 S. 13 (1) (b) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
438 S. 13 (2) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
 The 
purpose of this section is to protect consumers against being lured into shops where goods are 
not available according to the manner they were advertised. Other conduct that is expressly 
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prohibited is ‘referral selling’ which occurs when a consumer benefits from informing a supplier 
on where to find other consumers.439




440 The Act simply states that a person shall not promote or operate a pyramid selling 
scheme and goes on to define what constitutes such a scheme.441 In the case of Mamba an d 
Others v The Central Bank of Swaziland and O thers (unreported) High Court Civil Case 4536/ 
2008 a pyramid scheme was defined in terms of the US Securities and Exchange Commission.442 
In this case the applicant’s three bank accounts and assets were seized and frozen by the 
respondent for unlawfully defrauding and masterminding the theft of large sums of money 
belonging to consumers through deposit-taking under a pyramid scheme.443 The Respondent 
exercised its powers under the Financial Institutions Act of 2005 to freeze the applicant’s assets 
and accounts.444 The court dismissed the application for the release of the assets and accounts 
only on points of law, but felt duty-bound to comment on the scourge of pyramid schemes.445 It 
is interesting to note however, that instead of relying on the definition of a pyramid scheme as 
contained in the Fair Trading Act,446 the court resorted to defining the phrase in terms of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission.447 Furthermore, the court did not refer to the Fair Trading 
Act anywhere in the judgment despite that pyramid schemes are prohibited under section 18 of 
the Fair Trading Act.448
                                                          
439 S. 14 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
440 S. 18 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
441 S. 18 (1) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
442 At Para 46. 
443 At Paragraphs 1-2, 23. 
444 At Para 24.  
445 At Para 22.’ 
446 S. 18 (2) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
447 At Para 46. 
448 S. 19 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
 Despite these material omissions in the judgment, the above case reveals 





Nevertheless, there are two significant weaknesses in the Fair Trading Act. The first weakness is 
that the Act vests power in two different Ministries.449 The second weakness is that while it 
attempts to protect consumer interests, it does not offer a definition of the term ‘consumer’.450 
Concerning the first weakness, the Act empowers both the Minister for Enterprise and the 
Minister for Commerce to perform certain Acts authorized in its provisions.451 Without a doubt, 
it is risky and anomalous for the Act to empower each Minister in a different Ministry to exercise 
certain powers in terms of its provisions.452 For example, either of the Ministers may make an 
application to court for an order compelling a person who violates the provisions of the Act to 
publish certain information in terms of section 23 of the Act. Not only would this lead to a 
duplication of duties by the two Ministers, but the courts may be saddled with the burden of 
issuing two substantially similar orders based on a similar cause of action. Further, consumers 
may be subjected to double-jeopardy by the singular and independent acts of either Minister for 
substantially the same issue.453
(d) where necessary, to take copies of documents, or extracts from documents, that the person 
executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant in the case…’
 A practical illustration of double jeopardy may eventuate under 
section 27 of the Act which authorizes a Minister to send his officials to a person’s premises for 
purposes of conducting a search. The section states: 
 
‘Power to search 
27. (1) The Minister may authorize an officer of the Ministry to search any place named in the 
warrant for the purpose of ascertaining whether a person mentioned in the warrant has engaged 
in or is engaging in conduct that constitutes or may constitute a contravention of this Act. 
(3) A warrant issued under subsections (1) or (2) authorizes the officer named in it- 
(b) to use such assistance (including that of the Police) as is reasonable, in the circumstances; 
(c) the (sic) use such force for gaining  entry of any property and for breaking open any article 
or thing as is reasonable in the circumstances;  
454
                                                          
449 S. 2 (1) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001 defines ‘Minister’ as the Minister responsible either for the Ministry of 
Commerce or Ministry of Enterprise and Employment. 
450 The Act protects consumers by regulating misleading, deceptive and unfair practices in the supply chain. 
451 S. 2 (1) as read with S. 23 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
452 Ibid. 
453 The reason why consumers are being referred to as such is that the Act itself does not define a consumer. 
Therefore, it is possible that suppliers are also consumers. The end result is that the people for whom the Act was 
designed to protect may be prejudiced by the independent Acts of the Ministers concerned. 




The problem created by the section is that it authorizes the use of unrestrained force in gaining 
entry to a person’s premises and the breaking of any article while assisted by the police.455 Both 
Ministers may send different officials to the same premises without each knowing this has been 
done by the other.456 If a person resists, obstructs or delays the officials sent by a Minister on 
grounds that a search has already been conducted he may be found guilty and fined an amount of 
E10 000 or a period of 5 years imprisonment.457 The danger is that he may be prosecuted for the 
same offence and this is clearly this is unacceptable.458
Concerning the second problem which is the failure by the Act to define ‘consumer’, it is clear 
that even individual consumers face the risk of the harsh consequences already referred to above. 
The Fair Trading Act
  
 
459 defines a ‘person’ as including ‘a local authority, or any association of 
persons whether incorporated or not’. The result is that even individual consumers, whom the 
Act may possibly have been designed to protect, are subjected to the stringent requirements 
which ought to be imposed on suppliers.460 This conclusion must be drawn because the Act 
neither defines a ‘consumer’ nor a ‘supplier’, which means it applies equally to both consumers 
and suppliers in terms of the definition of ‘person’ as provided. Further, the Fair Trading Act 
may be enforced by any person.461 It is unfortunate that the provisions of the Act have not been 
in issue in the courts of Swaziland since it was enacted in 2001.462
The discussion in this chapter considered the consumer framework of Swaziland as well as the 
manner in which courts have tackled unfair contract terms and issues of product liability. The 
chapter also covered the relevant statutes in consumer protection. The issues raised in this 
 Case law needs to be 
developed in this important consumer statute. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
                                                          
455 S. 27 (3) (b) & (c) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
456 The Act does not prohibit this conduct on the part of Ministers. 
457 S. 27 (5) of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
458 What must be noted is that the Fair Trading Act of 2001 does not control or limit the powers of the two Ministers 
and this may lead to problems for consumers. 
459 S. 2 (1) of the Fait Trading Act of 2001. 
460 The absence of a demarcation line between consumers and suppliers lends weight to the conclusion. 
461 S. 22 & S. 24 of the Fair Trading Act of 2001. 
462 The case of Mamba and Others v The Central Bank of Swaziland and Others (unreported) High Court Civil Case 




chapter, juxtaposed with the authorities examined, galvanize the need for law reform in these 
crucial consumer areas. It has been seen that in Swaziland very few consumer cases have 
presented themselves for judicial determination. It is therefore difficult to say with a degree of 
precision what approach the superior courts would follow in dealing with the cluster of issues 
raised in this chapter in light of the prevailing Constitutional developments recently experienced 
in Swaziland. A further difficulty is that the development of the law on hire purchase in South 
Africa effectively came to a halt in 1980 when the South African Hire Purchase Act was repealed 
and replaced by the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. The impact has been felt in Swaziland, 
particularly in developing jurisprudence on hire purchase because no South African case law can 
be of assistance to the courts in Swaziland in arriving at consumer problems manifesting in the 






CONSUMER PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined consumer protection in Swaziland, particularly the inherent 
common law and legislative weaknesses in the consumer framework. This chapter focuses on 
consumer protection in South Africa with specific reference to the Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008 (CPA of 2008). Particular attention will be focused on critically examining the changes 
that were introduced by the Act in the common law of contract and product liability. Narrowing 
the chapter to unfair contract terms and product liability will provide perspective since there is 
much academic commentary and case law on these two important subject areas. Taking into 
account the fact that product liability and the law of contract in consumer law are very wide 
areas in themselves, the discussion will in no way be exhaustive but will be predicated on the 
most pertinent issues affecting consumers. The chapter will conclude by highlighting some of the 
weaknesses in the CPA of 2008. 
 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSUMER 
FRAMEWORK  
The earliest period from which consumer protection germinated in South Africa is 1942 when 
the South African Hire Purchase Act 36 of 1942 was enacted.1 This was a period when a global 
consumer movement in the mid-20th century was sweeping across Europe and the United States 
of America.2 However, consumer protection development in South Africa was not as radical as 
that experienced in Europe and other parts of the world, being rather a progressive process in its 
history.3 Historically, the majority of South African consumers were marginalized in as far as the 
equal provision of goods and services was concerned.4
                                                 
1 Smit and Venter v Fourie and another 1946 SA 9 (WLD) at 13. See also National Motors v Fall 1958 (2) SA 570 
(E) at 571. 
2 D Macquoid-Mason ‘Consumers and Consumerism’ in D Macquoid-Mason (ed) et al Consumer Law in South 
Africa (1997) 7. See also E van Eeden A guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 1, 3. 
3 Van Eeden (note 2 above) viii. 
4 Ibid vii. See also Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 9; Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Green Paper Vol. 
471 09/04 in GG 26774 (9 September 2004) 4. 
 More often than not, black consumers 
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were most disadvantaged because the South African economy was controlled and influenced by 
the dominant economic strength of the white business community.5 This situation was prevalent 
at the height of the apartheid era which was characterized by racial segregation and economic 
inequality.6 This era had an adverse effect on the legacy of consumer policy since it restricted 
commercial activity of the black majority in South African society.7 Besides the widespread 
human rights abuses, the apartheid regime promoted inequality in the consumption of goods and 
mainly responded to the problems of white consumers at the time.8
The apartheid consumer dispensation has been described as ‘a dog-eat-dog and survival of the 




9 Nevertheless, change was inevitable and individuals started mobilising themselves into 
groups pursuing consumer interests.10 The impact of this mobilization led to the establishment of 
consumer organisations such as the Housewives’ League, South African National Consumer 
Union (SANCU), and the National Black Consumer Union amongst others.11 Although the 
impact and lobbying influence of these groups on the South African government appears to be in 
doubt, the enactment of the Sale and Services Matters Act 25 of 1964 and the Price Control Act 
25 of 1964 suggests the contrary.12 In fact, these organisations exerted sustained pressure on 
government leading to the establishment of the South African Co-ordinating Consumer Council 
in the early 1970s in terms of the Marketing Act 59 of 1968.13 This was an umbrella consumer 
body established by government to handle consumer concerns and interests.14 However, the 
Council was only concerned with issues affecting businesses rather than individual consumer 
interests.15 A few years later the Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976 was enacted.16
                                                 
5 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 9. 
6 Preamble to the CPA of 2008. See also DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 4.  
7 Ibid. See also Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 9.  
8 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 9. See also DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 22. 
9 Van Eeden (note 2 above) ix. 
10 Ibid. see also Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 8. 
11 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 8. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 23. 
14 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 8. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 23. The Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976 was later repealed under S. 121 (2) (e) of the 
CPA of 2008. 
 The Trade 
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Practices Act17 prohibited misleading advertisements, statements and price indications amongst 
others.18 Again, the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 was enacted, effectively replacing the 
South African Hire Purchase Act as the law regulating the South African credit industry.19 The 
efforts of the South African government culminated in the enactment of the Unfair Business 
Practices (Consumer Affairs) Act 71 of 1988 which came into effect in 1988.20 Despite these 
legislative reforms, the majority of South African consumers remained marginalized.21
The activities of the 1990s signaled changes that foreshadowed the introduction of the CPA of 
2008. For example, in the period between 1992 and 1994 a number of consumer awareness 
studies were conducted in order to determine the social and economic factors contributing to the 
consumer imbalance in South African Society.
  
 
22 Further, the Business Practices Committee was 
set up under the Unfair Business Practices Act to look into issues of business and industry.23 The 
Committee submitted Report No. 15 which primarily initiated innovations in business through 
recommending the introduction of industry codes.24 The waves of change in consumer protection 
grew stronger when South Africa broke free from the clutches of apartheid in 1994 and a 
constitutional dispensation was birthed. The South African consumer framework had to be 
reviewed and brought into alignment with consumer frameworks of the industralised world.25 
The main motivation behind a new consumer framework was to create a single statute that spelt 
out consumer rights while at the same time rooting out the apartheid policies on black South 
Africans.26 This process would involve the introduction of consumer legislation that would level 
the playing field.27
                                                 
17 The Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976  was later repealed by the CPA of 2008. 
18 See the cases of Long John International Ltd v Stellenbosch Wine Trust (Pty) Ltd and others 1990 (4) SA 136 (D); 
S v Pepsi-Cola (Pty) Ltd and Others 1985 (3) SA 141 (C). 
19 MA Diemont & P Aronstam The Law of Credit Agreements and Hire Purchase in South Africa (1968) 43. 
20 The Unfair Business Practices Act 71 of 1988 was initially called the Harmful Business Practice Act. 
21 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 4. 
22 Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 9. 
23 T Woker ‘Business Practices Statutes and Consumer Protection’ in Macquoid-Mason (note 2 above) 123. 
24 Ibid. 
25 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 4, 6, 9. 
26 See the Preamble to the CPA of 2008. 





The democratic dispensation provided the much needed impetus because, in 1994, the South 
African Law Commission (SALC)28 was set up and specifically tasked with looking into issues 
of contract terms and consumer agreements in general.29 The efficiency of the SALC resulted in 
the publication of a working paper in 1994 which suggested ways in which courts would 
intervene in contractual disputes involving agreements embodying unfair contract terms, 
including exemption clauses.30 Two years into the post-apartheid period the SALC engaged in 
further extensive research which led to the publication of a discussion paper.31 In the discussion 
paper the SALC recognised the need for courts to intervene and control exemption clauses which 
operated unfairly against consumers in contracts, but warned against a ‘witch-hunt’ against the 
clauses in general.32 In 1998, the SALC released its final ‘Report on Unreasonable Stipulations 
in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts’33 which the South African Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) used as a foundation in 2004 in formulating the ‘Draft Green Paper on the 
Consumer Policy Framework’.34 This was part of an ongoing process to introduce the CPA of 
2008. The DTI concluded in its green paper that South Africa lacked a vibrant and strong 
consumer movement and made many recommendations, including the enactment of an all-
encompassing consumer statute that would include general provisions on unfair contracts.35 
Applying the SALC’s report in tandem with draft consumer legislation prepared by the DTI, the 
South African government finally fused the scattered legislation on consumer protection into the 
CPA of 2008.36 The CPA of 2008 has introduced significant changes in this area of the law and 
contains provisions ranging from the preservation of fundamental consumer rights to 
enforcement procedures under the various institutions it has set up.37
                                                 
28 The SALC was established by the South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973. 
29 SALC ‘Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts’ Working Paper 54 (Project 47, 
1994) Para 2. 
30 Ibid paragraphs 2.74- 2.76. See also T Woker ‘Consumers and Contracts of Purchase and Sale’ in Macquoid-
Mason (note 2 above) 26. 
31 SALC ‘Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts’ Discussion Paper 65 (Project 
47, 1996). 
32 Ibid Para 1.12 (iv). See also Woker (note 30 above) 44-45. 
33 SALC ‘Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts’ (Project 47, 1998). 
See also RD Sharrock ‘Judicial Control of Unfair Contract Terms: The Implications of the Consumer Protection 
Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 295, 298. 
34 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 30-31. 
35W Jacobs et al ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A Critical 
Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PER 302, 354. 
36 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 23. 




3. THE GENERAL OVERVIEW AND SCOPE OF THE CPA OF 2008 
The CPA of 2008 partially draws its existence from other international consumer protection 
instruments.38 The CPA of 2008 has a ‘rights-based approach’ towards consumer protection 
because it entrenches certain consumer rights.39 Therefore, consumer law in South Africa is no 
longer at its infancy and law reform debates and studies in the consumer field have played a 
critical role in changing the consumer climate.40 The CPA of 2008 now forms the nucleus of 
consumer legislation because it has brought together several statutes to create a comprehensive 
framework of international standard, removing the cleavages of race, class, gender, inequality 
and brought major changes in South African consumer law. Firstly, it will be seen how the Act 
has effectively curtailed the ancient and inflexible common law principles of contractual freedom 
and pacta s unt s ervanda which have been the central jurisprudential pillars of private law.41 
Furthermore, the Act enjoins courts to develop the common law thereby bringing to an end 
judicial reluctance to develop common law propositions as has been expressed in some 
decisions.42 It is hoped that the Act will also remedy inconsistent judicial pronouncements that 
have been experienced by consumers especially when the doctrine of contractual freedom is in 
issue.43
While the Act has ushered in a new consumer dispensation, totally ignoring the old framework 
may be suicidal for consumers.
 
 
44 It may be prudent to embrace the old common law framework 
because the CPA of 2008 enjoins courts to develop the common law as necessary to improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights.45
                                                 
38 Preamble to the CPA of 2008. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 5, 24. 
39 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 6, 12. 
40 Ibid 29. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 23.  
41 S. 22 and Part G of the CPA of 2008. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) vii, 3. 
42 Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (2) All SA 167 (SCA) at 
paragraphs 37-38. See also FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of 
Contract: The Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71, 72. 
43 See the cases of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A); Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 
(1) SA 1 (A); Botha v Finanscredit 1989 (3) SA 773 (A); First National Bank of Southern Africa v Bophuthatswana 
Consumer Council 1995 (2) SA 853 (BG); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 
(3) SA 572 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
44 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 57. 
45 S. 4 (2) (a) of the CPA of 2008. 
 In other words, the common law is still very 
much alive in regulating consumer affairs with the exception that it is now statutorily 
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circumscribed. Van Eeden46 states that ‘there is a symbiosis between the common law and 
evolving statute’. He says the ‘new and old legal frameworks are interwoven and interlocked 
such that the new cannot be understood without the old.47 Indeed, the Act recognises the 
authority of and gives effect to the common law.48 Therefore, consumers are still required to 
observe the common law despite the enactment of the Act. A modicum of responsible behaviour 
on the part of the consumer is still imperative because the Act has not totally obliterated some 
common law principles like freedom of contract, which may entitle suppliers to use unfair terms 
in consumer agreements.49
The Act had different dates of commencement and came into effect in two stages.
   
 
3.1. Application of the CPA of 2008 
50 The ‘general 
effective date’ was on the 24th of October 2010, which was subsequently deferred for a further 5 
months to April 2011, the month in which the Act as a whole became effective.51 On the other 
hand, certain provisions, especially those relating to product liability, came into effect on the 29th 
April 2010. This latter date is commonly referred to as the ‘early effective date’.52 The 
significance of these dates is very important when we consider agreements pre-existing the CPA 
of 2008.53 Pre-existing agreements are defined in Schedule 2 of the Act to be agreements made 
before the general effective date (April 2011).54
                                                 
46 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 57. 
47 Ibid 58. 
48 S. 2 (10), S. 4 (2) (a) & S. 56 (4) (a) of the CPA of 2008.  
49 For example, S. 51 (1) (c) (i) of the CPA of 2008 only prohibits exclusion of liability for gross negligence, and not 
ordinary negligence in a contract. 
50 R Bregman ‘The Consumer Protection Guide for Lawyers’ (2011) Law Society of South Africa 16. See also City 
of Johannesburg v National Consumer Commission (NCT/ 2667/2011/101 (1) (P), NCT/2081/2011/101(1) (P)) 
[2012] ZANCT 6 (30 March 2012) at Para 112. 
51 Ibid. See also Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 316. Item 2 (1) of Schedule 2 of the CPA of 2008 refers to the ‘early 
effective date’ (one year after signature of the Act by the President). Item 2 (2) of schedule 2 refers to ‘general 
effective date’. The general effective date is 18 months after signature of the Act by the President.  
52 Item 2 (2) of schedule 2 of the CPA of 2008. See also Bregman (note 50 above) 16; Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 
316. 
53 Item 3 (2) (a) (b) of schedule 2 of the CPA of 2008. 
54 Schedule 2 (S. 121 (3)) of the CPA of 2008. 
 The terms of section 5 set out the scope of 
application of the Act which is limited to transactions occurring within the Republic for the 
supply of goods or services unless the transaction is exempted from the application of the Act. 
Section 5 (2) refers to transactions to which the CPA of 2008 does not apply. The Act does not 
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apply to credit agreements in general but regulates the goods and services under that 
agreement.55




56 Further, the Act does not apply to juristic persons whose asset value or annual 
turnover, at the time of the transaction, is more or equal to the threshold value determined by the 
Minister in terms of section 6.57 The threshold was determined and set by the Minister of Trade 
and Industry to be the amount of R 3 million.58 The CPA of 2008, however, does not prescribe 
the manner in which information concerning a juristic person’s annual turnover will be 
obtained.59 The Act also does not apply to transactions involving the supply of services under an 
employment contract60 and transactions giving effect to a collective agreement in terms of 
section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.61
Section 2 (1) and (2) of the CPA of 2008 provide that the Act must be interpreted in a manner 
that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 3, and in the interpretation exercise, 
international law, amongst others, may be considered. This approach in interpretation allows 




3.2. Interpretation of the CPA of 2008 
62 It is suggested that the criteria for interpretation gives less prominence to the 
traditional rules of interpretation, viz, the literal rule;63 the mischief rule64 and the golden rule,65
                                                 
55 S. 5 (2) (d) of the CPA of 2008. See also Bregman (note 50 above) 13.  
56 S. 5 (2) (a) of the CPA of 2008. 
57 S. 5 (2) (b) of the CPA of 2008. 
58 GN 294 in GG 34181 of 1 April 2011. See also T Naude ‘The Consumer’s Right to Safe, Good Quality Goods 
and the Implied Warranty of Quality under S. 55 and S. 56 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2011) 23 
SA Merc LJ 336, 338. 
59 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 310. 
60 S. 5 (2) e) of the CPA of 2008. 
61 S. 5 (2) (g) of the CPA of 2008. 
62 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 305. 
63 BA Garner Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) 1462, defines the literal rule as a form of judicial construction holding 
that statutes are to be interpreted according to their literal terms. 
64 Ibid 1019. The mischief rule of interpretation states that a statute should be interpreted by first identifying the 
problem or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy and then adopting a construction that will suppress the 
problem and advance the remedy. 
65 Ibid 713. The golden rule of interpretation states that when a statute’s literal meaning would lead to an absurd or 
unjust result, or even to an inconsistency within the statute itself, the statute should be interpreted in a way that 




which assist courts in determining the intention of the legislature when a statute is ambiguous.66 
While Roman Dutch law generally recognises the incorporation of international law in 
interpretation, Jacobs et al 67 argues that legislation is usually interpreted according to the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of words. The fear of applying international law in interpretation 
is that this method of interpretation may lead to results which may not come about when 
applying the traditional rules when interpreting the Act.68 However, by referring to international 
law and other interpretation aids, section 2 (1) of the CPA of 2008 does not mean the established 
rules of interpretation will be jettisoned entirely when courts engage in the interpretation 
exercise.69
If the provisions of chapter 5 of the CPA of 2008 conflict with the Public Finance Management 
Act 1 of 1999 or the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, the last-mentioned Acts apply.
 Therefore, the ordinary rules of interpretation will apply with the qualification that 
only less emphasis is placed on them.  
 
70 The 
extensive list of definitions embodied in section 1 of the CPA of 2008 have the potential of 
introducing confusion if not properly addressed as will be discussed later in the chapter. Suffice 
to say, the definitions in the CPA 2008 are not only limited to section 1, but other sections have 
in-built definitions in themselves.71
Courts in South Africa have been criticised for lack of zeal in rewriting the common law and 
especially for their unjustified restraint in pronouncing on unfair contract terms due to their 
reverence of contractual freedom.
  
 
3.3. General scope of the CPA of 2008 
72 The reproaches often directed towards the courts have been 
met with section 4 (2) (a) of the CPA of 2008 which enjoins courts to develop the common law 
in the spirit of the Act.73
                                                 
66 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 305. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 S. 2 (2) of the CPA of 2008 states that the court may consider international law but this is not mandatory. 
70 S. 2 (8) CPA of 2008. 
71 For example, S. 53 of the CPA of 2008. 
72 For example, Howie P was not prepared to alter the common law in Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v 
Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd (note 42 above) at Para 38. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 2. 
73 S. 173 of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996, enjoins courts to develop the common law in line with 
the interests of justice. 
 This means that courts have been handed a lifeline because through this 
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section the legislature has invited them to breathe new life into the common law.74 The CPA of 
2008 vests consumers with rights and creates bargaining equality with businesses by promoting 
equality, access to information, fair marketing and business practices.75
• Right of equality in the consumer market
 Chapter 2 of the Act 
guarantees the following rights: 
 
76
• Consumer’s right to privacy.
 
77
• Consumer’s right to choose.
 
78
• Right to disclosure and information.
 
79
• Right to fair and responsible marketing.
 
80
• Right to fair and honest dealing.
 
81
• Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions.
 
82
• Right to fair value, good quality and safety.
 
83





Discussing the entire provisions of the CPA of 2008 is not a practical undertaking for this study. 
In what follows, the chapter will focus on how the CPA of 2008 deals with contract terms in line 
with the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions,85 and product liability under the 
right to fair value, good quality and safety,86
                                                 
74 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 2, 38. 
75 Preamble to the CPA of 2008. 
76 S. 8-10 of the CPA of 2008. 
77 S. 11-12 of the CPA of 2008. 
78 S. 13-21of the CPA of 2008. 
79 S. 22-28 of the CPA of 2008. 
80 S. 29-39 of the CPA of 2008. 
81 S. 40-47 of the CPA of 2008. 
82 S. 48-52 of the CPA of 2008. 
83 S. 53-61 of the CPA of 2008. 
84 S. 62-67 of the CPA of 2008. 
85 S. 48-52 of the CPA of 2008. 
86 S. 53-61 of the CPA of 2008. 
 while the other consumer rights will be adverted to 





4. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS UNDER THE CPA OF 2008 
The long history of unfair contract terms in South Africa dates back to the inflexible principle of 
freedom of contract enunciated by Innes, C.J. over a century ago in the case of Burger v Central 
South African Railways 1903 TS 571.87  Between the time of the pronouncement of Innes CJ and 
the enactment of the CPA of 2008, South African contract law was a minefield in which courts 
were called upon to tread masterfully in judicially restricting unfair contract terms.88 A salient 
feature of many court decisions before the CPA of 2008 came into force is that courts often 
grappled with the hallowed doctrine of freedom of contract.89 The battle for supremacy between 
freedom of contract and considerations of fairness and good faith in contractual relationships led 
to the invalidation of the exceptio doli generalis by the Appellate Division in the landmark case 
of Bank of  Lisbon and S outh Africa v Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 58 (A).90 Christie91 opines that the 
rejection of the doctrine was rather abrupt and unexpected and it for that reason that the SALC 
was tasked with investigating, among other issues, the potential effects of the lacuna that had 
been created by this decision in the South African law of contract.92 Over and above this 
mandate the SALC had to make proposals on legislation specifically regulating contracts, but 
this idea was not easily accepted by members of the legal community and the judicial impression 
was that the common law remedies were sufficient.93 It was contended that the existing 
legislation at the time was adequate and that only partial legislative intervention, if any, was 
necessary.94 However, following recommendations of the SALC, the DTI in 2004 proposed in its 
draft green paper95 that provisions dealing with unfair contract terms be included in the 
contemplated CPA of 2008.96
                                                 
87 In Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 at 576. See also RH Christie The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 5 ed (2006) 14; Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 353-354. 
88 See the cases of Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 and Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 43 above). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Christie (note 87 above) 12. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. See also SALC (note 33 above) Para 1.9-1.10. 
93 SALC (note 33 above) Para 2.1.3. See also T Naude & G Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses- A Rethink Occasioned by 
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’ Vol. 122 (2005) SALJ 441; Sharrock (note 33 above). 
94 SALC (note 33 above) Para 2.2.1.1. 
95 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 30-31. See also SALC (note 33 above) Para 1.1. 
96 Ibid. See also Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 354. 
 These were the initial steps that signaled the birth of provisions 
aimed at curbing unfair, unconscionable and unreasonable terms in consumer agreements. Prior 
to the enactment of the CPA of 2008, South African law had no legislative control over unfair 
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contract terms.97 However, this position has changed because Chapter 2, Part G of the CPA of 
2008 regulates unfair contract terms.98
Non-variation clauses were considered in the context of the parol evidence rule in the previous 
chapter, while in the present chapter the application and enforcement of a non-variation clause 
will be considered in the context of the Shifren principle
 The analysis that follows considers the impact of the CPA 
in reference to established common law principles as interpreted in judicial decisions. 
 
4.1. Non-variation clauses 
99
As earlier explained, a non-variation clause bars the informal relaxation of original contract 
terms in favour of either party in a contract.
 which will be discussed below.  
 
100 The validity and effectiveness of non-variation 
clauses had been one of the most controversial issues in the South African law of contract until 
1964.101 The question surrounding non-variation clauses was whether an agreement could 
impose a term stipulating that no variation of the agreement could be valid unless it was in 
writing.102 There were two contending views on this question.103 On the one hand, the contention 
was that non-variation clauses were invalid in contractual agreements, while on the other hand 
they were recognised as valid and enforceable.104 The debate was eventually christened the 
‘Shifren saga’ by professor Hahlo105 because a non-variation clause was considered at length by 
the Appellate Division in protracted litigation in the case of SA Se ntrale K o-op 
Graanmaatskappy B pk v  Shi fren e n A ndere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A).106
                                                 
97 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 441. See also First National Bank of Southern Africa v Bophuthatswana 
Consumer Council (note 43 above) at 864; Sharrock (note 33 above) 297. 
98 S. 48- S. 52 of the CPA of 2008. 
99 The phrase derives from the case of SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 
760 (A). 
100 HR Hahlo ‘Non-variation Clauses’ (1965) SALJ 4, 6. 
101 D Hutchison ‘Non-variation Clauses in Contract’ (2001) 118 SALJ 720. See also PMA Hunt ‘Non-variation 
Clauses’ (1963) Annual Survey of SA 137. 
102 Hahlo (note 100 above) 4. 
103 Hunt (note 101 above). 
104 Hutchison (note 101 above). See also Hunt (note 101 above). 
105 Hahlo (note 100 above) 4. 
106 Ibid. See also Hunt (note 101 above) 137. 
 In this case the plaintiff 
landlord and the defendant tenant had concluded a lease agreement which contained two clauses 
stating that the premises were not to be sub-let or ceded by the defendant tenant to a third party 
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without the written consent of the plaintiff landlord.107 The plaintiff thereafter orally agreed a 
cession from the defendant to a third party to the agreement on condition that the defendant 
guaranteed the payment of rent by the third party.108 The plaintiff sought to cancel the lease 
agreement on grounds that the defendant had leased the premises without consent contrary to the 
clause in the agreement.109 The question whether non-variation clauses were valid in contracts 
was laid to rest in this case since the court answered the question in the affirmative and held that 
the oral cession was invalid because the non-variation clause contemplated a written 
amendment.110 This decision is also celebrated for formulating the well-known ‘Shifren 
principle’ which underpins non-variation clauses by stating that a contractual provision that 
requires written amendments is valid and enforceable.111
Almost 30 years later the issue of orally varying the terms of a written agreement presented itself 
in the case of Van Tonder en ń Ander v Van der Merwe en Andere 1993 (2) SA 552 (W). In this 
case the applicants had entered into an agreement with the respondent for the sale of company 
shares and rights in a loan account.
 
 
112 Thereafter, the parties to the contract orally agreed to 
postpone payment of the balance of the purchase price by the respondent.113 However, the sale 
agreement contained a non-variation clause which provided that, ‘no amendment of this contract 
is binding unless it is in writing and signed by the parties or their duly authorized agents’.114 The 
applicant thereafter resiled on the oral agreement and applied to court for its cancellation on 
grounds that the respondent had not paid the balance on time. Spoelstra R, applying the 
reasoning in SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere,115 held that the oral 
agreement relied upon by the respondents did in fact amend the written contract and was 
accordingly not binding.116
                                                 
107 Shifren and others v SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk 1963 3 SA 721 (O) 722-723. 
108 Ibid 723. 
109 Ibid. 
110 At 767. See also Hutchison (note 101 above). 
111 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 71. See also Hutchison (note 101 above) 745. 
112 At 553. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere (note 99 above). 





The decision of Van Tonder en ń Ander v Van der Merwe en Andere117 above found support in 
the case of Miller and another N NO v  D annecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) where Ntsebeza AJ 
reluctantly applied the Shifren principle.118 In this case the defendant had purchased franchise 
rights from a certain seller in respect of a guest house.119 In terms of the written agreement of 
franchise the defendant was to pay the purchase price to the seller in three monthly instalments 
and any failure to make payment would entitle the seller to cancel the agreement and claim 
damages.120 The franchise agreement contained a non-variation clause which provided that there 
was to be no amendment to the agreement except on the written consent of both parties.121 The 
defendant failed to honour his obligations and had a meeting with the seller to explain his 
difficulty in making payment as agreed.122 Subsequently, it was orally agreed between the parties 
that the defendant would sell his interest in the guest house and thereafter pay the seller with the 
proceeds of the said sale.123 However, the seller later cancelled the agreement and ceded all his 
right, title and interest in the franchise agreement to a trust under the care of the plaintiff trustees 
who were now entitled to the payment by the defendant.124 In claiming the outstanding payment 
from the defendant the plaintiff trustees contended that the oral variation of the franchise 
agreement between the defendant and seller contravened the non-variation clause.125




126 He further noted that a party who grants an indulgence to another by extending 
time so as to show forbearance or substituted performance cannot go back on his word.127 The 
court found that by reneging from the oral undertaking, the seller had breached the duty of good 
faith.128
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 Hutchison (note 101 above) 722. 
119 At 931. 
120 At 931-932. 
121 At 935. 
122 At 932-933. 
123 At 933. 
124 At 932. 
125 At 935. 
126 At 937. 
127 Ibid. 
128 At 938. 
 Although the judgment does not address the question when it is appropriate to apply the 
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Shifren principle, Hutchison129 agrees with the outcome of the decision in Miller and anot her 
NNO v Dannecker,130 particularly the application of ‘good faith’ in determining the enforcement 
of a non-variation clause. He says that case came to ‘an agreeable outcome’ and that judge was 
‘to be congratulated for his boldness in approach’ since the concept of good faith is an escape-
valve from the harsh consequences of non-variation clauses.131
However, a different finding was arrived at by the Supreme Court of Appeal where the court was 
called upon to reconsider the Shifren principle in light of the constitutional developments in the 
leading case of Brisley v D rotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA).
  
 
132 The appellant tenant concluded a 
lease agreement with the respondent landlord which provided that rentals were payable in 
advance at the beginning of each month and that if rentals were not paid promptly the landlord 
was entitled to cancel the lease.133 The lease provided that any changes to the agreement were to 
be recorded in writing by the parties and the respondent was empowered in terms of the 
agreement to cancel the lease if rent was not paid promptly on the first day of each month.134 
Pursuant to an oral agreement between the parties the appellant had on several occasions paid her 
monthly rentals later than the date stipulated in the lease agreement.135 After several months of 
late payment, the respondent disregarded the oral agreement and instituted eviction proceedings 
against the appellant.136 Amongst other issues, the question was whether the non-variation clause 
under the Shifren principle contravened the concept of equality.137
In coming to its decision, the court stated that historical and jurisprudential considerations 




                                                 
129 Hutchison (note 101 above) 722. 
130 Miller and another NNO v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C). 
131 Hutchison (note 101 above) 722. 
132 At Para 1. 
133 At Para 4. 
134 Ibid. 
135 At Para5. 
136 Ibid. 
137 At Para 7. 
138 At Para 6.  
 One 
of the considerations was that the Shifren principle had become an established rule spanning a 
period close to 40 years and therefore, it could not simply be invalidated, destabilizing trade and 
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business.139 The court also considered that dispensing with the principle would compromise the 
desired certainty in legal proceedings.140  Assimilating the Shifren principle into the 
constitutional era, Cameron JA stated that non-variation clauses in contracts were no longer 
controversial and did not detract from constitutional values.141
‘[T]he appellant asks this Court to reverse the doctrine that contracting parties may validly 
agree in writing to an enumeration of their rights, duties and powers in relation to the subject 
matter of a contract, which they may alter only by again resorting to writing. This court nearly 
four decades ago upheld the validity of such clauses.’
 He stated: 
 
142
The Judge found support from the suggestion that the Shifren principle was not intended to 
protect the party in a stronger bargaining position, but instead served to limit disputes and protect 
the interests of both parties in an agreement.
 
 
143 The argument that the Shifren principle offended 
‘good faith’ was rejected in favour of the notion that good faith was not a ‘free-floating’ basis for 
rescinding non-variation clauses in agreements.144 It was concluded that the non-variation clause 




146 argues that the case was wrongly decided and contends that the respondent’s conduct was 
unfair and ought to have been discountenanced by the court in view of the subsequent oral 
agreement between the parties varying the written lease. The argument is sound because strict 
adherence to non-variation clauses under the Shifren principle allows the dominant party in a 
contract to go back on his word to the detriment of a consumer has relied on it.147
                                                 
139 At Para 8. 
140 Ibid. 
141 At Para 2. 
142 At Para 2. 
143 At Para 7. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 71. 
144 At Para 22. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 80. 
145 At Para 47. 
146 AJ Kerr ‘The Defence of Unfair Conduct on the Part of the Plaintiff at the Time the Action is brought: The 
Exceptio Doli Generalis and the Replicatio Doli in Modern Law’ (2008) 125 SALJ 241, 246. 
147 Hutchison (note 101 above) 721. 
 It has been 
suggested that in order to avoid the harsh consequences of the Shifren principle, any subsequent 
informal undertakings between parties must be reduced to writing and inserted into existing 
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agreements in terms of the prescribed formalities.148
The CPA of 2008 contains provisions which introduce significant changes concerning the 
manner in which courts deal with non-variation clauses.
 The above cases reveal inconsistencies in 
judicial reasoning in as far as non-variation clauses are concerned and this situation obviously 
leaves the consumer at a disadvantage. Whether the CPA of 2008 has addressed the issue of non-
variation clauses, and if so, whether consumers have been afforded greater protection will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
4.1.1. The impact of the CPA of 2008 on non-variation clauses 
149 Consumer agreements, whether or not 
in writing, are recognised under section 50 of the Act. Such agreements may be challenged by a 
contracting party for contravening either section 40, 41 or 48 of the CPA of 2008.150 In 
circumstances where the CPA of 2008 does not provide a remedy sufficient to correct the 
prohibited conduct, unfairness or injustice complained of relating to the agreement, the courts 
may consider other factors that further the purpose and spirit of the Act.151 In this respect courts 
may be persuaded to depart from the Shifren principle because the Act allows the admission of 
evidence concerning the nature of the parties to the agreement, their relationship to each other, 
their relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bargaining position.152 Although 
the CPA of 2008 had not yet come into force, one of these considerations was highlighted by the 
court in Brisley v Drotsky.153 The court considered the bargaining position of the appellant and 
came to the conclusion that she had not been in a weaker bargaining position when the lease 
agreement was concluded.154 Whether or not a consumer agreement has been signed is not a 
consideration that courts will consider in ensuring fairness between contracting parties.155
Another important factor that has a bearing on the Shifren principle concerns negotiations 




                                                 
148 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 72. 
149 S. 52 (2) of the CPA of 2008. 
150 S. 52 (1) (a) of the CPA of 2008. 
151 S. 52 (2) (a)-(j) of the CPA of 2008. 
152 S. 52 (2) (b) of the CPA of 2008. 
153 Brisley v Drotsky (note 43 above) at paragraphs 26, 33. 
154 Ibid. 
155 S. 50 (2) (a) of the CPA of 2008. 




CPA of 2008 recognises such negotiations, irrespective of when they were conducted.157 By 
introducing evidence of prior or subsequent negotiations between parties to a contract, the CPA 
of 2008 effectively varies the principle because a court will strike down a variation clause 
contrary to subsequent negotiations.158 The scope of 52 (2) of the CPA of 2008 is wide enough to 
cover oral negotiations as long as the outcome will further the realisation of consumer 
interests.159 If a court concludes that a non-variation clause is void or contrary to section 49 of 
the CPA of 2008, the court may invalidate and sever the clause to make the agreement lawful; or 
declare the whole agreement void.160
The nature and purpose of exemption clauses has already been discussed in chapter 3 and in this 
section, the aim is to consider the developments introduced by the CPA of 2008 to exemption 
clauses. At the height of addressing the problems posed by unfair contract terms in South Africa, 
the SALC in its ‘Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of 
Contract Terms’
 These considerations also find support in section 4 (2) (a) 
of the CPA of 2008 which empowers the courts to develop the common law for the realisation 
and enjoyment of consumer rights. 
 
4.2. The exemption clause 
161 recommended that exemption clauses be subjected to stricter regulation.162 
Important as these recommendations were, it must be noted that South African courts had 
already developed and applied different techniques to control and mitigate the unjust results of 
exemption clauses.163  For example, in the case of Wells v SA Alumenite Co. 1927 AD 69, Innes 
CJ held that courts would discountenance any exemption clause protecting fraud.164 In this case 
the appellant had purchased an ‘alumenite lighting system’ from the respondent company after 
being induced by untrue representations into making the purchase.165
                                                 
157 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 361. 
158 Ibid. 
159 S. 4 (2) (a) of the CPA of 2008. See Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 361. 
160 S. 52 (4) (a) of the CPA of 2008. 
161 SALC (note 33 above) Para 1.1.2 (iii).  
162 Ibid. 
163 See for example the case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 43 above). 
164 At 72. 
165 At 71. 
 The agreement signed by 
the appellant contained a clause absolving the respondent from liability for any representations it 
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made in the course of its business.166 The appellant then refused to pay for the lighting system 
alleging that the respondent’s employees had made misrepresentations on the fuel consumption, 
construction and mode of ignition of the machine.167 The appellant failed in the appeal because 
there was no allegation that the misrepresentation made by the respondent was fraudulent.168
‘On grounds of public policy the law will not recognise an undertaking by which one of the 
contracting parties binds himself to condone and submit to the fraudulent conduct of the other. 
the courts will not lend themselves to the enforcement of such a stipulation; for to do so would 
be to protect and encourage fraud.’
 
Recognizing the non-enforcement of exemption clauses protecting fraudulent conduct, the court 
stated as follows: 
 
169
The analysis below considers the control measures applied by courts in dealing with exemption 




The requirement that a contract term must be embodied in contractual form has been applied by 
the courts as a control measure against exemption clauses.
 The discussion has taken 
this consideration into account.  
 
4.2.1. Contractual form 
171 This rule finds expression in the 
English case of Chapelton v  Barry Urban District Council [1940] 1 All ER 356 (CA). In this 
case the appellant hired two desk-chairs from the respondent council at a beach, and after paying 
the required fee he was issued with two tickets which contained clauses exempting the 
respondent from liability for injury or harm consequential from the hire.172 The chair on which 
appellant was sitting collapsed and the appellant was injured in the process.173
                                                 
166 At 71 -72. 
167 At 71. 
168 At 73. 
169 At 72. 
170 Woker (note 30 above) 40. 
171 P Aronstam Consumer  Protection, F reedom of C ontract and the Law (1979) 26, 39. See also Gordon W ilson 
(Pty) Ltd v Barkhuizen 1947 (2) SA 244 (O) at 248. 
172 At 357. 
173 At 358. 
 Slesser LJ in the 
Court of Appeal held that the tickets were not contractual documents and therefore the appellant 
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could not be bound by the exemption clause in the ticket.174 This limits an exemption clause 
because whether or not the parties agreed the clause in issue must have been reasonably expected 
in the contractual document.175 Lord Denning M.R in Olley v Marlborough Court Ltd [1949] 1 
All ER 127 (CA) held that people who seek to rely on a contract must strictly prove that the 
written document is a contract.176 If the terms are embodied in a written document, such a 
document must be a contract or one that is reasonably expected to contain contractual terms.177 
For example, a receipt given to a purchaser as proof of payment cannot simply be considered a 
contract for the reason that it only constitutes evidence of a contract that has already been 
concluded.178
‘[W]here as here there is a document which purports to be a record of an agreement come to 
between the parties the rule of evidence does not prohibit the signatory to the document from 
pleading and proving that the document does not represent the true agreement between the 
parties and was not given animo contrahendi.’
 It is for that reason that Fischer JP in Gordon Wilson (Pty) Ltd v Barkhuizen 1947 
(2) SA 244 (O) stated as follows: 
 
179
The above excerpt underpins the view that a supplier cannot simply allege that a consumer 
signed a document or a piece of paper signifying his will to certain terms; instead, it must be 
proved that the document is a contract.
 
 
180 It sometimes happens that a contractual document 
resembling a receipt is signed by a consumer purchaser.181 In such circumstances, the consumer 
will be bound by the provisions of the document whether or not it is a receipt because he is 
deemed to know that the document created relations between himself and the other party.182
                                                 
174 At 360. 
175 Aronstam (note 171 above) 26. 
176 At 134. 
177 Christie (note 87 above) 182. See also Aronstam (note 171 above) 26. 
178 Ibid. 
179 At 248. 
180 Aronstam (note 171 above) 37. 
181 Ibid 28. 







4.2.2. Unexpected terms 
A party may successfully challenge an exemption clause if it was not reasonably expected in a 
contract.183 An exemption clause in a contract must not be ‘surprising’ or unexpected because it 
may be rendered contrary to the essence of a contract.184 Naude and Lubbe185 assert that a 
contract term that varies the consequences of a contract in a manner that is contrary to its 
fundamental essence is ‘surprising’. Therefore, courts should not recognise the clause unless it 
has been brought to the notice of the consumer prior to signature of the agreement.186 A 
consumer will reasonably expect terms consistent with a contract; however, if an unexpected 
term is contained in the agreement there is a legal duty on the other party to point out the 
inconsistency between the contract in its entirety and the term in issue.187 Consumers are thereby 
protected from harsh clauses because the contract assertor is bound to communicate with the 
consumer and this promotes substantive equality because bargaining may be possible, especially 
in standard form contracts.188
There are several decided cases where this concept has been applied. In the case of Shephard v 
Farrell’s Estate Agency 1921 TPD 62, the appellant wanted to sell his business.
  
 
189 The appellant 
approached the respondent estate agent after seeing an advert in a newspaper posted by the 
respondent stating as follows: ‘Our motto: no sale no charge: All advertisements at our 
expense’.190 The advertisement simply meant that the respondents would not charge any 
commission if they failed to sell property on behalf of any person who had enlisted their 
services.191 The parties concluded an agreement in terms of which the respondent would sell the 
appellant’s business on his behalf.192
                                                 
183 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 454. 
184 Ibid. See also Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above) Para 33. 
185 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 454. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. See also Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above) Para 33. 
188 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above) Para 33. 
189 At 63. 
190 At 63-64. 
191 At 66. 
192 At 64. 
  However, the agreement signed by the parties was at 
variance with the advertisement in that it gave the respondent the right to claim commission even 
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if the house was not sold by the respondent agency.193 It happened that the business was indeed 
sold, but by a different agency.194 After the business was sold, the respondent claimed 
commission from the appellant despite not being responsible for the sale.195 The court came to 
the conclusion that the appellant had not expected the term regarding commission to form part of 
the agreement since it was contrary to the advertisement in the newspaper.196 Mason J held that 
the appellant was entitled to assume that he had signed an agreement in terms of the 
advertisement.197
The above approach was also followed in the case of Du Toit v Atkinson Motors 1985 (2) SA 893 
(A). In this case the respondent published an advertisement in a newspaper offering a ‘Mercedes-
Benz 350, 1979’ for sale.
  
 
198 The appellant was enticed by the advertisement and purchased the 
vehicle.199 In order to complete the sale transaction the appellant was requested by the 
respondent’s sales manager to sign a document which, however, did not contain the year of 
manufacture of the vehicle.200 The document contained an exemption clause absolving the 
respondent from all liability concerning representations on the year of manufacture of the 
vehicle.201 After 3 months the appellant realised that the vehicle was a 1976 model and not a 
1979 model as published in the newspaper advertisement.202 The respondent approached the 
court for cancellation of the contract and repayment of the purchase price.203 In upholding the 
appeal Van Heerden AR held that by failing to explain the effect of the exemption clause to the 
appellant the respondent’s employees created the impression that the signed document was not at 
variance with the advertisement.204 In other words, the exemption clause in the document was 
unexpected and the appellant had been misled into purchasing the vehicle.205
 
 




196 At 66. 
197 Ibid. 






204 At 905-906. 
205 At 906. 
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Another important case dealing with unexpected terms was that of Bok Clothing Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd and another v Lady Land (Pty) Ltd (Under Provisional Judicial Management) 1982 (2) 
SA 565 (C). In this case the applicant supplier of clothing had a long-standing business 
relationship with the respondent retailer in terms of which it supplied women’s clothing for 
sale.206 The terms and conditions of sale of the clothes were found at the back of the order forms 
which facilitated the sale transactions between the parties.207 These conditions stated that the sale 
was subject to a reservation of ownership which authorized the applicant to terminate the 
agreement either when the respondent was placed under judicial management or for non-
payment of purchased goods.208 The respondent was eventually placed under judicial 
management and at the same time it was indebted to the applicant.209 The respondent’s director 
alleged that he was not aware of the conditions referred to by the applicant since he often ordered 
merchandise from the applicant through an agent using a foolscap sheet of paper which he 
regarded as the official order form.210 He contended that he had no knowledge of the order form 
and only became aware of its existence when the company was placed under judicial 
management.211 While acknowledging that clerks of the respondent company received order 
forms from the applicant, he stated that as a director he was not personally aware of the 
applicant’s order forms.212 The question that King AJ had to decide was whether the conditions 
of sale on the back of the order form governed the sales of the articles sold between the 
parties.213
In the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) the court had to consider the 
validity of an exemption clause.
 In dismissing the application King AJ held that the respondent director had not been 
aware of the terms and conditions embodied in the order form. 
 
214 In this case the appellant was the owner of a private hospital 
in which the respondent patient was admitted.215
                                                 
206 At 567. 
207 At 568. 
208 At 567. 
209 At ibid. 
210 At 567-568. 
211 At 568. 
212 At ibid. 
213 At ibid. 
214 At Para1. 
215 At Para 2. 
 On admission, the respondent signed a standard 
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form contract containing a clause exempting the hospital from liability for any cause, including 
personal injury and death resulting from the negligence of its nursing staff.216 The respondent 
suffered post-operative complications which left him permanently disabled as a result of the 
negligence of a nurse.217 The appellant relied on the exemption clause after the respondent 
brought a claim for damages resulting from the negligence of its nursing staff.218 Fire AR had to 
determine, amongst other issues, whether the exemption clause was brought to the notice of the 
respondent before the standard form contract was signed.219 The respondent contended that he 
had not been made aware of the clause and that there was a duty on the appellant to bring the 
clause to his notice because it was unexpected.220 The court found that the exemption clause was 
not surprising or unexpected, and that there was therefore no legal obligation on the appellant to 
draw the respondent’s notice to the clause.221 It was further held that the test whether or not a 
contract term is unexpected is objective in nature.222 The court concluded that the subjective 
expectations of the respondent on being informed of the clause were immaterial since exemption 
clauses were the rule rather than the exception.223
This decision has come under heavy criticism.
 
 
224  Naude and Lubbe225 contend that the 
exemption clause was, in fact, unfamiliar and surprising on grounds of the justus error doctrine. 
They argue that by virtue of excluding liability for negligence the exemption clause allowed the 
hospital to provide a service that was essentially different from its obligation to provide 
professionally acceptable medical care.226 This led to the exemption clause to be one that was 
surprising and unexpected.227 Pretorius228
                                                 
216 At Para 3. The respondent had suffered complications which caused damage exceeding R2 million. 
217 At Para 2. 
218 At Para 3. The clause was contained in Article 2 of the agreement. 
219 At Para 33. 
220 At Para 35. 
221 At Para 36. 
222 Ibid. See also CJ Pretorius ‘Exemption Clauses and Mistake: Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA)’ 
(2010) 73 THRHR 491, 496. 
223 At Para 36. 
224 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 459-460. See also Pretorius (note 222 above) 496.  
225 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 459-460. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Pretorius (note 222 above) 496. 
 contends that the decision in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
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Strydom229 should be revisited by the Supreme Court of Appeal because it undermines the rule to 
the effect that unexpected terms must be brought to a consumer’s notice. In the later decision of 
Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal had again to 
determine whether an exemption clause relied on by the appellant had to be brought to a 
customer’s notice.230 In this case the respondent customer’s vehicle was stolen from the 
appellant dealer’s premises after the vehicle had been delivered for general service and 
repairs.231 The vehicle was stolen during a robbery at the appellant’s premises and when sued by 
the respondent for damages the appellant relied on an exemption clause.232 The exemption clause 
absolving the appellant from liability for, inter alia, theft was contained in a ‘repair order form’ 
in barely legible writing.233 The court held that the exclusion clause undermined the very essence 
of the agreement and therefore, the clause ought to have been brought to the respondent’s notice 
in clear and legible writing.234 Pretorius235 agrees with the court’s finding and asserts that the 
exemption clause was unexpected especially because the vehicle was still under warranty and the 
lease agreement embodying the warranty did not contain an exemption clause despite the fact 
that it was the principal agreement.236 The decision in Mercurius Motors v  Lopez237 also finds 
support in the CPA of 2008 which states that any provision purporting to limit the risk or liability 
of a supplier or any other person must be brought to the knowledge of the consumer in plain 
language.238 Furthermore, the clause must be written in plain language and the party must be 
given an adequate opportunity to examine the agreement.239 The decision in Afrox Healthcare 
Bpk v Strydom240 is clearly at variance with Mercurius Motors v Lopez241 and the provisions of 
the CPA of 2008.242
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Another safeguard used by the courts has been to give special attention to exemption clauses that 
are drafted for the purpose of limiting liability for negligence. The analysis below will examine 
whether the traditional position, that a party may validly exempt him or herself from liability for 
ordinary and gross negligence through an exemption clause, still subsists after the CPA of 2008 
came into force.243
Perhaps the starting point would be to analyse the case of South African Railways and Harbours 
v Lyle Shipping Co. Ltd 1958 (3) SA 416 (A) where the appellant’s ship, the ‘Cape Sable’, was 
involved in a collision with the respondent’s tug.
  
 
244 The collision between the two vessels 
occurred during operations performed under a towage contract between the parties.245 The 
contract in question contained an exemption clause absolving the appellant from liability for 
negligence brought about by its servants.246 The question for determination on appeal was 
predicated on whether the exemption clause exempting the appellant from liability from 
negligence was valid.247 The court found that the exemption clause did not explicitly or generally 
exempt the appellant from liability and went on to interpret the exemption clause, explaining the 
situations under which a clause limiting liability for negligence may be construed.248 It was 
stated that in instances where liability for damages which an exemption clause purported to 
eliminate rested only on negligence, that exemption was to be considered in the context of only 
excluding liability for negligence.249 However, where the liability rested on some other ground 
other than negligence, then it was to be excluded to the extent of that ground and not on 
negligence except when expressly stated.250
                                                 
243 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 43 above) at 15. 
244 At 418. A ‘tug’ is a powerful small boat designed to pull or push larger ships.  
245 Ibid. 
246 At 418-419. 
247 At 419. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. See also First National Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (A) 
Para 6. 
250 Ibid. 
 This principle has been described as the traditional 
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approach to exemption clauses limiting liability for negligence.251 In dismissing the appeal Steyn 
J.A. held that the exemption clause did not shield the appellant from liability for negligence.252
In the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) 
Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) the issue of negligence was also considered.  In this case the appellant 
sought to recover damages for the loss of its jute grainbags stored by the respondent in a 
warehouse under a contract of bailment embodying an exemption clause.
 
 
253 The grainbags had 
been stolen by the respondents’ employees, including the chief security officer.254 Although the 
decision did not deal with gross negligence, Wessels ACJ mentioned in passing that a party may 
absolve himself from such liability through an exemption clause.255 In dismissing the appeal, the 
court held that the clause in question absolved the respondent from willful negligent conduct on 
the part of its employees.256
The Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa had to decide among other issues whether an 
exemption could limit liability for negligence in the case of First N ational B ank of  Sout hern 
Africa Limited v Rosenblum and A nother 2001 (4) SA 189 (A). In this case the appellant bank 




257 The safe deposit box which kept the respondents’ valuable articles was, 
however, stolen by one of the bank’s employees and the appellant bank was unable to restore the 
respondents’ articles.258 Relying on negligence by the bank, the respondent husband and wife 
successfully sued the appellant bank in the court a quo  for damages arising from the theft of 
contents of a safe deposit box.259
                                                 
251 First National Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Rosenblum and Another (note 249 above) at Para 6. 
252 At 419-420. 
253 At 800. 
254 At 801. 
255 At 807. See also J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Borderline between the Law of Contract and the Law of Delict’ 
(2012) 75 THRHR 107, 110-111. 
256 At 806-807. 
257 At Para 4. 
258 At Para 4-5. 
259 At paragraphs 2-3. 
 The bank appealed in the Supreme Court of Appeal and relied 
on an exemption clause embodied in the contract which limited its liability for theft and other 
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potential hazards.260 The question on appeal was whether the exemption clause covered acts of 
theft and negligence by the bank’s employees.261
In upholding the appeal, the court restated the traditional approach on exemption clauses coined 
in the case of South African Railways and Harbours v Lyle Shipping Co. Ltd
  
 
262 and came to the 
conclusion that the exemption clause was valid.263 The court found that the bank was exempted 
from liability for theft and negligence whether or not loss or damage was preventable.264 On the 
important question of whether the bank was liable for the willful misconduct of employees acting 
within the scope of their employment, it was held that the exemption clause protected the 
appellant bank because it did not derive any benefit from the misconduct committed by its 
employees.265
A similar conclusion was reached in the much criticised and very controversial case of Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
 
 
266 where the Supreme Court of Appeal was faced with an exemption 
clause embodied in a standard hospital form. In recognizing an exemption clause as a rule rather 
than the exception, Fire A.R upheld its validity by stating that the exemption clause protecting 
the hospital from liability for negligence was not contrary to public policy.267 The court stated 
that exemption clauses in hospital forms were the rule rather than the exception.268 An 
exemption clause contained in a contract between a patient and a hospital ought to be declared 
contrary to public policy because it offends the very essence of the contract.269 It is suggested 
that such exemption clauses should be invalidated by the legislature because a patient is not only 
in a vulnerable position physically but also in a weaker bargaining position.270
                                                 
260 At Para 1. 
261 At Para 5. See also Wells v SA Alumenite Co. 1927 AD 69 at 72. 
262 South African Railways and Harbours v Lyle Shipping Co. Ltd 1958 (3) SA 416 (A) 419.  
263 First National Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Rosenblum and Another (note 249 above) at paragraphs 6-7, 
20-22. 
264 At paragraphs 11-12.  
265 At Para 22. 
266 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
267 At Para 24. 
268 At Para 36. 
269 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 456. 
270 Ibid. 
 In Afrox 
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Healthcare B pk v St rydom271 the court clearly sacrificed substantive justice on the altar of 
judicial formalism because too much emphasis was placed on the bargaining power of the 
hospital and the patient rather than taking the conditions under which patients usually sign 
hospital forms.272 Naude and Lubbe273 opine that by placing too much emphasis on the hospital’s 
business interests, the non-commercial interests of the patient were accorded less weight, 
especially because the court summarily dismissed the consideration that the patient was in a 
weak bargaining position.274
In the more recent decision of Mercurius Motors v Lopez
  
 
275 Navsa J.A found that an exemption 
clause could not protect the appellant from liability for negligence.276 He restated the test for 
negligence as follows: 
 
‘(a) would a reasonable person, in the same circumstances as the defendant, have foreseen the 
possibility of harm to the plaintiff;  
(b) would a reasonable person have taken steps to guard against that possibility;  
(c) did the defendant fail to take the steps which he or she should reasonably have taken to 
guard against it?
If all three parts of this test receive an affirmative answer, then the defendant has failed to 
measure up to the standard of the reasonable person and will be adjudged negligent.’
  
 277
The court concluded that negligence attached because the appellant had not acted reasonably in 
the circumstances. The cases examined above reveal an inconsistency in judicial opinion 
concerning the validity of a clause exempting a party for his own negligence. The inconsistency 




                                                 
271 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
272 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 460-61. 
273Ibid. See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
274 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above) at Para 12. 
275 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above). 
276 At paragraphs 33-34. 
277 At Para 34. 
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 First National Bank of  Southern Africa Limited v 
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Rosenblum and Another279 and Mercurius Motors v Lopez280
Exclusion from negligence for bodily injury has also been considered by the courts in relation to 
the case of Afrox H ealthcare B pk v  St rydom.
 is alarming taking into account that 
all these cases were decided in the constitutional dispensation.  
 
281 For instance, in the case of Johannesburg 
Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 517 (SCA) the respondent brought a claim against the appellant 
country club alleging that her husband, a certain Mr. Stott, had passed away as a result of the 
negligence of the club.282 The late Mr. Stott, while playing golf at the country club sought cover 
under a shelter in order to avoid a rainstorm.283 Lighting struck while he was under the shelter 
and he was severely injured and subsequently passed away.284 The respondent claimed damages 
for her loss of support and other costs against the country club, alleging that her husband had 
been killed as a result of the negligence of the club.285 The club relied on an exemption clause 
contained in rules to which all its members were bound, including Mr. and Mrs Stott.286 The 
clause in issue absolved the club from liability for personal injury or harm to members, their 
children and their guests.287 The question for determination was whether the exemption clause 
absolved the club from liability arising from a dependant’s claim as opposed to a claim by a 
member.288 The court held that the exemption clause only protected the club against claims made 
by its members in respect of personal injury and did not contemplate claims made by dependants 
of club members.289 The court went on to consider the general validity of an exemption clause 
absolving a party from liability for negligently causing the death of another.290 In considering the 
clause Harms JA highlighted that it was arguable whether an exemption clause of this nature was 
consistent with public policy and the South African Constitution.291
                                                 
279 First National Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Rosenblum and Another (note 249 above). 
280 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above). 
281 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). See also Neethling & Potgieter (note 255 above) 111. 







289 At 517-518. 
290 At 518. 
291 Ibid. 
 It was held that an 
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exemption clause absolving a party from liability for negligently causing the death of another 
must contain clear wording to that effect.292
The court in Swinburne v  Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD) rendered the 
opinion that public policy carries more weight when measured against an exemption clause 
which takes away the right to bodily integrity as enshrined in the Constitution.
 
 
293 In this case the 
plaintiff tenant fell while climbing a short flight of stairs and he attributed his fall to negligent 
failure on the part of the defendant landlord to erect a handrail on the stairs which could have 
prevented his fall.294 Wallis J held that the Constitutional Court decision in the case of Mercurius 
Motors v Lopez295 had broadened the scope of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in the case 
Afrox H ealthcare B pk v St rydom.296 In this respect the court concluded that exemptions from 
liability for physical injury infringe upon the right to freedom, security of the person, bodily and 
psychological integrity embodied in section 12 of the Bill of Rights in the South African 
Constitution.297
It appears from the cases of Johannesburg Country C lub v  St ott
 
 
298 and Swinburne v  N ewbee 
Investments (Pty) L td299 that courts are slowly moving away from the decision in Afrox 
Healthcare B pk v St rydom300
Prior notice is another control measure applied by the courts in limiting the indiscriminate use of 
exemption clauses. This control measure requires a party to draw an unexpected contractual term 
 where it was held that exemption clauses excluding liability for 
personal injury in hospital forms were the rule rather than the exception. This will be more 
evident when considering the provisions of the CPA of 2008 to be examined below. 
 
4.2.4. Prior notice 
                                                 
292 Ibid. See also PN Stoop ‘The Current Status of the Enforceability of Contractual Exemption Clauses for the 
Exclusion of Liability in the South African Law of Contract’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ  496, 503; Neethling & Potgieter 
(note 255 above) 107, 111. 
293 At 312. See also Neethling & Potgieter (note 255 above) 111. 
294 At 299. 
295 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above). 
296 At 312. See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above); Neethling & Potgieter (note 255 above) 111. 
297 At 312. 
298 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 517 (SCA). 
299 Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD). 
300 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
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in an agreement to the notice of the other.301 The issue of bringing a contractual provision to the 
attention of a contracting party had been problematic under the South African law of contract 
particularly because there has been conflicting judicial opinion.302 In the case of Diners Club SA 
v (Pty) L td v L ivingston and another 1995 (4) SA 493 (W), the first defendant signed an 
application form that bound him as a co-principal debtor with the plaintiff while labouring under 
the impression that he was signing an application form for a corporate credit card.303 In finding 
that the first defendant was misled into signing the document, Labe J held that there was a duty 
on the plaintiff club to draw to the first defendant’s attention a clause written in extremely small 
print on the back of a signed application form for the corporate credit card.304
The issue of prior notice was also explored in the case of Fourie N .O v  H ansen and A nother 




305 The vehicle had been delivered at the home of first defendant who signed a 
rental agreement while labouring under the impression that he was signing a document for 
accepting delivery of the vehicle.306 The agreement contained an exemption clause absolving the 
second defendant from liability.307 The vehicle overturned on the way back from the sporting 
event and a claim against the driver and car-hire company was instituted.308 The car hire 
company disputed liability and relied on an exemption clause that purported to exempt it from 
liability.309 The court held that the exemption clause was unexpected in the agreement and 
thereby ought to have been brought to the notice of the party who signed the contract.310 In other 
words, the clause was unexpected and should have been brought to the attention of the first 
defendant because it offended the very nature of contracts that involve the hiring vehicles.311
                                                 
301 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above) Para 33. See also Aronstam (note 171 above) 32. 
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A few months later the Supreme Court of Appeal came to a different conclusion in Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom.312  The court concluded that there was no legal duty on one party to 
bring an exemption clause to the knowledge of the other.313 The authority of the Afrox 
Healthcare B pk v St rydom314 decision was tested in a later judgment of the same court in 
Mercurius Motors v Lopez.315 On the issue of prior notice, Navsa JA in the latter case stated that 
a person delivering his vehicle would reasonably expect that his car would be safely kept and any 
unexpected exemption clause ousting such a duty ought to be brought to a customer’s knowledge 
without the slightest hesitation.316
‘An exemption clause… that undermines the very essence of the contract of the contract … 
should be clearly and pertinently brought to the attention of a customer who signs a standard 
instruction form, and not by way of an inconspicuous and barely legible clause that refers to the 
conditions on the reverse side of the page in question.’
 He expressed himself as follows: 
 
317
Thus, an exemption clause that defeats the purpose for which the parties contracted for in the 








319 It often happens in ordinary consumer transactions that suppliers limit 
their liability through the inclusion of exemption clauses in tickets and notices in general public 
areas.320 The principle of prior notice also applies to tickets, notices and other contractual 
documents issued by suppliers when concluding consumer transactions.321
                                                 
312 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
313 At Para 36. 
314 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
315 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above). See also Fourie N.O v Hansen and Another (note 302 above). 
316 At Para 33. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 455. 
319 Christie (note 87 above) 179. See also Aronstam (note 171 above) 26-29; S Smith Atiya’s Introduction to the 
Law of Contract 6 ed (2005) 139; Woker (note 30 above) 39. 
320 Christie (note 87 above) 180. See also Woker (note 30 above) 39. 
321 Ibid. See also Smith (note 319 above) 140. 
 However, it must be 
pointed out that in ticket and notices cases the application of the doctrine of prior notice slightly 
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differs because such documents are not usually signed by consumers.322 One of the earliest South 
African decisions which considered an exemption clause in a ticket is the leading case of Central 
South A frican R ailways v  M cLaren 1903 TS 727. In this case an employee of the appellant 
issued a cloak room ticket to the respondent after receiving luggage from him.323 The ticket 
contained an exemption clause limiting the appellant’s liability for any loss to £5.324 After losing 
the respondent’s luggage, the appellant was granted a claim of £20 in the lower court and the 
appellant challenged this decision on the ground that the ticket contained a clause limiting the 
liability of the railway company to an amount of £5.325 The court dismissed the appeal and held 
that the clause had not been properly drawn to the respondent’s knowledge.326
While the effect of the established doctrine of prior notice has been entrenched in the law of 




exceptions are instances where a consumer cannot allege that a term was not brought to his 
notice. The requirement of prior notice will not be recognised if it is not possible to give personal 
notification of the exemption clause, or if it commercially impossible or impractical to give the 
notice.328 Further, the clause under scrutiny will be held as being applicable when everything 
was reasonably done to inform the person to whom the clause must apply.329 Another important 
factor is that if the clause is clearly and conspicuously marked out by a service provider, the 
consumer will be presumed to have seen it and will be held bound by the clause.330 In the case of 
Davidson v  J ohannesburg T urf C lub 1904 TH 260, Solomon J had to consider a widely 
published notice which contained certain conditions of admission on the defendant country 
club’s premises.331
                                                 
322 Christie (note 87 above) 180-181. 
323 At 732. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
326 At 735-736. 
327 Woker (note 30 above) 41. 
328 Ibid. See also Christie (note 87 above) 180 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
331 At 262. 
 The plaintiff merchant seller was assaulted, detained and forcibly ejected 
from defendant’s premises by police detectives who had been acting as servants of the 
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defendant.332 All persons who visited the racecourse at the country club on that day had 
purchased tickets which contained a provision that the defendant reserved the right to eject 
anyone from the premises.333 The court recognised the wide publication of the terms of 
admission and stated that the defendant was entitled to rely on the clause reserving its right to 
eject persons from its premises.334
Despite the above exceptional cases, the guiding light is that the rule on a notice is not inflexible 
and determining what constitutes reasonable notice is always circumstantial.
 
 
335 It will be seen 
below that the CPA of 2008 reinforces the common law doctrine of prior notice.336 The Act 
requires clauses limiting liability to be brought to a consumer’s notice and affords a consumer an 
adequate opportunity to examine the provision in issue.337
Another type of judicial control to exemption clauses is the contra proferentem
 The cumulative effect of the cases 
examined above demonstrates that the control measure on prior notice has been effective in 
limiting the unfair results of exemption clauses on consumers. 
 
4.2.5. The Contra Proferentem rule of interpretation 
338 rule of 
interpretation. In addition to prior notice, considerations of negligence and unexpected terms, 
South African courts have also used the contra pr oferentem rule of interpretation as another 
common law technique to shield unsuspecting consumers from the clutches of exclusion 
clauses.339 The rule has been applied by the courts in order to curb the undesired effects of 
exemption clauses, especially where a party seeks to escape liability by inducing the other party 
into being bound by ambiguous contract terms.340
                                                 
332 At 264. 
333 At 262. 
334 At 265. 
335 Woker (note 30 above) 41. See also Christie (note 87 above) 182. 
336 S. 51 (1) (c) and S. 49 of the CPA of 2008 apply to all exemption clauses generally. 
337 S. 49 (5) of the CPA of 2008. See also Pretorius (note 222 above) 500. 
338This is a Latin phrase translating ‘against the offeror’. See Garner (note 63 above) 352.  
339 Hotels, Inns and Resorts SA (Pty) Ltd v Underwriters at Lloyds and Others 1998 (4) SA 466 (C) at 477. See also 
Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co. Ltd 1948 (3) SA 99 (A) at 123. 
340 J Mickleburgh Consumer Protection (1979) 324. 
 This rule is usually applied as a last resort and 
requires ambiguous contract terms to be interpreted unfavourably and restrictively against the 
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drafter in favour of the weaker consumer.341 This proposition was expressed in the case of 
Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co. Ltd 1948 (3) SA 99 (A). In this case the plaintiff brought an 
action against the defendant for specific performance under a contract of the sale of immovable 
property.342 The contract had a provision of an option to purchase the immovable property.343 
After contentions arose on the interpretation of the document between the parties, the court held 
that the seller bore the blame for not properly expressing the terms plainly in the agreement.344
‘The contra proferentem rule, however, is one which is not to be used unless all the ordinary 
rules of interpretation have been exhausted in an attempt to arrive at the true intention of the 
parties, that is to say, of course, the true expressed intention…’
 In 
holding that the agreement was to be interpreted against the party in whose power it was to make 
the agreement clearer Davis J held as follows: 
 
345
The contra proferentem rule of interpretation affords relief only where the clause in question is 
ambiguous and yields no clear meaning.
 
 
346 If the clause is clear, it will apply with full force and 
effect.347 The proferens is the party who authors the contract personally or does so through his 
agent.348 In explaining the operation of the rule, McNally JA in the case of Transport and Crane 
Hire (Pvt) Ltd v Hubert D avies & Co L td 1991 (4) SA 150 (ZSC), cited with approval the 
comments made by Lord Denning in the English decision of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v 
Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 1 QB 284349 and held that when courts apply the doctrine they 
often give the narrowest of meanings to the wording of an ambiguous exemption clause.350
                                                 
341 Transport & Crane Hire (Pvt) Ltd v Hubert Davies & Co. (Pvt) Ltd 1991 (4) SA 150 (ZS) at 163. See also Cairns 
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342 At 108. 
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344 At 121 
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Construing contract terms in this manner requires the courts to analyse the contract term in 
tandem with the surrounding circumstances especially where all methods of ascertaining the 
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intentions of the parties have failed.351 The contra proferentem rule of interpretation says this 
rule of interpretation effectively ‘cuts the Gordian Knot’ in ambiguous contract stipulations.352  
The main justification for the application of contra proferentem rule of interpretation is that the 
author of an incurably ambiguous agreement must be held to suffer the adverse consequences 
because it was within his power to prepare the agreement in plain and clear language.353
In the case of Weinberg v Oliver 1943 AD 181, the plaintiff entered into an oral agreement with 
the defendant under which it was agreed that the plaintiff would park his car at defendant’s 
garage at a monthly fee.
 The 
manner in which this rule applies is seen in a number of cases. 
 
354 The words, ‘Cars garaged at owner’s risk’ were painted in large 
letters on the inside wall of the defendant’s garage and were plainly visible to anyone using the 
garage.355 The contract concluded by the parties was also subject to the terms on this notice.356 
The car was damaged by the defendant’s employee while pursuing his private errands and the 
defendant argued that he was protected by the notice that cars in the garage were parked the 
owner’s risk.357 Watermeyer JA restrictively interpreted the notice and held that the plaintiff 
undertook risk only in respect of occurrences happening inside the garage and not outside where 
the car was damaged.358 Therefore, the plaintiff did not undertake to bear any additional risks to 
which the car might become exposed to if it was taken out of the garage into the public streets.359 
The notice did not relieve the defendant from liability.360





                                                 
351 Aronstam (note 171 above) 35-36. 
352 Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co. Ltd (note 339 above). See also Christie (note 87 above) 224. 
353 Aronstam (note 171 above) 36. See also Christie (note 87 above) 224. 
354 At 184-185. 
355 At 185. 
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358 At 188-189. See also Woker (note 30 above) 42. 
359 At 188. 
360 At 189. 
361 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
 already examined above also illustrates the restrictive nature of the principle. In this case 
Wessels A.C.J. restrictively interpreted the exemption clause which provided that the defendant 
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was absolved from liability for damage or loss arising in respect of the bailor’s property.362 The 
question was, inter al ia, whether willful conduct in the form of theft was exempted.363 In 
dismissing the appeal the court interpreted the clause and found that its words were wide enough 
to cover the loss suffered by the appellant through the unintentional breach of contract or 
negligent conduct of the respondent.364
In Hotels, Inns and Resorts SA (Pty) Ltd v Underwriters at Lloyds and Others 1998 (4) SA 466 




365 A clause in the agreement exempted the security company from loss or 
damage that was to be suffered by the plaintiff during the tenure of the contract.366 The plaintiff 
suffered damage as a result of fire started by the security company’s employee.  The security 
company was at all material times insured by the first defendant. The plaintiff sued the 
defendants who sought to deflect liability by engaging the exemption clause in the agreement. In 
granting the relief claimed Hlophe J, quoting from Christie,367
‘For many years South African Courts have interpreted exemption clauses narrowly because 
“the law cannot stand aside and allow such traps to operate unchecked, and the courts have 
protected the public from the worst abuses of exemption clauses by setting limits to the 
exemptions they will permit…”’
 stated that:  
 
368
In coming to its findings, the court simply construed the exemption clause narrowly and relied on 
the case of South African Railways and Harbours v Lyle Shipping Co. Ltd,
 
 
369 where the concept 
had been previously applied and explained. The court concluded that the conduct complained of 
went to the root and very essence of the contract and the defendant could thus not be 
exempted.370
                                                 
362 At 806. 
363 At 805-806. 
364 At 807. 
365 At 467. 
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368 At 477. 
369 South African Railways and Harbours v Lyle Shipping Co. Ltd (note 262 above). 
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 Likewise, the contra proferentem principle was applied in the case of First 
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National Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Rosenblum and Another371 and it was found that the 
appellant was exempted for theft and acts of negligence.372
‘The bank hereby notifies all its customer that while it will exercise every reasonable care, it is 
not liable for any loss or damage caused to any article lodged with it for safe custody whether 
by theft, rain, flow of storm of water, wind, hail, lightning, fire, explosion, action of the 
elements or as a result of any cause whatsoever, including war or riot damage and whether the 
loss or damage is due to the bank’s negligence or not’.
 The appellant relied on Clause 2 of 
the agreement which read:  
 
373
The respondents had argued that the exemption clause could not shield the appellant bank’s 
employees when they committed acts of theft.
 
 
374 The respondents based their contentions on the 
principle that one cannot exempt oneself from liability for willful acts as explained in the case of 
Wells v SA Alumenite Co.375 They further argued that it was only theft beyond the control of the 
bank which the clause recognised; thus, theft or negligence by the bank or its employees was not 
covered by the clause.376 In interpreting the clause the court dismissed the respondent’s 
arguments and stated that the exemption clause excluded liability for the potential negligence of 
the bank’s employees as they were part of the ‘directing and controlling’ minds of the bank.377 
Marias J reasoned that if the clause did not include the employees of the bank under such 
circumstances the clause would have not been necessary in the first place.378 In this respect, the 
court held that the phrase ‘controlling and directing’ minds of the bank not only applied to senior 
management but extended to ordinary employees of the bank.379
                                                 
371 First National Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Rosenblum and Another (note 249 above). 
372 At Para 26. 
373 At Para 3. 
374 At paragraphs 8-9. 
375 Wells v SA Alumenite Co (note 261 above) at 72 at Para 9. 
376 At Para 10-11. 
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378 Ibid. 
379 At Para 18. 
 The rationale was that it would 
only happen in the rarest of instances where the actual controlling minds of the bank (the bank 
management) would be complicit in the theft of safe deposit boxes and this was not the reason 
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why the clause was inserted.380 Therefore, it was held that the exemption clause contemplated 
negligent acts of the many employees of the bank as well.381 The principle set out in the case of 
Wells v SA  A lumenite C o.382 relied upon by the respondents was also dismissed as not being 
applicable to construction of contractual terms but rather to their enforcement.383 Nevertheless, it 
seems settled that where the theft or fraud committed by an employee benefits an employer, the 
employer will be barred from relying on the exemption clause.384
The CPA of 2008 regulates unfair contract terms in sections 48 to section 52 and prescribes the 
content and formalities which all consumer contracts must comply with.
 
 
4.3. The impact of the CPA of 2008 on exemption clauses 
385 While this discussion 
is limited to exemption clauses, it must be made clear that the provisions of Part G apply with 
equal force to other clauses, namely, indemnity clauses, clauses where a consumer assumes risk 
or liability and clauses where a consumer acknowledges certain facts.386 Therefore, any reference 
to exemption clauses must also be deemed to also apply to the above clauses. The CPA of 2008 
has ‘grey list’387 and ‘black list’388 provisions.389 Grey list provisions are embodied in section 49 
in terms of which contractual provisions to comply with certain requirements before they can be 
recognised as valid, while black list provisions are found in section 51 and are prohibited in 
contracts.390
                                                 
380 At Para 20. 
381 At Para 21. 
382 Wells v SA Alumenite Co (note 261 above) at Para 9. 
383 At Para 23. 
384 At Para 22. See also Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Rennies Group Ltd 1997 (4) SA 91 (W) 98-99; Stoop (note 
292 above) 503, 509.  
385 Sharrock (note 33 above) 297.  
386 S. 49- S. 52 of the CPA of 2008. 
387 S. 49 of the CPA of 2008. 
388 S. 51 of the CPA of 2008. 
389 Sharrock (note 33 above) 316, 321. See also T Naude ‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms 
Legislation in Comparative perspective’ (2007) 124 SALJ 128, 131 
390 Sharrock (note 33 above) 316. See also T Naude ‘The Consumer’s “Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Terms” 
Under the new Consumer Protection Act in Comparative perspective’ (2009) 126 SALJ 505, 519. 
 It is necessary to consider the impact of the CPA of 2008 against the control 






4.3.1. Prior notice and unexpected terms under the CPA of 2008 
It must be remembered that under the common law only unexpected or surprising clauses were to 
be brought to the consumer’s notice. However the CPA of 2008 has now entrenched the common 
law requirement of prior notice without any qualifications whatsoever.391 The CPA of 2008 
requires a consumer to be given adequate time to consider an exemption clause which must be 
brought to his attention in plainly written language.392 A supplier who seeks to enforce an 
exemption clause must establish that the clause was brought to a consumer’s notice in terms of 
section 49 of the CPA of 2008.393 Therefore, it seems the proposition propounded in Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v  St rydom394 that exemption clauses are the rule rather than the exception, no 
longer applies since all exemption clauses must be brought to a consumer’s notice. Therefore, the 
position in the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,395 has been altered.396
Another factor to be taken into account is that it is now immaterial whether or not the Minister 
has prescribed certain agreements to be written in plain and understandable language. This is 




397 Such agreements are enforceable whether or not they have been signed.398
Furthermore, exemption clauses in ‘small print’ in tickets, notices and agreements as witnessed 
in the case of Mercurius Motors v Lopez
 
 
399 are dispensed with by the Act which requires all the 
clauses listed in the section to be conspicuously drawn to the attention of a consumer in a 
conspicuous manner likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer.400
                                                 
391 S. 49 (1) of the CPA of 2008. 
392 S. 49 (1), (3), (5) and S. 22 of the CPA of 2008. 
393 Pretorius (note 222 above) 500.  
394 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above) Para 36. 
395 Ibid. 
396 S. 49 of CPA of 2008. 
397 S. 50 (1), (2) & S. 22 of the CPA of 2008. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Mercurius Motors v Lopez (note 43 above). 







4.3.2. Negligence under the CPA of 2008 
The CPA of 2008 only prohibits exemption clauses for gross negligence expressly and leaves 
room for suppliers to exploit exemption clauses under any other circumstances subject to section 
49 (1) of the Act.401
Where a clause purports to exempt a supplier for negligence, that exemption clause must be 
brought to the consumer’s attention who must then counter-sign against the clause in issue 
because negligence imputes the existence of potential risk.
 Section 51of the CPA of 2008 provides: 
 
‘51. (1) A supplier must not make a transaction or agreement subject to any term or condition 
if- 
(c) it purports to- 
(i) limit or exempt a supplier of goods or services from liability for any loss directly or 
indirectly attributable to the gross negligence of the supplier or any person acting for or 
controlled by the supplier.’ 
 
402 Therefore, where an agreement 
anticipates the existence of potential risk of an unusual character or which is not even reasonably 
expected to possibly lead or result in serious injury or death, a consumer is required to counter-
sign against such an exemption clause.403 Once this formality is complied with, the exemption 




405 raises concern about counter-signing an exemption clause that excludes liability for 
negligence likely to result in personal injury or death and contends that such a provision is a 
‘double-edged sword’. He says that by assenting to such terms consumers give suppliers leverage 
for contending that exemption clauses which exclude liability for personal injury or death are 
always fair, which he totally rejects.406
                                                 
401 S. 51 (1) (c) (i) of the CPA of 2008. Furthermore, S. 49 (1) (a) of the CPA of 2008 provides that any provision 
purporting to limit the risk or liability of a supplier or any other person must be brought to the knowledge of the 
consumer in plain language. 
402 S. 49 (1) & (2) of the CPA of 2008. See also Naude (note 390 above) 510; Pretorius (note 222 above) 500. 
403 S. 49 (2) of the CPA of 2008. See also Naude (note 390 above) 510; Pretorius (note 222 above) 500. 
404 S. 49 (2) of the CPA of 2008.  
405 Naude (note 390 above) 510. 
406 Ibid. 
 This is the danger that results where gross negligence is 
black-listed in terms of section 51 without expressly grey-listing ordinary negligence under 
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section 49.407 While the Act requires countersigning by the consumer, it has been observed that 
the procedural step of counter-signing an exemption clause does not detract from the fact that 
service providers may avoid liability for personal injury resulting from their negligent 
conduct.408 The reality is that by condoning the exemption of liability for negligence the CPA of 
2008 indirectly gives latitude to the Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom409 decision that hospitals 
may exempt themselves from liability for negligence, with the qualification that patients need 
only to counter-sign against the exemption clause.410 It may be that the CPA of 2008 leaves 
possible room for encroachment on an individual’s fundamental right to life and bodily integrity 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.411
The decision of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v St rydom
 
 
412 has been criticised primarily for failing to 
take into account a weak and vulnerable patient’s precarious position when signing hospital 
forms which often contain exemption clauses introduced at the last minute.413 In healthcare, an 
exemption clause protecting a hospital from liability ought to be declared contrary to public 
policy and invalid because consumers in such instances are not able to guard against a supplier’s 
negligence.414  Sharrock415 holds the view that any exemption clause limiting the liability of a 
supplier for ‘ordinary’ negligence should be considered unfair. The overall criticism leveled on 
section 49 pay is that the section mainly addresses the procedural aspects of an agreement, 
thereby sacrificing substantive fairness which is always paramount in consumer agreements.416
                                                 
407 Naude (note 390 above) 523. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
410 S. 49 (2) (c) of the CPA of 2008. 
411 Naude (note 390 above) 510. 
412 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 43 above). 
413 Naude (note 390 above) 510. 
414 Naude & Lubbe (note 93 above) 456. See also Naude (note 390 above) 511. 
415 Sharrock (note 33 above) 318. 
416 Naude (note 390 above) 511. 
 
 
4.3.3. The contra proferentem principle under the CPA of 2008 




‘4. (4) to the extent consistent with advancing the purposes and policies of this Act, the Tribunal 
or court must interpret any standard form, contract or other document prepared or published by 
or on behalf of a supplier, or required by this Act to be produced by a supplier, to the benefit of 
the consumer-  
(a) so that any ambiguity that allows for more than one reasonable interpretation of a part of 
such a document is resolved to the benefit of the consumer.’ 
 
The CPA of 2008 has thus entrenched the contra proferentem rule in section 4 (4) (a) in terms of 
which courts may interpret ambiguous contract terms to the benefit of consumers.417
A time limitation clause denies a contracting party the right to seek the intervention of a court 
upon the prescription of a stipulated time-frame in an agreement.
 Standard 
form contracts are also subject to interpretation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The 
rule therefore finds recognition in the CPA of 2008. 
 
5.4. The time-limitation clause 
418 Such clauses have been 
described as ‘conditions which clog the ordinary right of an aggrieved person to seek the 
assistance of a court of law’.419 A time-limitation clause has the same effect whether it appears in 
a contract or in the provisions of a statute and it is necessary to examine the approaches under 
both instances.420
The Constitutional Court of South Africa had to determine the validity of a statutory time-
limitation clause in the case of Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) 124 (CC). In this case 
the plaintiff brought an action for damages against the defendant for injuries suffered as a result 
of being intentionally shot by a soldier.
  
 
421 The defendant disputed the claim and relied on section 
113 (1) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 which stated that no civil action was to be instituted 
against the State after a period of 6 months had elapsed since the date on which the cause of 
action arose.422
                                                 
417 Ibid 506-507. See also Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 307. 
418 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 74. 
419 Innes JA in Benning v Union Government (Minister of Finance) 1914 AD 180 at 185. 
420 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at Para 46. See also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 74. 
421 At 126. 
422 Ibid. 
 The plaintiff contended that section 113 (1) of the Defence Act was contrary to 
178 
 
section 22 of the interim constitution of the Republic of South Arica Act 200 of 1993.423 This 
particular section stated that every person had the right to have a dispute settled by a court of 
law.424




section 22 of the interim constitution of the Republic of South Arica.426 Didcott J noted that non-
variation clauses had been familiar in the statutory terrain of South Africa, and had to be taken 
into consideration when legal proceedings were contemplated against a department of the 
State.427 He explained that the utility of such clauses was to allow an organ of government 
enough time to investigate claims laid against it in a responsible manner and to consider whether 
or not to be embroiled in litigation,428 while at the same time preventing procrastination in 
litigation and its harmful consequences.429 The court formulated a test and stated that the 
question whether the right of access to a court in terms of section 22 of the interim constitution 
of South Africa was impeded depended on the availability of an initial real and fair opportunity 
to exercise the right.430
‘What counts…, I believe, is the sufficiency or insufficiency, the adequacy or inadequacy, of 
the room which the limitation leaves open in the beginning for the exercise of the right. For the 
consistency of the limitation with the right depends upon the availability of an initial 
opportunity to exercise the right that amounts, in all the circumstances characterising the class 
of the case in question, to a real and fair one. The test, thus formulated, lends itself to no hard 
and fast rule which shows us where to draw the line.’
 The court stated as follows: 
 
431
                                                 
423 At 128. 
424 Ibid. 
425 S. 113 (1) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
426 At 128. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Ibid. 







The court concluded that 113 (1) of the Defence Act of 1957 was to be struck down as 
unconstitutional.432 Departing from a time-limitation clause in a statutory provision, in the case 
of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) the court had to determine the validity of a time-
limitation clause in a contract from a constitutional context.433 The question in this case was 
whether a time-limitation clause in a short-term insurance policy was contrary to the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, and thus invalid on considerations of public 
policy.434 Ngcobo J pointed out that the test in Mohlomi v Minister of Defence435 formulated by 
Didcott J was not a hard and fast rule as the Constitutional Court had held.436 Ngcobo J went on 
to extend the test and stated that in a constitutional dispensation it was necessary to incorporate 
considerations of reasonableness and fairness when determining whether a time-limitation clause 
was contrary to public policy.437
‘There are two questions to be asked in determining fairness. The first is whether the clause 
itself is unreasonable. Secondly, if the clause is reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the 
light of the circumstances which prevented compliance with the time limitation clause.’
 The court stated: 
 
438
A voetstoots sale is one where goods are sold as they are and a seller is protected by the clause if 
the goods are latently defective. In other words, goods are sold ‘as is’. However, a voetstoots 
clause does not protect a seller who fraudulently sells goods with the full knowledge of latent 
 
 
Ngcobo J applied the above test and came to the conclusion that the clause was not offensive and 
dismissed the appeal. The question whether the CPA of 2008 regulates time-limitation clauses 
must be answered in the negative because the Act does not contain any provision that regulates 
these clauses. Therefore, it appears that the common law propositions set out above will continue 
to sustain legal force. 
 
4.5. The voetstoots clause 
                                                 
432 At 135-136. 
433 The court had to determine whether a time-limitation clause prevented the plaintiff from accessing the courts and 
thus contrary to S. 34 of the South African Constitution of 1996. 
434 At paragraphs 1, 19. 
435 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) 124 (CC). 
436 At Para 50. 
437 At paragraphs 51-52. 
438 At Para 56. 
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defects inherent in the articles sold.439 This constitutes the exception to the operation of 
voetstoots sales. In order for the exception to apply, the seller must have withheld information on 
the latent defect with intention to defraud the buyer.440 In Van Den Bergh v Coetzee 2001 (4) SA 
93 (T) the defendant executor completed the sale immovable property to the plaintiff initiated by 
the deceased owner through an agreement of sale which included a voetstoots clause.441 The 
deceased owner of the property had sold the property fully aware that it had irreparable latent 
defects; however, the executor was not aware of these latent defects.442
‘A seller will be deprived of the protection afforded by a voetstoots clause where the seller (1) 
was aware of the defect in the merx at the time of making the contract and (2) dolo m alo 
concealed its existence from the purchaser with the purpose of defrauding him.’
 Shongwe J. restated the 
proposition of the law set out in Van der Merwe v Meades 1991 (2) SA 1 (A) that: 
 
443
The voetstoots clause was able to protect the executor because he had no knowledge whatsoever 




444 In Truman v Leonard 1994 (4) SA 371 (SE) it was held that a voetstoots clause was 
enforceable where a seller knows of a latent defect but does not conceal it with the intention of 
defrauding a buyer .445 The court stated that in such circumstances the voetstoots clause cannot 
be ‘thought away’ and the seller is entitled to rely on the clause provided he acted honestly.446
In Mayes and A nother v  N oordhof 1992 (4) SA 233 (C) the court arrived at a different 
conclusion. In this case, the defendant sold property to the plaintiffs, who were a couple, without 




                                                 
439 Van Den Bergh v Coetzee 2001 (4) SA 93 (T) at 95-96. 
440 Ibid. 
441 At 94. 
442 At 94-95. 
443 At 96. 
444 At 95-96. 
445 At 373. 
446 Ibid. 
447 At 234. 
 When the 
couple visited the site where the property was located they discovered the squatter camp and 
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thereafter made attempts to return the land to the defendant who refused to accept it.448 The 
plaintiffs then sought the court’s intervention. The court stated that plaintiffs could only succeed 
if they proved that the defendant withheld information with a wrongful intention.449 Fagan J 
found that, although there was no direct evidence that the defendant intended to defraud the 
plaintiffs, there existed circumstantial evidence that the defendant willfully withheld information 
with the intention to defraud the plaintiffs and accordingly granted the application.450
The case law examined above dealt with immovable property. A legal interest in land or any 
other immovable property constitutes ‘goods’ in terms of the CPA of 2008.
 
 
4.5.1. The application of the CPA of 2008 in voetstoots clauses 
451 It follows that the 
CPA of 2008 treats movable and immovable property in a similar manner. Therefore, the 
discussion that follows applies to both immovable property and movables.452
The common law principle of voetstoots is brought about by the provisions of section 55 (6) of 
the CPA of 2008. In terms of this section, the consumer’s right to safe, good quality goods is 
curtailed if the consumer was informed of the condition of the goods prior to the consumer 
transaction and the consumer expressly accepted the goods in that condition.
 
 
453 The presence of 
a voetstoots clause in a consumer agreement is sufficient to fulfill the above requirement. In 
other words, the CPA of 2008 recognises the authority of a voetstoots clause, and a consumer 
cannot claim that the goods are not fit for purpose, or that they are not in good working order, or 
even that they are defective.454
The provisions of section 55 as enforced in section 56 (2) of the CPA do not appear to apply to 
voetstoots sales because in such sales a consumer undertakes to purchase the goods in the state 
he finds them in. Section 56 (2) allows a consumer to return whatever goods within a period of 6 
months from the date of delivery if they are not up to the required standard. In other words, a 
 
 
                                                 
448 At 235. 
449 At 247. 
450 At 247-248. 
451See the definition of ‘goods’ in S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. 
452 Ibid. 




consumer has 6 months to enforce the provisions of section 55 failing which the remedies under 
section 56 become unenforceable.455 It is clear that section 55 (6) of the CPA of 2008 preserves 
the common law position in as far as voetstoots clauses are concerned and consumers will 
continue to suffer at the hands of cunning sellers because they will continue to sign agreements 
containing the causes when purchasing second hand goods. This position will be exacerbated by 
the fact that the Act not only recognises express consent of the consumer, but any conduct 
consistent with accepting goods in a potentially unfit condition.456
In South Africa product liability has, through the years, been subject to much scrutiny by 
academic scholars.
 It has not been stated in the 
CPA of 2008 what factors will be considered in ascertaining such conduct. 
 
5. PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THIRD PARTY CONSUMERS 
457 As already discussed in chapter 2, the common law imposes liability on 
manufacturers for goods which cause harm to consumers either under the law of contract or the 
law of delict.458 Under the law of contract manufacturers are liable under the aedilitian 
remedies.459 Under negligence, a manufacture could be held liable for consequential damages 
when a consumer relies on the aquilian action under the law of delict.460 Van Eeden461
Before the CPA of 2008 came into force a manufacturer could limit his liability for 
consequential damages arising from harm caused by defective products through the use of an 
 expresses 
the difficulty of prosecuting a delictual claim against manufacturers in the following manner: 
 
‘The plaintiff who contemplates bringing an action based on product liability must travel a route 
beset with a formidable range of substantive and procedural obstacles and hurdles, including the 
requirements and complexities of the private law of evidence and the law of procedure.’ 
 
                                                 
455 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 373. 
456 S. 55 (6) (b) of the CPA of 2008. 
457 Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd (note 42 above) at Para 8. See 
also Van Eeden (note 2 above) 21.  
458 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 31. 
459 MA Fouché ‘The Contract of Sale’ in MA Fouché Legal Principles of Contracts and Negotiable Instruments 
(1995) 160.  
460 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 31. 




The extent to which a manufacturer can be held liable in delict for unintended harm caused by 
defective manufacture in an instance where there was no contractual relationship between the 
manufacturer and the consumer was considered by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
in the leading case of Anna E lizabeth J acomina Wagener v  P harmacare L td, C uttings v  
Pharmacare L td 2003 (2) All SA 167 (SCA). The appellant urged the court to apply the 
acquilian remedies and ‘fashion a remedy’ that enforced and protected their constitutional right 
to bodily integrity in terms of the Bill of Rights as enshrined in the Constitution.
 It will be revealed below whether such liability can still be limited now that 
the CPA of 2008 regulates product liability in South Africa. Product liability in the present 
context will be predicated on the development of the common law leading to the imposition of 
strict liability in terms of section 61 of the CPA of 2008. 
 
5.1. Strict liability under the common law  
463 In fashioning 
this remedy the court was urged to extend the propositions in the case of Kroonstad Westelike 
Boere Kooperatiewe Vereniging v Botha 1964 (3) SA 561 (A) which had already attached strict 
liability for consequential damages arising from defective merchandise supplied by merchant 
sellers who had professed expert knowledge.464 However, the court rejected the urge to impose 
general strict liability under the common law despite appellant’s desperate attempts at breaking 
new ground in the field of a manufacturer’s liability.465  Further, the court was against a total 
rejection of long established principles regulating the liability manufacturers under the common 
law, rather preferring an incremental shift into a more modern approach.466 The court then came 
to the conclusion that ‘if strict liability is to be imposed it is the legislature that must do it’.467
 
 




                                                 
462 Ibid 32. 
463 At Para 9. 
464 Ibid. 
465 At Para 22. 
466 At Para 37. 
467 At Para 38. 
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5.2. The CPA of 2008 and product liability 
The South African product liability regime under the CPA of 2008 has its origins in product 
liability legislation of the European Union and the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987.468 
Before the CPA of 2008 came into force, general safety standards in South Africa did not apply 
but were specifically provided in areas of medicine, electrical components, transport and 
foodstuffs.469 However, certain dangerous manufactured goods containing active ingredients did 
not have safety standards.470 Consumers assumed that the South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS) quality marks were safety guarantees, and this was obviously a misconception.471  The 
advent of the CPA of 2008 has seen the codification of liability for damage caused by defective 
goods in section 61 of the Act which dispenses with the requirement of proving negligence.472 
This development was a response to the difficulties experienced by consumers in proving a 
manufacturer’s fault in the production process.473
Under the dispensation of the CPA of 2008 every individual in the South African territory is 
afforded protection under section 61.
  
 
474 For example, a consumer’s right to claim a refund, 
replacement or repair of goods is recognised under the Act.475 Another important development 
introduced by the CPA of 2008 in South African consumer law is that a consumer can claim 
economic loss for personal injury, death or loss of property.476 Under the common law of delict a 
party could not claim damages for pure economic loss but this has position has changed under 
the Act.477
                                                 
468 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 24. 
469 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 31. 
470 For example, dangerous but necessary household items like paraffin, pesticides, disinfectants, and cleaning 
solvents among others.  
471 DTI Green paper (note 4 above) 31. 
472 S. 61 (1) of the CPA of 2008. 
473 Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd (note 42 above) at Para 38. 
474 S. 5 (5) of the CPA of 2008. 
475 Naude (note 390 above) 506. 
476 S. 61 (4) of the CPA of 2008. See also Van Eeden (note 8 above) 32. 
477 J Burchell Principles o f Delict (1993) 9. See also Murphy v  Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908 
(HL) at 923. 
 The CPA of 2008 also entrenched the warranty on fitness for purpose under section 
55 of the Act. In terms of the Act consumers have the right to receive goods that are reasonably 
suitable for the purposes for which they were intended, are of good quality, in good working 
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order and free from any defects.478 The implied warranty on fitness for purpose is in addition to 
any common law or express warranty by a producer, importer, distributor or supplier.479
There are two differing opinions on the type of liability that is imposed by section 61. The first 
opinion is advanced by Bregman,
 
 
480 who is of the view that section 61 imposes ‘strict’ liability 
in the sense that it is immaterial whether or not the harm resulted from the negligence of the 
manufacturer or importer, distributor or retailer of the products.481 Strict liability ‘does not 
depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but is based on the breach of an absolute duty to 
make something safe’.482 In other words, liability attaches in all consumer agreements and 
transactions, including those exempted from the application of the Act.483 The raison d’être for 
strict liability is that risk attached to the use of a product is evenly distributed among users of that 
product and any defect arising thereby is automatically borne by the manufacturer.484
The second view is advanced by Van Eeden
  
 
485 who asserts that section 61 of the CPA of 2008 
introduces a form of ‘modified’ strict liability. Section 61 is not ‘strict’ in the sense that 
manufacturers, importers, distributors or retailers can be absolved from liability if they are able 
to prove any of the defences listed in section 61 (4) of the Act.486 Therefore, the defences act as a 
shield from the consequences of section 61 and thus it cannot be said that liability is strict.487 
Naude488 adopts nether of the above views but instead, she carefully states that ‘section 61 does 
not create absolute no-fault liability’. Although the views expressed above are not mutually 
destructive, the view expressed by Van Eeden489
                                                 
478 S. 55 (2) (a) & (b) of the CPA of 2008. 
479 S. 56 (4) of the CPA of 2008. 
480 Bregman (note 50 above) 93. 
481 S. 61 (1) of the CPA of 2008. See also Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 383. 
482 Garner (note 63 above) 934. 
483 S. 5 (5) as read with S. 61 (1) of the CPA of 2008. 
484 GG Howels & S Weatherill Consumer Protection Law (1995) 204. 
485 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 242. 
486 S. 61 (4) of the CPA of 2008. 
487 Ibid. 
488 Naude (note 58 above) 346. 
489 Van Eeden (note 2 above) 32. 
 appears to be more appropriate because the Act 
does in fact state that liability of a particular person will not arise if any of the provisions of 




The position of the law expressed by Howie P that strict liability is generally not sustainable in 
delictual claims in the case of Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v 
Pharmacare L td490 has been altered since the Act imposes no-fault liability for defective 
products.491
The extensive list of definitions embodied in section 1 may have the potential of introducing 
confusion if not properly attended to. Suffice to say, the definitions in the CPA of 2008 are not 
only limited to section 1, but other sections have in-built definitions in themselves.
  
 
6. CRITICISMS OF THE CPA OF 2008 
6.1. Drafting flaws in the Act 
492 One of the 
sections in issue is section 4 (4) (b) which allows a court to interpret a contract limiting the rights 
of a consumer in line with the reasonable expectations of a person. Naude493 contends that the 
section is unnecessary. Courts are already empowered to invalidate unfair contract terms in Part 
G of the Act and ‘section 4 (4) (b) should be deleted’.494
Another problem is the application of the Act being limited to transactions
  
 
495 ‘occurring within 
the Republic’.496 The first issue with this phrase is that it is inconsistent with other consumer 
statutes which apply to transactions ‘having effect within South Africa’.497 The second issue 
arising is that the scope and meaning of the phrase is not certain.498  The uncertainty arises 
because section 5 (8) (a) of the CPA of 2008 provides that the Act applies to suppliers who 
reside or have their principal offices outside the Republic of South Africa.499
                                                 
490 Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd (note 42 above). 
491 S. 61 of the CPA of 2008. 
492 S. 53 of the CPA of 2008. 
493 Naude (note 390 above) 507. 
494 Ibid. 
495 ‘Transaction’ is defined in S. 1 of the CPA of 2008. 
496 S. 5 (1) (a) of the CPA of 2008. 
497 S. 4 (1) National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
498 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 309. 
499 Ibid 313. 
 It has been pointed 
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out that this situation may give rise to jurisdictional and choice of law problems where a 
consumer seeks to enforce his remedies against a foreign supplier in terms of the Act.500
Another problem is raised by section 5 (2) (a) which provides that the Act does not apply to 
services or goods supplied or promoted to the state. The problem with this section is that since 
the Act does not define ‘state’, it is not clear whether business entities such as companies, where 




There arises a question on the proper forum for challenging unfair terms in consumer agreements 
in terms of the Act. The question is raised by the content of section 69, as read with section 52 of 
the CPA of 2008. These sections are not entirely in harmony. Section 52 gives ordinary courts 
adjudicating authority in issues involving the fairness of terms in consumer agreements. Section 
69 (a) – (d) on the other hand states that a consumer may only approach an ordinary court with 
jurisdiction over a matter upon exhausting the other remedies available to him.
 The CPA of 2008 is not clear in this respect. 
 
6.2. Choice of forum 
502 This 
observation is made by Jacobs et al503
The CPA of 2008 has made significant strides in curbing injustices that were perpetrated by the 
common law under the law of contract, especially freedom of contract which has been curtailed 
by Part G and suppliers no longer enjoy a monopoly over consumers.
 who opines that a court of law may only be approached as 
a last resort after the consumer has presented his case either with the Tribunal, Ombud, 
provincial consumer court or Commission, or refers the matter to an alternative dispute 
resolution agent. This opinion appears contrary to the express provisions of section 52 which 





                                                 
500 Ibid. 
501 Ibid. 
502 S.1 of the CPA of 2008 defines a ‘court’ as excluding a consumer court. 
503 Jacobs et al (note 35 above) 362. 
504 S. 48- S. 52 of the CPA of 2008. 
 Furthermore, the CPA 
of 2008 has shifted liability to every type of supplier who is now held strictly liable where 
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defective products are proved to have been supplied and this marks a milestone feat in the realm 
of the manufacturer’s liability in South African consumer law.505  Nevertheless, the problems 
embedded in the Act leave it in a state of imperfection. The various gaps will undoubtedly have 
to be filled by the courts when they interpret the Act in accordance with their mandate to develop 
the common law.506 This is a judicial mandate recognized in the Act itself and the courts have a 
duty to develop the common law in accordance with the purpose and spirit of the Act. South 
Africa, propelled by constitutional values that find expression in judicial pronouncements, has 
finally emerged from the dark chapters of consumer exploitation and carried the banner of 
consumer justice into the 21st
                                                 
505 S. 61 of the CPA of 2008. 






CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter addressed contract terms and aspects of product liability in South African 
consumer protection law. This chapter considers the manner in which unfair contract terms and 
product liability have been tackled in the United Kingdom (UK). Consumer protection in the UK 
is mainly regulated by legislation and this chapter will consider the changes introduced by 
legislation in product liability and in regulating unfair contract terms. The main statutes to be 
examined in this chapter include the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, Sale of Goods Act of 
1979 and the Consumer Protection Act of 1987. This chapter will also consider the impact of 
European Community (EC) legislation in UK consumer law.  
 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONSUMER FRAMEWORK IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM  
Unlike consumer protection in Swaziland and South Africa, consumer protection in the UK has 
largely been influenced by legislation since its inception and its roots are very deep-seated.1 The 
earliest period from which UK consumer protection law can be traced is as far back as the 13th 
century when Henry III’s Assize of Bread and Ale was enacted in 1266 to control contaminated 
food through uniform weights and measures.2 The Assizes of Bread and Ale prohibited traders 
from supplying products in short weight.3 As business methods developed in mercantile relations 
during the 17th and 18th centuries, it was considered necessary to regulate the price of bread and 
coal.4 It has been observed that most of the statutes regulating these commodities were inclined 
towards fair trading rather than consumer protection.5
                                                          
1 DW Oughton Consumer Law: Text, Cases and Material (1991) 11-12. See also R Lowe & GF Woodroffe 
Consumer Law and Practice (1980) 1; G Howells Comparative Product Liability (1993) 3; P Cartwright Consumer 
Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory and Policy in the U.K (2001) 1. 
2 Howells (note 1 above) 3. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 12; Cartwright (note 1 above) 152. 







While legislation regulated the relations of merchants during the formative years freedom of 
contract later dominated transactions between merchants and consumers.6 Freedom of contract 
eventually attained judicial recognition in the 19th century and courts refused to interfere in the 
affairs of traders and consumers except where a contract was influenced by fraud or 
misrepresentation.7 However, freedom of contract declined in the late 19th century as a result of 
the industrial revolution and consumer protection legislation focusing on consumers rather than 
traders began to be enacted.8 One of the first statutory instruments aimed at achieving this goal 
was the Adulteration of Food and Drink Act of 1860 which made it an offence to knowingly sell 
poisoned food or food which contained harmful ingredients.9 This Act was followed by the 
Pharmacy Act of 1868 which extended protection to harm from adulterated drugs, and later the 
Adulteration of Food, Drink and Drugs Act of 1872 was enacted.10 The Merchandise Marks Acts 
of 1887 to 1953 later followed and eventually formed the core provisions of the Trade 
Descriptions Act of 1968.11 While legislative developments of the 20th century took place, there 
was also an upsurge in judicial intervention with the House of Lords being influential in the 
development of the law of torts which had been neglected in favour of the law of contract.12
The House of Lords realised that the complexities in manufacturing and production processes 
brought about by industrialization placed the personal safety of consumers at risk because 
consumers could no longer easily inspect goods they purchased.
  
 
13 Therefore, the court took it 
upon itself to protect end-consumers of products since consumer protection legislation was a 
‘patchwork’ and ‘harm had to occur in order to stimulate a legal response’.14
                                                          
6 Oughton (note 1 above) 12-13. See also GG Howells & S Weatherill Consumer Protection Law (1995) 13-14. 
7 Ibid. See also PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 403; Printing and Numerical 
Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462. 
8 S Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract 6 ed (2005) 11-12. 
9 Cartwright (note 1 above) 212. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 12; Howells (note 1 above). 
10 Howells (note 1 above). 
11 Cartwright (note 1 above) 162. See also Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 156; Howells & Weatherill (note 6 
above) 333. 
12 Smith (note 8 above) 13, 352-353. 
13 J Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) 246. See also Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562; Grant v Australian 
Knitting Mills [1936] A.C. 85. 
14 Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 379.  
 The decisions of 
Donoghue v  St evenson [1932] A.C 562 and Grant v  Australian Knitting Mills [1936] A.C. 85 
were the first stages of judicial intervention in favour of a third party consumer harmed by 
defectively manufactured goods. Later on a proposal to regulate consumer affairs through 
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government was rejected as ‘a grandiose notion’ by the Molony Committee in 1962.15 
Nevertheless, there was a surge of consumer legislation from the 1960’s through to the 1980’s 
where statutes imposing both criminal sanctions and affording civil redress were enacted to 
rectify the many common law deficiencies.16
Prior to the introduction of sale of goods legislation, courts in the UK had developed common 
law protections aimed at shielding unsuspecting consumers from potentially defective 
products.
 The regulation of implied terms is considered next. 
 
3. IMPLIED TERMS 
17 The courts formulated and enforced implied terms on description, merchantability 
and fitness for purpose of goods sold to consumers.18 These implied terms were later statutorily 
entrenched in the Sale of Goods Act of 1893 and later in the Sale of Goods Act of 1979.19 The 
entrenchment of the implied terms effectively dispensed with the common law doctrine of caveat 
emptor which required purchasers to be cautious whenever they purchased goods.20 The Sale of 
Goods Act of 1979 regulates the purchase of goods between sellers and buyers and also imposes 
certain warranties on purchased goods.21
The implied term on description requires goods sold to be defined according to their correct 
specification or description.
 It is necessary to consider the scope and operation of 
each implied term. 
 
3.1. Implied term on description 
22 The test whether goods have been sold by description is a ‘broad, 
common sense test of mercantile character’.23 There are several factors that must exist before a 
sale can be considered one by description. In terms of the Sale of Goods Act24
                                                          
15 Molony Committee Report The F inal R eport of  t he C ommittee on C onsumer P rotection (1962) (Cmnd 1781, 
1962) Para 886. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 18. 
16 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above). 
17 Howells (note 1 above) 53. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 13; M Griffiths Law of Purchasing and Supply 
(1994) 87. 
18 Howells (note 1 above) 53. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Kindell & Sons v Lillico & Sons and others [1969] 2 A.C. 31 at 123. 
21 S. 11- S. 15 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. See also Griffiths (note 17 above) 87-88. 
22 S. 13 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 
23 Ashington Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] A.C. 441 (HL) at 489, per Lord Wilberforce. 
24 S. 13 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 
 the implied term 
on description must be complied with whether or not the sale is conducted in the course of 
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business.25 The goods need not actually be handed to the consumer when the description is made 
because section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979 has been extended to apply even to 
displayed products.26 This was expressed by Lord Wright in the famous Australian case of Grant 
v Australian Knitting Mills.27 This case involved the appellant consumer, a medical practitioner, 
who contracted dermatitis as a result of defective woollen underwear containing excess chemical 
irritant-free sulphites.28 The appellant brought an action under negligence against both the 
retailer and the manufacturer which produced the defective underwear.29
‘It may also be pointed out that there is a sale by description even though the buyer is buying 
something displayed before him on the counter: a thing sold by description, though it is specific, 
so long as it is sold as not merely as the specific thing but as a thing corresponding to that 
description…’
 In determining when a 
sale can be said to be by description the court stated: 
 
30
With regard to unascertained goods, the question whether a sale is by description is always 
construed in terms of the contractual provisions governing the sale.
 
 
31 Lord Diplock answered this 
question in the case of Ashington Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] A.C. 
441, when he stated that unascertained goods are presumed to be sold by description under a 
contract of sale intended to identify the kind of goods to be supplied.32
One of the most important requirements for a sale to qualify as one by description is that the 




                                                          
25 Oughton (note 1 above) 200. See also Howells (note 1 above) 54. 
26 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (note 13 above) at 100. 
27 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (note 13 above). 
28 At 86. 
29 Ibid. 
30 At 100. 
31 Howells (note 1 above) 55. See also Ashington Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd (note 23 above) 
at 503; Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine Art [1990] 1 All ER 737 at 741. 
32 At 503. 
33 Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine Art (note 31 above) at 744. See also Ashington 
Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd (note 23 above) at 490.  
 This 
requirement was expressed in the case of Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull 
Fine Art [1990] 1 All ER 737, where the defendant dealer sold a picture to the plaintiff which 
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later turned out to be a forgery.34 The plaintiff alleged that it relied on a description of the picture 
by the defendant and that the defendant had breached the implied warranty on description in 
terms of section 13 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979.35  The court held that reliance by a 
buyer on the description made by a seller ‘is the natural index of a sale by description’.36 In other 
words, the court was saying that in order for a sale to be by description, the description must be 
influential in the sale such that it becomes an essential term of the contract.37 Therefore, without 
such influence, the description cannot be said to be one by which the contract for the sale of 
goods is made.38
The Sale of Goods Act
 
 
The cumulative effect of the above considerations constitutes what may be defined as a sale by 
description. The implied term on merchantability is considered in the next subsection.  
 
3.2. Implied term on merchantability  
39 requires goods sold to be of merchantable quality and unlike the 
implied term on description, this term applies to goods sold in the course of business.40 However, 
the exact meaning of the phrase ‘merchantable quality’ is not clear.41 Section 14 (6) of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 does not define the phrase. It must be noted that the phrase does not attach 
any specific value or feature of quality and goods may be of inferior quality and yet still be 
deemed merchantable.42 The converse is also as Lord Wilberforce held in the case of Ashington 
Piggeries Ltd and another v Christopher Hill Ltd, that ‘goods may quite well be unmerchantable 
even if purpose-built’.43 In the case of Rogers and anot her v  P arish (Scarborough) L td and 
others [1987] 2 All ER 232, the plaintiff businessman had bought a motor vehicle which later 
turned out to be faulty.44
                                                          
34 At 739. 
35 Act of 1979. 
36 At 744. 
37 At 741. 
38 At 741. 
39 Act of 1979. 
40 Section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 
41 Griffiths (note 17 above) 97. 
42 Ibid 98. 
43 At 495. 
44 At 234. 
 The plaintiff then rejected the motor vehicle on grounds that it was not 
of merchantable quality in terms of section 14 (6) and claimed that the defendants had thus 
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breached section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979.45 Upholding the appeal, Mustill LJ 
held that in determining merchantability, it had to be taken into account whether the vehicle 
could be driven with any degree of comfort, handling, reliability and pride in the vehicle’s 
outward appearance, and that merchantability was not limited to the vehicle’s mechanics.46
Likewise, in the case of Bernstein v Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 220, 
the plaintiff purchased a new motor vehicle from the defendant and the vehicle later broke down 




Thereafter the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, contending that the vehicle was 
not of merchantable quality in terms of section 14 (6) and that the defendant had breached 
section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979.48 Rougher J declined to define 
‘merchantability’.49 The court held that in determining merchantability, it had to be considered, 
inter alia, (a) whether the car was capable of being driven in safety; (b) the ease with which the 
defect could be remedied; and (c) whether there was a succession of other defects.50 The court 
granted judgment in the plaintiff’s favour.51




52 In the case of Shine v  General Guarantee Corporation [1988] 1 All ER 
911 the defendant finance company let a motor vehicle to the plaintiff which had previously been 
submerged in water and treated as an insurance company write-off because the expense of 
repairing it was too great.53 In allowing the appeal the court held that the condition of 
merchantability imposed by the Sale of Goods Act54 required the purchaser’s reasonable 
expectation about the goods and their condition at the time of sale to be considered.55
                                                          
45 At 235. 
46 At 237. 
47 At 221. 
48 Ibid. 
49 At 222. 
50 Ibid. 
51 At 231. 
52 Shine v General Guarantee Corporation [1988] 1 All ER 911 at 915. 
53 At 912. 
54 S.14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 





An important consideration on the implied term on merchantability is that it does not apply when 
the defects in question were drawn to the buyer’s attention, or where such defects were 
ascertainable upon inspection or examination as prescribed in the contract of sale.56
In terms of the Sale of Goods Act
 The implied 
term on fitness for purpose is considered next. 
 
3.3. Implied term on fitness for purpose 
57 any goods purchased must be fit for the purpose for which 
they were purchased. A buyer is at liberty to assume that goods are fit for purpose if the seller is 
aware why the goods are being purchased.58 In order for the implied warranty on fitness for 
purpose to apply the buyer must have relied on the seller’s skill and judgment when purchasing 
the goods.59 There are instances where goods are fit for purpose but are unsuitable to the buyer’s 
own preferences.60 In such situations a seller is not in breach of the warranty if the goods are not 
to the purchaser’s own personal satisfaction.61 For example, in the case of Griffiths v P eter 
Conway [1939] 1 All ER 685 the plaintiff contracted dermatitis from a tweed coat purchased 
from the defendant.62 The plaintiff’s skin was rather abnormal and had an idiosyncrasy which 
resulted in her contracting the dermatitis.63 As a result of the dermatitis  the plaintiff alleged that 
the coat was not fit for purpose and then brought an action for damages against the defendants on 
grounds of breach of warranty imposed by section 14 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893.64 In 
finding that section 14 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893 did not apply to the plaintiff, the 
court stated that before the warranty on fitness for purpose can be implied it was necessary for 
the buyer to make known to the seller, either expressly or impliedly,  the purpose for which the 
goods were required.65
                                                          
56 S. 14 (2) (a) and (b) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979.  
57 S. 14 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. See also Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (note 13 above) at 99. 
60 Griffiths v Peter Conway [1939] 1 All ER 685. See also Howells (note 1 above) 62. 
61 Ibid. 
62 At 686. 
63 At 691. 
64 At 690. 
65 At 691. 
 The court further held that if a person suffering from an abnormality 
requires goods for his use and seeks the protection of section 14 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act of 
1893, it was essential for the seller to know that the goods are required by a buyer who suffers 
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from abnormalities.66 Informing the seller will enable the exercise of the seller’s skill and 
judgment in accordance with that knowledge.67
In the case of Kindell & Sons v Lillico & Sons and others [1969] 2 A.C. 31, a large number of 




68 The respondent claimed damages for breach of warranty in terms of 
section 14 (1) and (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893.69 Despite the fact that the appellants 
attempted to rely on an exemption clause, Lord Pearce stated that in determining fitness for 
purpose, ‘the rarity of unsuitability would be weighed against the gravity of its consequences’.70 
Lord Reid also held that the scope of section 14 (1) was not limited to defects that could be 
detected, but also extended to latent defects.71
The case of Vacwell E ngineering Co L td v B .D.H C hemicals [1971] 1 Q.B 88, applied this 
standard. In this case there was a violent and fatal chemical explosion in the plaintiff company’s 
laboratory after a chemical called boron tribromide supplied by the defendant company came 
into contact with water while laboratory procedures were being performed.
  
 
72 The plaintiff 
company thereafter claimed damages against the defendant for the losses on its laboratory.73 The 
question for determination was whether the plaintiff’s had made known to the defendants the 
purpose for which they purchased the chemical such that the defendants realised that the 
plaintiffs were relying on the defendant’s skill and judgment in terms of section 14 (1) of the 
Sale of Goods Act of 1893.74 In granting the claim, the court realised that although the chemical 
was fit for its intended purpose, there was likelihood of an explosion resulting from the chemical 
coming into contact with water which ought to have been foreseen in ordinary industrial use, and 
therefore, the implied term of fitness for purpose was found to have been breached.75
                                                          
66 At 691. 
67 Ibid. 
68 At 122. 
69 At 73-74. 
70 At 115. 
71 At 84. 
72 At 93-94. 
73 At 93. 
74 At 104. 





It has been demonstrated above that the sale of goods legislation effectively curtailed freedom of 
contract under the doctrine of caveat emptor in contracts of sale.76 The Sale of Goods Act was 
amended in 2002 by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 200277 to 
implement the Consumer Sales Directive of 1999;78 however, the impact of this amendment is 
yet to be seen.79
Before legislation was enacted to deal with unfair contract terms in the UK, the common law was 
primarily concerned with the procedural aspects of contracts as underpinned by concepts like 
duress, fraud and misrepresentation under freedom of contract.
 Interventions to control unfair contract terms are considered in section 4 below. 
 
4. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN THE UK 
80 Over time, the law of contract 
was developed to focus on the substantive regularity of contracts to the point of statutory 
regulation.81
The perpetual abuse of exemption clauses was met with hostility by the English judiciary, 
particularly judicial mavericks like Lord Denning, who attempted to remedy the effects of 
exclusion clauses which stripped consumers of their rights.
 Perhaps the most notable statute regulating unfair contract terms is the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act of 1977. This section will first examine the manner in which exemption 
clauses were controlled under the common law and later consider the innovations introduced by 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 in redressing the inherent flaws in the common law.  
 
4.1. Judicial control of exemption clauses 
82
‘None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had- when I was called to the bar- with 
exemption clauses. They were printed in small print on the back of tickets and order forms and 
invoices. They were contained in catalogues or timetables. They were held to be binding on any 
 The history of judicially controlling 
exemption clauses is summed up by Lord Denning deciding the Court of Appeal case of George 
Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 Q.B 284 as follows: 
 
                                                          
76 Kindell & Sons v Lillico & Sons and others (note 20 above). 
77 SI 2002/3045. 
78 Directive 99/44/EC (OJ 1999 L171). 
79 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission ‘Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods’ (Law Com No. 
317) (Scot Law Com 216) 2009, Cm 7725 SG/2009/218, at viii. See also J Poole Case Book on Contract Law 
(2003) 218. 
80 Atiya (note 7 above). See also Cartwright (note 1 above) 11. 
81 Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 7-8. 
82 Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 2 QB 326. See also Smith (note 8 above) 289, 302, 310. 
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person who took them without objection. No one ever did object. He never read them or knew 
what was in them. No matter how unreasonable they were, he was bound. All this was done in 
the name of ‘freedom of contract’. But the freedom was all on the side of the big concern which 
had the use of the printing press. No freedom for the little man who took the ticket or order form 
or invoice. The big concern said, ‘Take it or leave it.’ The little man had no option but to take it. 
The big concern could and did exempt itself from liability in its own interest without regard to 
the little man. It got away with it time after time. When the courts said to the big concern, ‘You 
must put it in clear words,’ the big concern had no hesitation in doing so. It knew that the little 
man would never read the exemption clauses or understand them. It was a bleak winter for our 
law of contract…Faced with this abuse of power- by the strong against the weak- by the use of 
the small print of the conditions- the judges did what they could do to put a curb on it. They still 
had before them the idol, ‘freedom of contract’. They still knelt down and worshipped it, but 
they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They used it to stab the idol in the back. This 
weapon was called ‘the true construction of the contract’. They used it with great skill and 
ingenuity. They used it so as to depart from the natural meaning of the words of the exemption 
clause and to put on them a strained and unnatural construction. In case after case, they said that 
the words were not strong enough to give the big concern exemption from liability; or that in 
the circumstances the big concern was not entitled to rely on the exemption clause…But when 
the clause was itself reasonable and gave rise to a reasonable result, the judges upheld, at any 
rate when the clause did not exclude liability entirely but only limited it to a reasonable 
amount.’83
While judicial control of exemption clauses was based on the above premise, it will be seen later 





The notion of fairness has never attained the force of law so as to be recognised as a legal 
concept in the UK despite Lord Denning M.R. attempting to introduce ‘equality of bargaining 
power’ as a basis for determining the validity of contracts in the case of Lloyds Bank v Bundy 
 made a number of developments. The judicial innovations applied 
by the English courts are examined below.  
 
4.1.1. Fairness  
                                                          
83 At 296-298. 
84 (SI 1999/2083) as amended by SI 2001/1186. 
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[1975] 2 QB 326.85 In this case the appellant farmer mortgaged his farmhouse to the respondent 
bank as collateral for an overdraft loan in favour of his son’s company which was in financial 
trouble.86 The contract encumbering the house had been negotiated by the bank’s manager with 
the appellant.87 The company failed to pay the amount owed and the respondent bank foreclosed 
on the house and instituted eviction proceedings against the appellant.88 In granting the appeal 
Lord Denning M.R. held that there was inequality of bargaining power between the parties which 
had resulted in the conclusion of an unfair contract.89 Lord Denning’s efforts were not well 
received by the House of Lords which resisted applying a fairness test to contractual terms.90  
Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] A.C. 686 stated that the task 
of providing a general principle of relief against inequality of bargaining power was a matter for 
Parliament, not the courts.91
Unusual contract terms must be brought to the notice of a contracting party.
  
 
4.1.2. Prior Notice 
92 In the case of 
Thornton v  Shoe Lane Parking [1971] All ER 686 the plaintiff was injured in the defendant’s 
multi storey car park which had a sign at its entrance indicating that all cars were parked at the 
owner’s risk.93 When the plaintiff entered the car park, a ticket containing an exemption clause 
was issued by an automated machine at the entrance of the parking area.94 The plaintiff was 
injured in the parking area when he returned to collect his motor vehicle.95 After the plaintiff 
sued the defendant for the injury sustained, the defendant did not deny liability but alleged it was 
protected by the exemption clause on the parking ticket.96
                                                          
85 Oughton (note 1 above) 100. See also Cartwright (note 1 above) 12. 
86 At 334. 
87 At 335. 
88 At 336. 
89 At 339-340. 
90 Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 306-307. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 100. 
91 At 708. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 100. See also RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed 
(2006) 18. 
92 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] All ER 686 at 690. See also Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stilleto Visual 
Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 348 at 352; Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 98. 




 In coming to their decision, the court 
stated that the plaintiff would only be held bound by the exemption clause if he knew the clause 
existed or if the defendant did what was reasonably necessary to bring the clause to the notice of 
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the plaintiff.97 The court found that neither requirement had been satisfied and dismissed the 
appeal.98
In the case of Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stilleto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 
348, the plaintiff company which operated a library of photographic transparencies sent, at the 




One of the conditions stated that the transparencies were to be returned within 14 days from the 
date of delivery failing which a daily penalty would be imposed in respect of each.100 The 
transparencies were returned later than the usual time limits resulting in the imposition of the 
penalty.101 The plaintiff then claimed the amount owing in respect of the late return of the 
transparencies based on the penalty clause on the conditions contained in the delivery note.102 
After the defendants had challenged the clause, the court held that the clause was onerous and 
the defendants could not have known of its existence unless it was brought to their attention.103 It 
was not expected that a delivery note would contain a clause purporting to charge a holding fee 
for the retention of the transparencies at a high and exorbitant rate.104 In granting the appeal, the 
court held that ‘if one condition in a set of printed conditions is particularly unusual or onerous, 
the party seeking to enforce it must show that the particular condition was fairly brought to the 
attention of the other party’.105
Closely linked with the requirement of prior notice is the requirement that the exemption clause 
must be one embodied in contractual form in order to be recognised as part of the agreement.
 
 
4.1.3. Contractual form 
106 
A court will refuse to recognise the clause if it was contained in a document not considered to be 
contractual.107
                                                          
97 At 690. 
98 Ibid. 
99 At 349. 
100 Ibid. 
101 At 349, 350. 
102 At 350. 
103 At 352. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Smith (note 8 above) 139. See also Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 127 (CA) at 134. 
107 Ibid. 
 In the case of Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 127 (CA), 
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the plaintiff was a guest at the defendant hotel.108  The plaintiff decided to leave the hotel for a 
while, and when she left, she left her hotel room key on a rack at the hotel reception.109 Upon her 
return she found her hotel room key missing from the rack and gained access to her room using a 
pass key only to discover that her furs, jewellery and other personal items had been stolen.110 She 
claimed damages against the defendant hotel on the ground that the defendant had negligently 
failed to guard or supervise the place where the key was kept.111
‘People who rely on a contract to exempt themselves from their common law liability must 
prove that contract strictly. Not only must the terms of the contract be clearly proved, but also 
the intention to create legal relations- the intention to be legally bound- must also be clearly 
proved. The best way of proving it is by a written document signed by the party to be bound. 
Another way is by handing him, before or at the time of the contract, a written contract 
specifying certain terms and making it clear to him that the contract is in those terms.’
 After the defendant relied on an 
exemption clause in a notice in the plaintiff’s room the question whether the clause formed part 
of the contract between the parties was answered by Lord Denning as follows: 
 
112
The court went on to dismiss the appeal by the defendant and held that the exemption clause 




As already discussed in previous chapters, the contra proferentem rule of interpretation simply 
requires ambiguous contract terms to be interpreted against the party who relies on the contract 
for the enforcement of its provisions.
 
 
4.1.4. The contra proferentem rule of interpretation 
114 Historically, courts in the UK adopted a hostile approach 
towards unreasonable contract terms.115 Contractual clauses which sought to limit liability were 
treated more favourably than those clauses which completely excluded liability.116
                                                          




112 At 134. 
113 Ibid. 
114 D Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts 2 ed (1982) 137. 
115 Oughton (note 1 above) 133. 
116 Ibid. 
 The 
distinction between clauses that exclude liability and those that limit liability was expressed in 
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the case of Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 101. In this 
case there was a clause that limited the liability of a security company which had negligently 
performed its services leading to the loss of a boat.117 Lord Wilberforce stated that with regard to 
limitation clauses, courts were not required to create ambiguity by strained interpretation where a 
natural and plain meaning of the clause was more desirable.118
‘Clauses of limitation are not regarded by the courts with the same hostility as clauses of 
exclusion; this is because they must be related to other contractual terms, in particular to the 
risks to which the defending party may be exposed, the remuneration which he receives and 
possibly also the opportunity of the other party to insure.’
 He expressed himself as follows: 
 
119
The criterion in the above excerpt was applied by Lord Denning MR Lord in the case of George 
Mitchell ( Chesterhall) L td v F inney L ock Se eds L td who refused to restrictively interpret a 
limitation clause contained in a contract for the sale of certain cabbage seeds. The appellants in 
this case had supplied cabbage seed which produced cabbages with no heart.
 
 
120 Thus, the 
cabbages were commercially useless and the plaintiff claimed damages for the loss suffered.121 
The court stated that with the enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, the problem 
of narrow and strict interpretation of exemption clauses under the contra proferentem rule was a 
thing of the past.122 The Judge held that in interpreting exemption clauses the court ‘should no 
longer have to go through all kinds of gymnastic contortions to get around them’.123 The court 
went on to dismiss the appeal.124 The findings of Lord Denning that the seeds were qualitatively 
defective were confirmed by Lord Bridge on appeal in the House of Lords where it was held that 
the limitation clause was clear and that it was not fair for the appellants to limit their liability in 
the circumstances.125
                                                          
117 The plaintiff had claimed damages exceeding the amount the company was liable for in terms of the agreement. 
118 At 124. 
119 Ibid. 
120 At 294 
121 Ibid. 
122 At 298-299. 
123 At 299. Coincidentally, this is one of the last cases to be considered in the Court of Appeal by one of the greatest 
English judges in Lord Denning on the 29th September, 1982. 
124 At 302. 
125 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 A.C. 803 (HL) at 817. 
 As opposed to exemption clauses, this case reveals the more relaxed and 
literal interpretation of limitation clauses by the courts. 
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It is clear from the above cases that the dividing line between limitation and exclusion clauses 
was always an issue that was to be taken into account in the application of the contra 
proferentem rule. However, an effort to dispense with this demarcation has been successfully 
made by the courts.126 Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, it has been held that courts 
are required to interpret exemption clauses in a similar way to limitation clauses and thereby 
dispense with the strenuous interpretation that once prevailed towards these clauses.127 This is a 
more modern approach which gives exemption clauses their ordinary meaning and any 
ambiguity arising will be subject to the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act.128
After the Unfair Contract Terms Act came into force the contra proferentem rule had little effect 
as demonstrated in the landmark case of  Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich 
Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. In this case retired investors had mortgaged their homes to 
secure advances and enhanced interest rates in equity linked bonds.
  
 
129 A fall in equities resulted 
in severe losses and the investors presented their claims to the appellant on their collective 
investment.130 The appellant caused the investors to sign a form which assigned all their rights to 
the appellant subject to reservations.131 The question was whether there had been a valid 
assignment in terms of the form when a certain clause affecting the rights of the contracting 
parties had to be interpreted.132 The court held that a more contextual approach to interpretation 
was more appropriate in the circumstances.133 Lord Hoffman held that in construing a 
contractual document the aim was to find the meaning which the document would convey to a 
reasonable man having all the background knowledge.134 The court rejected the common method 
of interpretation and held that ‘the old intellectual baggage of “legal” interpretation’ had been 
discarded in favour of ‘common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be 
interpreted in ordinary life.’135
                                                          
126 Smith (note 8 above) 153. See also Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2001] WLR 735 at 739. 
127 Smith (note 8 above) 153. 
128 Ibid. 
129 At 907. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 At 914. 







This approach was followed by the House of Lords in the case of Bank of  C redit and  
International SA  v  A li [2001] WR 735, where the appellant bank became insolvent after 
declaring its employees redundant.136 The employees brought claims against the appellant based 
on individual agreements on employee benefits signed in full and final settlement.137 In 
dismissing the appeal, Lord Bingham of Cornhill for the majority in the House of Lords 
reaffirmed the observations of Lord Hoffman138
‘In construing this provision, as any other contractual provision, the object of the court is to 
give effect to what the contracting parties intended. To ascertain the intention of the parties the 
court reads the terms of the contract as a whole, giving the words used their natural ordinary 
meaning in the context of the agreement,  the parties’ relationship and all the relevant facts 
surrounding the transaction so far as known to the parties.’




In the above excerpt, the court was simply saying that in determining the wishes of contracting 
parties, courts consider the express language of the terms in the agreement. It can be concluded 
therefore that in the UK, the contra proferentem is no longer applies in its traditional sense after 





The Hire Purchase Act of 1938 which proscribed the exclusion of the implied conditions of 
merchantability and fitness for purpose was the first legislative attempt to deal with exclusion 
 
 
The above discussion reveals the different judicial interventions and the extent to which courts 
were willing to go in shielding consumers from unfair exemption clauses. The impact of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act in regulating unfair contract terms is considered below. 
 
4.2. Impact of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 on exclusion clauses 
                                                          
136 At 737. 
137 At 737-738. 
138 In the case of Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912. 
139 At 739. 
140 Bank of Credit and International SA v Ali (note 126 above) at 756. 
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clauses in the UK.141 A later statute of general application towards the regulation of exemption 
clauses was enacted in the form of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977.142 Before the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act was introduced the courts had generally failed to control and disembody 
exclusion clauses from the confines of contractual freedom.143 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 
only deals with exemption clauses and invalidates exclusion clauses in all contracts of sale in the 
course of business, including sales on hire purchase.144 It is said that the name of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act is quite misleading and is a misnomer because it is both narrow and wide at 
the same time.145 Lowe and Woodroffe146 suggest that the name of the Act is narrow because it 
refers to ‘contract’, yet it also deals with aspects of negligence under different circumstances. On 
the other hand, it is suggested that the name of the Act is wide because it does not regulate all 
‘unfair terms’ but only focuses on exemption clauses.147
It is interesting to note that despite the House of Lords’ reluctance to endorse Lord Denning’s 
recognition of fairness as a ground for invalidating unfair contracts, the English legislature 
eventually enacted the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. The enactment of this Act 
significantly reduced judicial temptation to apply the fairness criterion in dealing with exemption 




                                                          
141 R Cranston Consumers and the Law (1978) 72.  
142 Smith (note 8 above) 313. 
143 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 95. 
144 Smith (note 8 above) 314. 
145 N Locket & M Egan Unfair Terms in Consumer Agreements: The New Rules Explained (1995) 51. See also 
Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 106; Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 25; J Mickleburgh Consumer 
Protection (1979) 328; Smith (note 8 above) 314. 
146 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 106.  
147 Ibid. See also Locket & Egan (note 145 above) 51; Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 25; Cartwright (note 1 
above) 11. 
148 Lloyds Bank v Bundy (note 82 above). See also Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 311. 
 Besides vesting courts with the 
authority to invalidate unfair terms the Unfair Contract Terms Act also empowers courts to 
determine the reasonableness of contract terms in terms of section 11 of the Act. The application 







4.2.1. Total invalidity of certain clauses in consumer contracts 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act totally invalidates some clauses.149 Section 2 of the Act prohibits 
contractual terms that limit liability of a contracting party for bodily injury or death resulting 
from negligence.150 For example, any notice that warns a consumer to enter any premises ‘at his 
risk’ does not sustain legal force if injury or death subsequently eventuates after having entered 
such premises.151 Therefore the exemption clause in Thornton v  Shoe  L ane P arking152
The Unfair Contract Terms Act
 would 
have been void under section 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act had the Act been already in 
existence when the case was decided. However, this section does not apply indiscriminately but 
is subject to the limitations imposed by section 1 (2) of the Act which refers to exceptional 
circumstances under which section 2 (1) may not apply. 
 
4.2.2. Reasonableness criterion in determining the fairness of an exemption clause 
153 allows courts to exercise their discretion in determining 
whether an exemption clause is fair and reasonable.154 Any exemption clause restricting the 
implied warranties of description, merchantable quality and fitness for purpose will be subject to 
the reasonableness test.155 Therefore, the statutorily implied terms cannot be excluded unless it is 
proven to the court’s satisfaction that the exclusion was reasonable in the circumstances.156 
Amongst other clauses, indemnity clauses are prohibited subject to being declared reasonable in 
terms of section 11 of the Act.157 The same applies to clauses that exclude or limit liability for a 
misrepresentation or remedies for misrepresentation over one party.158
                                                          
149 Yates (note 114 above) 74. 
150 S. 2 (1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (note 84 above). 
151 Smith (note 8 above) 314. 
152 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking (note 92 above). 
153 Ibid. 
154 Yates (note 114 above) 81. See also Mickleburgh (note 145 above) 339. 
155 S. 6 (2) (a) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (note 84 above). See also Yates (note 114 above) 77; Howells (note 
1 above) 65. 
156 S. 11 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. See also Yates (note 114 above) 77; Howells (note 1 above) 65. 
157 S. 4 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
158 S. 8 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
 The application of the Act 






4.3. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1999159 were implemented by the UK 
in accordance with the EC Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.160 The 
Regulations repealed and replaced the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 
1994161 and are read together with the Unfair Contract Terms Act in regulating unfair terms 
between suppliers and consumers.162 A contract term falling within the scope of the Regulations 
will be considered unfair if contrary to the requirement of good faith it causes an imbalance in 
the contractual relationship between a consumer and supplier to the consumer’s detriment.163 
However, the contract in its entirety will continue to bind the parties if it is capable of continuing 
in existence without the unfair term.164
In pursuit of ensuring compliance with this requirement the Director of Fair Trading in the case 
of Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] 3 WLR 1297 was the first 
to seek legal enforcement of the Regulations.
  
 
165 In this case the appellant Director of Fair 
Trading sought an injunction to restrain the respondent bank from using a purportedly unfair 
term in its standard form credit agreements.166 The bank argued that the regulation which formed 
the basis of the injunction was inapplicable to the term in question, and further that the term was 
not unfair.167 The House of Lords had to determine two questions: whether the fairness 
provisions of the 1994 Regulations applied to the term in the standard form credit agreement, and 
if they applied, whether the term was unfair.168
                                                          
159 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1999 (SI 1999/2083) as amended by SI 2001/1186. 
160 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Directive 93/13/EEC (OJ 1993 L95/29). See Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] 3 WLR 1297 at 1303;  Smith (note 8 above) 317. 
161 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (SI 1994/3159). 
162 R Lawson Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms 7 ed (2004) 198, 200. See also Smith (note 8 above) 
313; Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc (note 160 above). 
163 Regulation 4 (1) as read with Schedule 2 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994. See also 
Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc (note 160 above) at 1307. 
164 Regulation 5 (2) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994. 
165 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc (note 160 above) at 1311. See also Smith (note 8 
above) 317. 
166 At 1300. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
 Lord Bingham stated that the requirement of 




‘Openness requires that terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no 
concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might 
operate disadvantageously to the customer. Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, 
whether deliberately or unconsciously, take advantage of the customer’s necessity, indigence, 
lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, weak bargaining 
position or any other factor listed in or analogous to those listed in schedule 2 of the 
regulations.’169
In allowing the appeal, Lord Bingham of Cornhill held that the term did not cause a 
significant imbalance so as to be contrary to good faith.
 
 
170 Despite this case being concerned 
with the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994,171 it reveals that the 
Director of Fair Trading is authorized to challenge unfair terms through applying for 
injunctive relief whenever a contract term is unfair.172 It must be noted that the Regulations 
import the once rejected concepts of good faith and equality in determining the fairness of 
consumer contracts.173 Regulation 7 (2) entrenches the contra proferentem rule while 
regulation 7 (1) seeks to ensure that contract terms are drafted in clear language so as to 
avoid ambiguity.174
The law of contract could not cover all areas of consumer relations and it is for that reason that 
the law of tort often came to the consumer’s aid.
 
 
Having dealt with unfair contract terms, it is necessary to consider the manner in which 
product liability has been regulated in the UK.  
 
5. PRODUCT LIABILTY AND THIRD PARTY CONSUMERS 
175
                                                          
169 At 1301.  
170 At 1310. 
171 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/3159). 
172 Director General of  Fair Trading v  First National Bank plc (note 160 above) at1300. See also Smith (note 8 
above) 317, 326. 
173 Regulation 4 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994. See also Smith (note 8 above) 322. 
174 Poole (note 79 above) 245. 
175 Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 375-376. 
 Before examining the legislative provisions 
controlling product liability it is important to first consider the common law position as 
expressed in case law. The consumer protection legislation on product liability with which this 
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section is concerned is the UK Consumer Protection Act 1987. First, it is necessary to consider 
the manner in which the common law dealt with product liability. 
 
5.1. Negligence 
Lowe and Woodroffe176 state that ‘the history of the law of tort is one of gradual and cautious 
development’. Liability for defective products in the UK was governed by the doctrine of 
contractual privity under the law of contract until 1932 when the landmark decision of Donoghue 
v Stevenson177 was handed down by the House of Lords.178 Contractual privity limited the right 
to recover damages only to contracting parties, to the exclusion of third party consumers.179 
There were two exceptions that applied to privity of contract which enabled a third party to 
recover damages for defective goods.180  These were where a seller had induced a sale of 
defective goods by fraudulent misrepresentation and where the goods sold were inherently 
dangerous.181 Lord Atkin revealed the general discontentment of the courts concerning the 
effects of contractual privity whenever defective products caused harm to third party consumers 
when he made the following comments in the landmark Scottish case of Donoghue v  
Stevenson:182
‘I do not think a more important problem has occupied lordships in your judicial capacity: 
important because of its bearing on public health and because of the practical test which it 




The manner in which the law of torts developed the law of negligence leading to the curtailment 





                                                          
176 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 31. 
177 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
178 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 31. See also S Ashworth Product Liability Casebook: US and UK Judgments 
and Commentaries (1984) 102. 
179 Ibid. See also Smith (note 8 above) 335. 
180 Ashworth (note 178 above). 
181 Ibid. 
182 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
183 At 579. 





5.1.1. The dissenting judgment of Lord Buckmaster in Donoghue v Stevenson 
It goes without saying that when the above case was decided in the House of Lords the very 
compelling dissenting judgment by Lord Buckmaster aligned with the established and already 
existing principles of privity of contract.185 In upholding privity of contract Lord Buckmaster for 
the minority commenced by distinguishing a number of 19th century decisions the first of which 
was Langridge v Levy (1837) 2 M & W 519.186 In this case a gunsmith sold a gun he knew was 
defective for the use of the purchaser’s son.187 Upon use, the gun exploded and injured the 
purchaser’s son who was held to have a right of action against the gunmaker.188 This case 
outlined the two exceptions to privity of contract where a manufacturer could be held liable to a 
third party for harm resulting from defectively manufactured products.189 The first exception was 
that privity of contract did not apply where fraudulent misrepresentation had induced the 
purchase of defective articles which eventually resulted in harm to a third party in a contract.190 
Secondly, a manufacturer was liable for harm caused by an article inherently dangerous.191 
Under both circumstances, the seller was liable to the end-user of the article whenever harm 
arose as a result of its use.192 Lord Buckmaster dismissed this case as inapplicable because it 
dealt with a fraudulent misstatement which was not the issue he was called upon to decide.193
Lord Buckmaster went on to consider the case of Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109 
where the defendant had contracted with the Post-master General to convey mail through a mail-
coach with latent defects and to keep the mail in safe condition.
 
 
194 Owing to the latent defects of 
the mail-coach the plaintiff driver got injured after being thrown off from the mail-coach.195 The 
Court of Exchequer held that the plaintiff could not recover damages against the defendant in tort 
because the parties did not stand in a contractual relationship with each other.196
                                                          




189 Howells (note 1 above) 69-70. 
190 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 569. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. See also Ashworth (note 178 above); Howells (note 1 above) 69-70. 
193 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 567. 
194 Ibid 588-589. See also Howells (note 1 above) 69. 
195 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 589. See also Ashworth (note 178 above). 
196 Howells (note 1 above) 69. 
 In concluding 
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that a manufacturer was not liable to a third party for negligent construction the Lord 
Buckmaster quoted Alderson B, as follows: 
 
‘It may be noted, also, that in this case that Alderson B said: “The only safe rule is to confine 
the right to recover to those who enter to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step 
beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty”.’197
The above underpins privity of contract as it applied in 1842, particularly the fact that courts 
would not grant relief to third parties.
 
 
198 In fact, the judicial view expressed by Lord Abinger CB 
in the case of Winterbottom v  Wright199 was that discarding the established doctrine of 
contractual privity would result in ‘infinity of actions’.200 Lord Buckmaster went on to examine 
the case of Longmeid v Holliday (1851) 6 Ex 761 where the wife of a man had purchased ‘the 
holiday lamp’ from the defendant seller and maker of the said lamp.201  The plaintiff was 
induced into purchasing the defective lamp by the defendant.202 The defendant made false 
warranty that the lamp was reasonably fit for purpose and the plaintiff relied on this warranty.203 
When the plaintiff lighted the lamp it exploded and injured her.204 This case also found disfavour 
with Lord Buckmaster who held that the case was inapplicable because the suite had been 
brought against the vendor instead of the manufacturer.205 Lord Buckmaster recognised the 
doctrine of privity as applying between manufacturers and third parties but held that the doctrine 
did not apply in instances where the article in question was dangerous in itself or where a 
manufacturer fraudulently conceals a defect in the article.206
Lord Buckmaster refused to follow the case of George v Skivington (1869) LR 5 Exch. 1 which 




                                                          
197 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 568. 
198 Ashworth (note 178 above). 
199 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109. 
200 Ashworth (note 178 above) 104. 
201 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 589. 
202 Ibid 589-590. 
203 Ibid 590. 
204 Ibid. 
205 At 568. 
206 At 569. 
207 Ibid. 
 In this case a chemist had sold 
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hairwashing shampoo to the plaintiff’s husband which caused her harm upon use.208 While the 
shampoo was inherently dangerous, the court did not make reference to the yardstick of 
inherently dangerous articles in its classification.209 Lord Buckmaster found this case 
embarrassing because the claim succeeded much against the established exceptions to privity. 
What compounded matters further was that the case of Langridge v Levy,210 earlier dismissed by 
Lord Buckmaster as being more inclined to fraudulent misstatements, was applied and approved 
by the court in George v  Sk ivington211 without proper justification. Lord Buckmaster 
emphatically rejected the words of Cleasby B., in George v S kivington212
‘…and Cleasby B., who, realising that Langridge v Levy (2 M.W. 519.) was decided on the 
ground of fraud, said: “Substitute the word ‘negligence’ for ‘fraud’, and the analogy between 
Langridge v Levy (2 M.W. 519.) and this case is complete”. It is unnecessary to point out too 
emphatically that such a substitution cannot possibly be made. No action based on fraud can be 
supported by mere proof of negligence. I do not propose to follow the fortunes of George v 
Skivington (L.R. 5 Exch. 1); few cases can have lived so dangerously and lived so long.’







214 suggests that the court was ‘generous’ in this decision considering the authoritative 
effect of contractual privity at the time. Lord Buckmaster also considered the case of Heaven v 
Pender [1883] 11 QBD 503 where the plaintiff worker was injured during the collapse of a 
staging within the precincts of a dry- dock owned by the defendant.215 A dictum in this case had 
been harped upon by the majority judgment despite the case being generally inapplicable 
because it only revolved around the duty of the owner of premises to invited persons.216 The 
court in this case granted damages for personal injury on the basis of an occupier’s liability.217
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212 Ibid. 
213 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 570.  
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217 Howells (note 1 above) 70. 
 




‘So far, therefore, as the case of George v Skivington (L. R. 5 Ex. 1.) and the dicta in Heaven v 
Pender (11 Q.B.D  503, 509) are concerned, it is in my opinion better that they should be buried 
so securely that their perturbed spirits shall no longer vex the law.’218
The minority held that no case, with the exception of George v Sk ivington,
 
 
219 ever violated 
privity of contract and that, as a result, third party liability under tort could not be sustainable in 
the law.220
As already pointed out above, the English judiciary was intent on protecting third parties under 
the law of tort. Lord Atkin had realised that industrialization in the UK had brought along certain 
potential hazards on the personal safety of consumers.
 This approach prompted Lord Atkin to adopt a different approach which is considered 
below. 
 
5.1.2. The majority judgment of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson 
 221
‘At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some 
general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found 
in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it 
as in other systems as a species of ‘culpa,’ is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of 
moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral 
code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person 
injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of the 
complaints and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour 
becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, who is my 
neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions 
which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is 
my neighbour? The answer seems to be- persons who are so closely and directly affected by my 
  In setting a new consumer trail on 
which future decisions would derive, Lord Atkin formulated the ‘neighbour principle’ which 
imposed a duty of care on manufacturers towards third party consumers of products. He stated: 
 
                                                          
218 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 576. 
219 George v Skivington (note 211 above). 
220 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above) at 577-578. 
221 Burchell (note 13 above). 
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act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.’222
This understanding meant that manufacturers were obliged to take extra precaution during 




The Judge observed that this was a ‘common sense’ approach and that the law could be extended 
under the circumstances.224
‘It is said that the law of England and Scotland is that the poisoned consumer has no remedy 
against the negligent manufacture. If this were the result of the authorities, I should consider the 
result a great defect in the law, and so contrary to principle that I should hesitate long before 
following any decision to that effect which had not the authority of this House. I would point 
out that, in the assumed state of the authorities, not only would the consumer would have no 
remedy against the manufacturer, he would have none against anyone else…I do not think so ill 
of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its principles are so remote from the ordinary needs of 
civilized society and the ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy 
where there is obviously a social wrong.’
 He stated: 
 
225
Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan agreed with Lord Atkin in the majority decision and the 
liability of manufacturers to third parties for negligent manufacture under negligence attained 
judicial recognition. The above principles were later extended to cover a wide range of 




Although the case of Donoghue v Stevenson
 These situations are considered 
below. 
 
5.1.3. Extension of the manufacturer’s liability 
227
                                                          
222 At 580. 
223 At 582. 
224 At 599. 
225 At 582. 
226 For example, see the cases of Stennet v Hancock and Peters [1939] 2 All ER 578 and Hill v James Crowe (Case) 
Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812. 
227 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
 had made a significant departure from contractual 
privity, the original effect of the decision had been severely limited in that it had been decided in 
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the context of persons who had suffered harm as a result of internally consumed food and 
drinking products.228 The decision in Donoghue v St evenson229 was later broadened to cover 
other forms of liability analogous to that presented before the House of Lords.230 In the famous 
Australian case of Grant v  A ustralian K nitting Mills231 the tort of negligence as applied in 
Donoghue v  Stevenson232
‘It was argued, but not perhaps very strongly, that Donoghue’s case was a case of food or drink 
to be consumed internally, whereas the pants were to be worn externally. No distinction, 
however, can be logically drawn for this purpose between a noxious thing taken internally and a 
noxious thing taken externally…’
 was brought under the judicial spotlight. The manufacturer was held 




The Privy Council drew inferences from the known circumstances of the case and reversed the 
decision of the Australian High Court.
  
 
234 It was found that the defendant manufacturer owed a 
general duty of care to the plaintiff because the product had reached the plaintiff with the defect 
it had when it left the manufacturer.235 The case of Daniels and D aniels v R White & Sons Ltd 
and Tabbard [1938] 4 All ER 258 was less consumer friendly in the extension of liability and the 
development of the law of negligence since it neither followed Donoghue v St evenson236 nor 
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills.237 In this case a man purchased lemonade for himself and his 
wife from the second defendant retailer and the lemonade later led to their illness because it 
contained carbolic acid.238
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230 Smith (note 8) 353. 
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232 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
233 At 106. 
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 The husband and wife thereafter claimed damages against both the 
manufacturer and retailer of the lemonade. Lewis J stated that the duty owed by a manufacturer 
to the consumer or end-user of a product was not to ensure that the manufactured goods were 
perfect but to take reasonable care that the goods did not have a defect that was likely to cause 
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injury.239 The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the defendant company had 
breached its duty of care.240 However, the husband was able to recover damages for personal 
injury against the retailer since there was a breach of the implied warranty on description in 
terms of section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893.241
Despite this temporary setback, the principles in Donoghue v Stevenson
 The wife was not successful with her 
claim against both the retailer and manufacturer because she was considered a third party 
towards both defendants.  
 
242 were later extended in 
the case of Stennet v  H ancock and P eters [1939] 2 All ER 578. In this case the plaintiff was 
severely bruised on the leg by a flange falling off the wheel of the first defendant’s lorry while 
walking on a pavement.243 The flange had dislodged because the lorry was negligently repaired 
by an employee of the second defendant.244 Instead of finding the first defendant liable the court 
held that the second defendant must have known that if the flange was not properly fixed, injury 
would result to other road users.245 The court held that any failure on its part to grant relief 
would ‘be a sad lacuna in the law’.246
The case of Daniels and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd and Tabbard was brought under judicial 
spotlight in the case of Hill v Jam es Crowe (Cases) L td [1978] 1 All ER 812. In this case the 
plaintiff was on duty packing wooden cases into a lorry he was driving.
  
 
247 The plaintiff fell and 
injured his ankle and hand after one of the wooden cases manufactured by the defendant 
collapsed.248 He then claimed damages against the defendant manufacturer alleging that the cases 
were badly manufactured.249
                                                          
239 At 261. 
240 At 263. 
241 At 264. 
242 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
243 At 579. 
244 At 581. 
245 At 583. 
246 At 585 
247 At 813. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
  The plaintiff argued that the defendant had failed in its duty of care 
to ensure that the cases were fit for any transit hazards which included standing on the cases 
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while they were being loaded.250 Besides finding that liability had been established by the 
plaintiff Mackenna J rejected the case Daniels and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd and Tabbard251 
as having been wrongly decided.252
Lord Wilberforce and all the judges in the House of Lords stretched the neighbour principle to 
breaking point in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] A.C 728 (HL). In this case the 




253 The building was built on inadequate foundations after the defendant had approved 
the building plans.254 After a while the building cracks and slopping floors which resulted in 
structural movements.255 The plaintiffs claimed damages against the defendant council for 
negligently failing to inspect the foundations on which the block of flats was constructed.256 The 
question for determination by the court was whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
occupants with regard to building inspections.257
‘[I]n order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation…the question the 
question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the 
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, 
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter- in which case a prima facie 
duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to 
consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the 
scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of 
it may give rise.’
 In answering this question Lord Wilberforce 
formulated a two-stage test that was to be considered in determining whether a duty of care 
existed. He stated: 
 
258
                                                          
250 Ibid. 
251 Daniels and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd and Tabbard [1938] 4 All ER 258. 
252 At 816. 




257 At 751. 





The Judge was saying that in certain circumstances a duty of care to avoid negligently causing 
pure economic loss against another person was recognised by courts which only had the duty of 
establishing the limits of such liability.259 In finding the council liable for the breach of its duty 
the court unanimously held that the plaintiffs were entitled to ‘the amount of expenditure 
necessary to restore the dwelling to a condition in which it is no longer a danger to the health or 
safety of persons occupying and possibly expenses arising from necessary displacement.260
However, Lord Keith in a unanimous decision of the House of Lords in the case of Murphy v  
Brentwood D istrict C ouncil [1990] 2 All ER 908 (HL)
 
 
261 set the judicial limits of a 
manufacturer’s duty of care when he held that the neighbour principle was not intended to go 
beyond injury to a person or property.262 In this case the plaintiff purchased a house after the 
defendant council had approved its construction on a concrete raft foundation.263 Over time the 
raft foundation developed cracks which resulted in the plaintiff’s house also developing serious 
cracks in the inner walls.264 The plaintiff moved to a new house and claimed damages against the 
defendant council for costs incurred in moving to a new location.265 This case was peculiar 
because the House Lords had to be constituted of seven judges as opposed to the usual five 
because it had to overrule its own decision as expounded by Lord Wilberforce almost 13 years 
earlier in the case of Anns v Merton London Borough Council.266 Lord Keith was of the view that 
the scope of a manufacturer’s duty of care as set out in the case of  Anns v  M erton L ondon 
Borough Council267 fell to be reconsidered because the ‘two-stage’ enquiry formulated by Lord 
Wilberforce was ‘not a universally applicable principle’.268 The court was unanimous in holding 
that the case of Anns v  Merton London Borough Council269
                                                          
259 At 752. See also Burchell (note 13 above) 8. 
260 At 759. 
261 Also cited as [1991] 1 A.C 398. 
262 Burchell (note 13 above) 9. 
263 At 912. 
264 Ibid. 
265 At 913. 
266 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] A.C 728 (HL). See also Burchell (note 13 above) 8. 
267Anns v Merton London Borough Council (note 266 above). 
268 At 914. 
269 Anns v Merton London Borough Council (note 266 above). 
 was based on pure economic loss 
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which went ‘much further than a duty to take reasonable care to prevent injury to safety or 
health’.270
‘In my opinion it is clear that Anns did not proceed on any basis of established principle, but 
introduced a new species of liability governed by a principle indeterminate in character but 
having the potentiality of covering a wide range of situations, involving chattels as well as real 
property, in which it had never hitherto been thought that the law of negligence had any proper 
place.’
 Lord Keith stated: 
 
271




The court concluded that extending liability to pure economic loss was injudicious and ‘put the 
law of negligence in a state of confusion defying rational analysis’.
 Lord Keith stated: 
 
‘In my opinion there can be no doubt that Anns has for long been widely regarded as an 
unsatisfactory decision…I think it must be recognised that it did not proceed on any basis of 
principle at all, but constituted a remarkable example of judicial legislation…There can be no 
doubt that to depart from the decision would re-establish a degree of certainty in this field of 
law which it has done a remarkable amount to upset.’ 
 
273 Having held that Anns v 
Merton L ondon B orough C ouncil274 was wrongly decided and upholding the appeal the court 
overruled all subsequent decisions that had previously relied on the case.275 Despite these 
innovations, consumers continued to experience difficulties, especially identifying the 
manufacturer and proving factors like fault, the nature of the defect and causation.276
                                                          
270 At 920. 
271 At 922. 
272 Anns v Merton London Borough Council (note 266 above). 
273 At 923. 
274 Anns v Merton London Borough Council (note 266 above). 
275 At 923. 
276 Howells (note 1 above) 51. See also Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 376; Cartwright (note 1 above) 15. 
 It was then 






5.2. The impact of the Consumer Protection Act of 1987 on Product liability 
The liability of suppliers for defective products finally attained legislative recognition when the 
UK consumer Protection Act of 1987 was enacted.277 The UK consumer Protection Act of 1987 
came as a result of the ‘White Paper on The Safety of Goods’278 after the ‘duty of care’ 
requirement in Donoghue v Stevenson279 was deemed insufficient for consumers.280 The ‘White 
Paper on The Safety of Goods’281 introduced the imposition of safety standards on suppliers, and 
penalties for failure to comply with these standards.282 The Act was a timely response to public 
concern at the height of panic and fear in the UK following the outbreak of salmonella283, 
listeria284 and BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis)285 which had had been found in certain 
food products in certain parts of the UK in the late 1980s to early 1990s.286 Although not 
automatically imposing sanctions on manufacturers for the production of defective products, the 
Act provides significant protection to consumers by imposing strict liability against 
manufacturers who supply defective products.287
The neighbour principle found legislative recognition in section 2 of the UK Consumer 
Protection Act of 1987 which imposes liability for defective products on producers, importers or 





                                                          
277 The UK consumer Protection Act of 1987 replaced the Consumer Protection Act of 1961. 
278 Cmnd 9302. 
279 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
280 Cartwright (note 1 above) 137. See also Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 72; Howells & Weatherill (note 6 
above) 380. Part III of the UK CPA 1987 replaced S. 11 of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 which now contains the 
law relating to misleading price indications. 
281 Cmnd 9302. 
282 Cartwright (note 1 above) 137. 
283 ‘WordWeb’ Dictionary, available at http://www.wordweb.info.free, accessed on 17 July, 2012, defines this word 
as ‘a rod-shaped gram-negative enterobacteria which causes typhoid fever and food poisoning’. This bacterium can 
also be used as a bioweapon. 
284 ‘WordWeb’ Dictionary (note 283 above), defines this word as ‘a large group of bacteria having rigid cell walls; 
motile types have flagella’. 
285 ‘WordWeb’ Dictionary (note 283 above), defines this word as ‘a fatal disease of cattle that affects the central 
nervous system; causes staggering and agitation’. It is also called mad cow disease. 
286 Cartwright (note 1 above) 166. 
287 Ibid 87. See also Part I of the UK Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
288 S. 2 (2) (a) - (c) of the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987. 
 A manufacturer may, however, avoid liability for defective products by raising any 
of the defences listed in section 4 of the Act. The UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987 is read in 
tandem with the Product Safety Regulations 1994 which are the main sources of product safety 
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law.289 The provisions of Part I of the Act cannot be excluded from application by a contract 
term, by notice or in any other manner.290 It must be mentioned that in the event claims based on 
negligence fall outside the ambit of the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987, the ordinary 
negligence principles as set out in Donoghue v  S tevenson291 will apply in those circumstances 
and fault will have to be alleged and proved by the plaintiff.292
As has already been pointed out at the introductory part of this chapter, the criminal law in the 
UK has had significant input in the protection of consumers.
  
 
Although not forming part of the core aims of this study, it is necessary to briefly highlight the 
role of the criminal law in safeguarding consumer interests in the UK. 
 
6. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
293 The principal criminal statute in 
UK consumer protection is the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968.294 The Trade Description Act is 
a strict liability statute imposing criminal sanctions on traders who make false descriptions 
concerning goods.295 Section 2 (1) of the Act defines a trade description as ‘an indication, direct 
or indirect, and by whatever means given’ of any matter described.296 The effect of this statute in 
UK consumer protection was considered in the case of Wings v Ellis [1984] 3 W.L.R 965. In this 
case the respondent holiday firm distributed a brochure containing false information that 
bedrooms at a certain hotel in Sri Lanka were fully air-conditioned.297  The respondent later 
discovered that the information on the brochures was false since the bedrooms were not air-
conditioned and took remedial action by sending letters to all clients who had booked holidays 
through various travel agents informing them about the inaccurate information.298
                                                          
289 Cartwright (note 1 above) 94. The Regulations implemented EC Directive 92/59/EEC (OJ 1992 L228/24). 
Regulation 7 states that ‘no producer shall place a product on the market unless the product is a safe product’. 
290 S. 7 of the UK Consumer Protection Act of 1987. 
291 Donoghue v Stevenson (note 13 above). 
292 Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 376. 
293 Oughton (note 1 above) 55. See also the Trade Descriptions Act 1968; Parts II & III of the UK Consumer 
Protection Act 1987; Food Safety Act 1990. 
294 Cartwright (note 1 above) 15. 
295 Lowe & Woodroffe (note 1 above) 158. See also Cartwright (note 1 above) 156, 162. 
296 Howells & Weatherill (note 6 above) 375. 
297 At 968. 
298 Ibid. 
 The 
complainant booked and travelled to the advertised destination without being informed of the 
inaccuracy of the information on the brochure neither by the respondent nor the travel agent 
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where he made the booking.299  After complaint lodged a complaint on his return the respondent 
was charged with the offences of contravening section 14 (1) (a) (ii) and 14 (b) (ii) of the Trade 
Descriptions Act for the false information on the brochure.300 The question for determination 
was whether section 14 (a) of the Trade Descriptions Act created a strict liability offence.301 This 
section makes it an offence to make a statement knowing it to be false in the course of 
business.302
‘The Act is not based on the law of contract or tort. It operates by prohibiting false descriptions 
under the pain of penalties enforced through criminal courts. But it is not a truly criminal 
statute. Its purpose is not the enforcement of the criminal law but the maintenance of trading 
standards. Trading standards, and not criminal behaviour, are its concern.’
 Lord Scarman defined the Trade Descriptions Act thus: 
 
303
In order to avoid the harsh consequences of strict liability courts have continuously interpreted 
statutory provisions in favour of defendants.
 
 
304 In doing so, courts either consider the express 
wording of the statute, or examine the context in which the statutory provision exists in order to 
determine the mischief which Parliament sought to remedy.305 A majority of the offences in the 
Trade Descriptions Act impose strict liability with the exception of section 14 (1) (a) and (b) 
which has been said to impose some form of ‘semi-strict’ liability because the section refers to 
words such as ‘knowingly’ and ‘recklessly’ which are believed to impute fault.306 The reason 
section 14 is not completely a strict liability section is that a manufacturer may raise a defence of 
‘due diligence’ against a complainant in terms of section 24 of the Act.307 The defence is proved 
on a balance of probabilities and is designed to mitigate the potential harshness the may result 
from the imposition of strict liability.308
                                                          
299 Ibid. 
300 At 969. 
301 At 976. 
302 Ibid. See also S. 14 (a) of the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968. 
303 At 978. See also Cartwright (note 1 above) 94. 
304 Oughton (note 1 above) 57. 
305 Ibid 56. 
306 Wings v Ellis [1985] A.C. 272; Wings v Ellis [1984] 3All ER 577. See also Oughton (note 1 above) 56. 
307 Cartwright (note 1 above) 91. See also Regulation 9 of the General Product Safety Regulations of 1994. 





In the case of Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd and others v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1984] 2 
All ER 503, the question whether a statutory provision imposed strict liability had to be 
determined after it was alleged that the appellants had breached the Hong Kong Building 
Ordinance by deviating from an approved building plan.309 Lord Scarman stated that strict 
liability would be imposed if it assisted in the enforcement of the statute by promoting greater 
vigilance by the offender.310 The court dismissed the appeal on grounds that the Ordinance 
imposed strict liability.311
If the offender has observed due vigilance in discharging his duties, he is entitled to rely on the 
defences under the Trade Descriptions Act.
  
 
312 The case of Tesco Supermarkets L td v N attrass 
[1972] A.C. 153 represents this proposition.313 In this case a branch of the appellant supermarket 
advertised by displaying a poster offering discounts on a certain washing powder. The 
complainant consumer was later charged the normal price by the appellant after the discounted 
washing powder had run out of stock.314 The higher cost was not the appellant’s fault but that of 
the branch manager who had failed to prevent his assistant from replacing the discounted items 
with washing powder indicating the original price.315 The complainant lodged a complaint in 
terms of section 11 (a) of the Trade Descriptions Act,  which made it an offence to offer goods at 
a lower price than that at which they were, in fact, being offered.316 The appellant invoked 
section 24 of the Act which entitles a person to rely on the defence that the offence was a result 
of reliance by a complainant on information supplied by another.317
‘If the principal has taken all reasonable precautions in the selection and training of servants to 
perform supervisory duties and has laid down an effective system of supervision and used all 
 In finding that the appellant 
was not liable for the offence, Lord Diplock stated: 
 
                                                          
309 At 505. 
310 At 505, 508. 
311 At 512. 
312 S. 24 of the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968. 
313 At 129. 
314 At 129. 
315 Ibid. 
316 At 129. 
317 At 135. 
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due diligence to see that it is observed, he is entitled to rely on a default by a superior servant in 
his supervisory duties as a defence under s. 24 (1)...’318
Therefore, the company was able to deflect liability at the expense of the manager who had 
failed to perform his duties diligently. Furthermore, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest held that it was 
not sufficient for a defendant to show that he took reasonable precautions, what was necessary 
was that the precautionary measures were implemented with due diligence.
 
 
319 From the above, it 
is clear that a person who is not at fault may raise the defence that he or she took reasonable 
precaution which was exercised with due diligence under section 24 of the Trade Descriptions 
Act.320
                                                          
318 At 154. 
319 At 139-140. 




The chapter has revealed the shift from common law regulation of consumer protection to the 
use of statutory innovations that were introduced in the different consumer protection areas in the 
UK. Also considered has been the manner in which judicial remedies like implied terms were 
grafted into and presented in statutory form to the benefit of consumers. It cannot be denied that 
the changes in UK consumer law, especially in product liability, were initiated by the courts as 
opposed to Parliament. Nevertheless, the legislature took the baton and made significant changes 
which provide sufficient protection for consumers under the law of contract and in product 
liability. Despite the enactment of a number of statutes, the courts in the UK have not adopted an 
armchair approach to consumer protection but are continuously engaged in the process of 





INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although international consumer protection is a vast topic, this chapter will limit itself to a brief 
discussion of the types of consumer protection instruments at international level. The reason for 
considering international consumer instruments is because the Constitution of Swaziland of 
20051 makes provision for the adoption of international agreements into the domestic law of the 
country. The international agreements recognised under the Constitution include treaties, 
conventions, protocols and other international agreements or arrangements.2
The importance of consumer protection is recognised at international level by bodies such as the 
United Nations (UN), the European Community (EC) and Consumers International (CI) which 
have made significant strides in setting the parameters for member countries.
 These instruments 
may be of great assistance to Swaziland in formulating a consumer framework. Unfair contract 




 Unfortunately, the 
African Union is lagging behind in as far as consumer protection is concerned and there appears 
to be no collective consumer policy regulating member countries in the African continent. The 
role of the above international bodies in ensuring that consumer interests are prioritized on a 
global scale will be examined and international consumer protection instruments will be 
considered.  
 
2. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC) 
2.1. The EC Treaty 
4
                                                          
1 S. 238 of the Constitution of 2005. 
2 S. 238 (6) of the Constitution of 2005. 
3 P Cartwright Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory and Policy in the U.K (2001) 156-157. 
4 DW Oughton Consumer Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (1991) 72. 
 suggests that historically, consumer protection in Europe was ‘chequered’ and 
‘unspectacular’ because when the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by the 
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Treaty of Rome in 1957, a consumer protection framework was not anticipated.5 The Treaty of 
Rome, initially signed by six countries, was the founding document which brought the EEC into 
existence in order to introduce economic integration in Europe.6 The Treaty of Rome was later 
amended in 1987 by the Single European Act which introduced several changes in the operation 
of markets in the EEC, particularly decision making processes under Article 100A.7 In 1991 
member states of the EEC agreed to change the name from the EEC to the EC through the Treaty 
of the European Union (EC Treaty) in the Netherlands.8 The most important feature which is 
relevant in this discussion is that the EC was vested with legal personality under Article 281 of 
the EC Treaty.9
In ensuring that consumers are adequately protected, the EC Treaty requires all Member states to 
follow EC Community law and no state may plead that its internal laws, policies and procedures 
justify non-compliance with its EC obligations.
 The power to institute and defend legal proceedings, as will be seen below, 
derives from this Article. 
 
2.2. Respect for EC law 
10 This proposition was set out in the case of 
Commission of  t he E uropean C ommunities v  T he K ingdom of  t he N etherlands Case C-144/99 
[2001] ECR I-3541.11 In this case the Kingdom of the Netherlands was bound to adopt 
provisions of Council Directive 73/239/EEC on laws and regulations on the business of direct 
insurance designed to protect consumers from exploitation.12 Article 35 (1) of the directive 
required member states to amend their national laws so as to comply with the directive within a 
stipulated time-frame and in the present case the Kingdom of the Netherlands was bound to 
amend its laws with 18 months from notification by the Commission.13
                                                          
5 Ibid. See also R Lowe & GF Woodroffe Consumer Law and Practice (1980) 302; GG Howells & S Weatherill 
Consumer Protection Law (1995) 80, 97. 
6 Oughton (note 4 above) 29. See also Howells & Weatherill (note 5 above) 80. 
7 N Locket & M Egan Unfair Terms in Consumer Agreements: The New Rules Explained (1995) 2. See also Howells 
& Weatherill (note 5 above) 80; Oughton (note 4 above) 29. 
8 Howells & Weatherill (note 5 above) 81. 
9 HG Beale Chitty on Contracts 29 ed (2004) Vol. 1 684. 
10 Commission of the European Communities v The Kingdom of the Netherlands Case C-144/99 [2001] ECR I-3541 
at Para 4642, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lexUriServ/UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61982CJ0160:EN:PDF, 
accessed 29 November 2012. 
11 Ibid. 
12 At Para 4641. 
13 At Para 4638.  
 After the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands failed to comply with the notice of compliance for over six years (1975-1981), the 
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Commission of the European Communities brought an action under Article 169 of the EEC 
treaty (not the EC Treaty which was adopted in 1991) for a declaration that the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC Treaty. Despite not raising a 
defence the Kingdom of the Netherlands alleged that it had to revise its own internal laws before 
implementing provisions of Directive 73/239/EEC. In coming to its decision the European Court 
of Justice (the ECJ) stated: 
 
‘According to well-established case-law first, a Member state may not plead provisions, notices 
or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with 
obligations and time limits resulting from Community directives, and secondly ere 
administrative practices, which by their nature may be changed according to the whim of the 
authorities and which lack appropriate publicity cannot be regarded as constituting a valid 
implementation of the duty imposed on Member states by the third paragraph of Article 189 of 
the Treaty.’14
Another important consideration is that the EC requires member states to act in good faith and 
abstain from conduct calculated to jeopardize the objectives of the Treaty.
 
 




Article 10 of the EC Treaty was considered in the case of Commission of  t he E uropean 
Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Case C-266/03.
 Article 10 of the 
Treaty provides: 
 
‘Member states shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by 
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of Community tasks. They 




                                                          
14 At Para4642. 
15 Article 10 of the EC Treaty. 
 In this case the Grand Duchy of 
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Luxembourg had compromised the implementation of contested bilateral agreements by 
negotiating and bringing them into force contrary to Article 10 of the EC Treaty.17 When the 
Commission brought an action against the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg it was declared that 
Article 10 had been violated.18 The same conclusion was reached by the ECJ in the case of 
Commission of the European Committees v Ireland Case C459/03.19 In this case British Nuclear 
Fuel operated a Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) plant on the coast of the Irish Sea that was designed to 
recycle plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.20 The plant mixed plutonium dioxide with depleted 
uranium dioxide in order to produce MOX.21 After extensive consultations and the 
Commission’s having approved the commencement of operations in the plant, Ireland lodged a 
complaint and brought proceedings against the UK in the Arbitral Tribunal contending that the 
MOX plant posed an environmental hazard because of the potential harm of ionizing radiation. 
The Commission was not pleased with Ireland’s prosecuting the matter in the Arbitral Tribunal 
and brought proceedings against Ireland under Article 292 of the EC Treaty for failure to respect 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ to rule on the application and interpretation of EC law.22 The 
Commission also sought an order against Ireland for failing to adhere to the duty of good faith 
and corporation under Article 10 of the Treaty, failing to consult Community institutions and 
exercising competence exclusively reserved for the Community.23
The ECJ found in favour of the Commission and held that Ireland had breached Article 10 of the 
Treaty by breaching the duty of good faith.
  
 
24 Furthermore, the court held that Ireland had 
breached Article 292 of the Treaty by submitting instruments of Community law for 
interpretation and application by the Arbitral Tribunal.25
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Case C-266/03 (2 June 2005) 
Available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=60187&pageIndex=0doclang=EN&mode=1st&dir=&occ=fi
rst&part=1&cid=53440, accessed 29 November 2012. 
17 At Para 53. 
18 At Para 67. 
19 Commission of the European Committees v Ireland Case C459/03 Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriserv/LexUriserv/.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0459:EN:HTML, accessed 29 November 2012. 
20 At Para 21. 
21 At Para 21. 
22 At Para 59. 
23 At Para 158. 
24 At Para 183. 
25 At Para 157. 
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2.3. Free movement of consumer goods in the EC 
The Treaty requires the economic interests of consumers to be safeguarded under Article 129A.26 
One of the important provisions which aim to preserve consumer choice in the EC is Article 30 
which requires the free movement of goods among EC member states.27 Article 30 states that 
rules imposing direct or indirect restrictions on imports are prohibited between member states.28  
In other words, stringent domestic trade laws that hinder trade on imported goods may be 
challenged on the ground that they hinder the free movement of goods under Article 30.29
Article 30 of the EC Treaty was considered by the European Court of Justice in the landmark 
decision of Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein Case 120/78 [1979] 
ECR 649 (often called the ‘Cassis de Dijon case’). In this case a French blackcurrant liqueur 
called ‘Cassis de Dijon’ was imported into Germany, where restrictions were imposed on the 
importation and marketing of weak alcoholic drinks.
  
 
30 German law required a minimum alcohol 
content of 25% for specific alcoholic drinks yet the imported liqueur had an alcoholic content of 
15-20% which was very weak according to German standards.31 The court was called upon to 
decide whether the restrictions imposed by German law violated Article 30 of the EC Treaty.32 
After it was contended that the restriction was aimed at protecting the health of consumers, the 
court held that the law stifled consumer choice and did not, in any way, advance consumer 
interests.33
A similar finding was made by the court in the case of Walter Rau v Smedt Case 261/181 [1982] 
ECR 3961. In this case Belgian law required margarine to be marketed in cube-shaped blocks 
and in no other manner.
 The court also laid down the principle that where an imported product had previously 
been sold in one member state without any hindrances, subsequent sale of the same product in 
another member state would be proper. 
 
34
                                                          
26 Cartwright (note 3 above) 156. 
27 Howells & Weatherill (note 5 above) 85. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Rewe Zentrale v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, cited in Howells & Weatherill (note 
5 above) 87. 
30 Howells & Weatherill (note 5 above) 87. 
31 Oughton (note 4 above) 77. 
32 Howells & Weatherill (note 5 above) 87. 
33 Ibid. see also Oughton (note 4 above) 77. 
34 Howells & Weatherill (note 5 above) 88. 
 In finding that Belgian law unduly restricted consumer choice, the 
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court held that the rule limited the importation of margarine marketed in different ways in other 
member states contrary to Article 30.35
Consumer protection measures in the EC are enforced through different legislative instruments, 
namely, Regulations, Directives and Recommendations.
 
 
2.4. EC Consumer protection instruments 
36 Directives are considered the most 
important legislative instruments in the EC because of their binding nature on a member states.37 
Article 189 of the EC Treaty provides that a Directive ‘shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods’.38 A Regulation on the other hand is ‘self-executing’ 
in that it binds a member state upon enactment by the EC and does not require domestic 
implementation by a member state like directives.39 As opposed to Regulations and Directives, 
Recommendations are not binding to member states at all and only serve to guide member states 
in implementing and interpreting EU policy.40




2.4.1. Instruments regulating contracts 
41 (the directive), which was adopted in 1993 to ensure that consumers were not 
subjected to unfair contract terms within the EC.42 The directive only sets minimum contract 
standards for Member states which are at liberty provide more protection through domestic 
legislation.43
                                                          
35 Ibid 89. 
36 Locket & Egan (note 7 above) 5. 
37 Ibid. See also S Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract 6 ed (2005) 25.  
38 Howells and Weatherill (note 5 above) 104. 
39 Locket & Egan (note 7 above) 5. See also Oughton (note 4 above) 71. 
40 Locket & Egan (note 7 above) 6. 
41 Directive 93/13/EEC (OJ L95/29). 
42 Locket & Egan (note 7 above) 19. See also Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] 3 
WLR 1297 at 1311. 
43 RD Sharrock ‘Judicial Control of Unfair Contract Terms: The Implications of the Consumer Protection Act’ 





Prior to the adoption of the Directive, there were concerns advanced both by the business 
community and consumer groups on the scope of implementation of the directive.44 Business 
concerns did not wish the Directive to curtail the monopoly in the supply of products, including 
in particular contract terms which had not been negotiated, while consumer groups argued that 
consumers required more protection from unfair contract terms.45 When the directive was 
subsequently adopted, Article 3 (1) provided that ‘a contractual term which has not been 
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it 
causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to 
the detriment of the consumer’.46 This signified that the directive was more inclined towards 
preserving consumer interests. The Directive was, however, criticised by Lord Steyn in the case 
of Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] 3 WLR 1297 to the effect 
that it was ‘inelegantly drafted’ and ‘generally untidy in its text [so] that it could not be said it 
was entirely harmonious’.47
EU Directives are enacted for different reason but the core mandate of these legal instruments is 
to facilitate trade in EU countries.
 
 
2.4.2. Instruments regulating products 
48 Concern over the safety of goods by member states at the 
European level resulted in the enactment of several product liability Directives some of which 
introduced strict liability into EC consumer law.49 Product safety Directives include the Toy 
Safety Directive50 which regulates toy safety in the EC; the European Product Liability 
Directive51 which imposes strict liability for defective products and the General Directive on 




                                                          
44 Locket & Egan (note 7 above) 14. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid 99. See also T Naude & G Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses- A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441, 457; T Naude ‘The Consumer’s “Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Terms” Under 
the New Consumer Protection Act in Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 126 SALJ 505, 511, 523. 
47 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc (Note 42 above) at 1312. 
48 Smith (note 37 above) 323. 
49 Howells and Weatherill (note 5 above) 199. 
50 Directive 88/378/EEC (OJ 1988 L187). 
51 Directive 374/85/EEC (OJ 1985 L210/29).  
52 Directive 92/59/EEC (OJ 1992 L228/24). 
53 Howells and Weatherill (note 5 above) 385. 
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3. THE UNITED NATIONS 
The UN has introduced a number of innovations in consumer protection. One of these 
innovations is the adoption of the ‘Guidelines on Consumer Protection’ (the Guidelines)54 in 
1985, which were aimed at encouraging countries to adopt consumer protection policies.55 The 
Guidelines are a benchmark following which member states of the UN may enhance their 
domestic consumer laws and policies.56
(h) proposals for international co-operation in the field of consumer protection.
 The Guidelines provide for: 
 
(a) the physical safety of consumers 
(b) the protection of economic interests of consumers 
(c) access to information by consumers 
(d) measures to enable consumers to obtain redress 
(e) distribution of essential goods and services 
(f) satisfactory production and performance standards 
(g) adequate business practices and informative marketing  
57
(a) the right to be heard 
 
 
Further, appendix 1 of the Guidelines recognises the following basic consumer rights: 
 
(b) the right to be informed 
(c) the right to safety 
(d) the right to choose 
(e) the right to safety 
(f) the right to redress 
(g) the right to consumer education 
(h) the right to a healthy environment 
(i) the right to the satisfaction of basic needs 
 
                                                          
54 The UN Guidelines were passed through UN General Assembly Resolution 39/248 of 9 April 1985. 
55 Cartwright (note 3 above) 154. 
56 Macquoid-Mason ‘Consumers and Consumerism’ in Mcquoid-Mason Consumer Protection in South Africa 




The UN also introduced the (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods in 1980 as part of its consumer protection initiative in the sphere of contract law.58 Article 
36 (2) (b) of the Convention provides that supplied goods must be ‘fit for any purpose expressly 
or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the conclusion of the 
contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill or judgment’.59
Besides the establishment of regional bodies like the EC there were other international consumer 
protection developments in the last part of the 20
 
 
4. CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL 
th century.60 One of the international consumer 
developments was the establishment of an international consumer organisation called Consumers 
International which is a federation of consumer groups.61 The organisation was formed in 1960 
and named the International Organization of Consumer Unions (IOCU).62 The founding 
consumer groups were the Belgian Association de s C onsommateurs, the English Consumers 
Association, the American Consumers Union, the Australian Consumers Association, and the 
Dutch Consumenten.63 The name was changed to ‘Consumers International’ in 1994 and the 
objective of offering technical assistance and raising consumer standards in developing countries 
around the world was maintained.64





                                                          
58 Smith (note 37 above) 25. See also T Naude ‘The Consumer’s Right to Safe, Good Quality Goods and the Implied 
Warranty of Quality under Sections 55 and 56 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 
336, 341. 
59 Naude (note 58 above). 
60 Macquoid-Mason (note 56 above) 11. 
61‘Consumers International’  available at http://www.consumersinternational.org/who-we-are/about-us, accessed 30 
November 2012. 
62 Ibid. See also Macquoid-Mason (note 56 above). 
63 Macquoid-Mason (note 56 above). 
64 Ibid. 
65 ‘Consumers International’ (not e 61 above). 
  As a consumer pressure group the organisation champions consumer rights at 
an international level and helps consumers in developing countries to access UN institutions like 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Economic Social and 
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Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) as well as the Economic and Social Council.66 This consumer 
body has also had significant influence in the passing of major international consumer protection 
instruments such as the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection of 1985 after lobbying for a 
period spanning a decade.67
                                                          
66 Macquoid-Mason (note 56 above). 




The EC and the UN have introduced measures aimed at ensuring that the relevant member states 
formulate their domestic laws in line with the prescribed international legislative instruments. 
The Directives as they apply in the EU appear to be effective since goods circulating in member 
countries are subject to the EU control. The fact that consumer protection is at an advanced stage 
at an international level is an indictment on Swaziland which has not made any attempt at 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This concluding chapter does not make a crystal ball forecast on the future of consumer law in 
Swaziland, instead, it suggests possible solutions to the weaknesses identified in the consumer 
framework. It has been revealed in the study that contract terms in general are unregulated, and 
consumers are not accorded sufficient protection from defective goods. This is a general 
observation drawn from the study. While it may be true that the current consumer framework has 
its weaknesses, there are areas where consumer exploitation has been controlled. The most 
notable has been the reluctance of courts to enforce agreements where money lenders charge 
consumers excessive interest on credit advanced under the Money Lending and Credit Financing 
Act 3 of 1991.1
One of the objectives at the beginning of this study was to examine the struggle experienced by 
courts in dealing with unfair contract terms under the common law. In particular, the question 
was whether courts are empowered to invalidate contracts that impose onerous terms on 
  
 
At the introductory stage of this comparative study it was stated that two issues affecting 
consumers were to be considered. The first issue concerned the impact of unfair contract terms in 
consumer agreements in Swaziland. In particular, the question was whether courts are authorized 
to invalidate unfair contract terms in consumer agreements under the common law. The second 
issue was whether the current consumer framework affords consumers in Swaziland sufficient 
protection from manufacturers who supply defective goods. In considering whether these two 
issues have been addressed the chapter will make general conclusions and recommendations on 
unfair contract terms followed by conclusions and recommendations on product liability. This 
recommendations made are in line with consumer developments in the UK and South Africa as 
already examined. 
 
2. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS  
                                                          
1 S. 4 & S. 6 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991. 
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consumers. For example, courts have had to consider controversial Contract terms in healthcare 
where hospitals avoid liability for negligent treatment of patients.2
The English and South African decisions examined reveal that courts have attempted to combat 
unfair contract terms by introducing certain techniques of control. These control measures ensure 
that consumers are afforded remedies against oppressive contract terms. There seems to be 
judicial consensus that the Constitution can be used as an instrument to adapt freedom of 
contract under public policy.
 In considering whether such 
contract terms can be invalidated the study has proved to be more than a mere academic exercise 
since it has provided practical solutions not only for lawyers but also for consumers in 
Swaziland. 
 
3 This view is also shared by academic writers who agree that courts 
should refuse to enforce contractual provisions which are unfair, oppressive and unconscionable 
on public policy considerations.4
Despite earlier South African and English decisions where courts were reluctant to invalidate 
contract terms on grounds of public policy it appears from later decisions that a new-found 
willingness to protect consumers by recognizing public policy developed. This led to 
assimilating the often rejected concepts of fairness and good faith which emerged as important 
factors whenever a contract term was challenged.
  
 
5 Lawyers took it upon themselves to assist 
courts in ensuring that contract terms passed constitutional scrutiny in accordance with 
constitutional values as illustrated in a number of South African decisions.6
                                                          
2 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
3 Ibid Para 174. See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at Para 91. 
4 P Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 42. 
5 South African Forestry Co. Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA). See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) 
SA 323 (CC) 
6 See the cases of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 2 above), Barkhuizen v Napier (note 5 above); 
Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 517 (SCA). 
 For example, in the 
case of Afrox H ealthcare B pk v  St rydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) an exemption clause was 
challenged under section 27 (1) (a) of the South African Constitution of 1996 which protects the 
right to health. In the case of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) a time-limitation clause 
was challenged under section 34 of the South African Constitution of 1996 which protects the 




The same constitutional values my also be invoked in Swaziland and consumers are at liberty to 
challenge unfair contract terms on constitutional grounds. For instance, the constitutionality of an 
exemption clause that absolves a party from liability for negligently causing death to another 
may be tested under section 15 (1) of the Constitution of 2005 which guarantees the right to life. 
Section 20 of the Constitution of 2005 which guarantees the right to equality of persons may also 
be raised by an aggrieved consumer alleging inequality in the bargaining position of parties at 
the conclusion of the consumer agreement. Similarly, a consumer can challenge a time-limitation 
clause under section 33 of the Constitution of 2005 which protects the right to administrative 
justice. The above avenues are open to consumers in Swaziland and  the duty is upon courts to 
judiciously meet the challenge of applying public policy unlike the half-hearted attempt to apply 
the concept as illustrated in the case of Nonhlanhla T sabedze v  T he U niversity of  Sw aziland 
(unreported) High Court Civil Case 3432/ 2010. 
 
Whether courts are able to deal with unfair contract terms under the common law in Swaziland is 
not clear because the cases examined do not reveal any challenges directed towards the fairness 
of contract terms. Therefore, the study has not revealed that the common law of contract is 
inadequate in protecting consumers in Swaziland. Neither has it been demonstrated that the 
common law of contract is fraught with weaknesses in as far as protecting consumers is 
concerned. Perhaps when the fairness of a contract term falls for determination the courts will 
adopt the constitutional approach. Another important and fundamental consideration that may be 
suggested in order to enhance innovative judicial law making in the law of contract is for courts 
in Swaziland to place more emphasis on the protection of consumers and their rights over the 
profit-making motive of businesses.7 This will yield positive results for consumers and assist the 
courts in deciding what is fair and reasonable in any circumstance.8
Having considered the obvious importance of the control measures applied by the courts under 
the common law, it cannot be said that judicial control as the primary method of protecting 
 
 
                                                          
7 K Hopkins ‘Standard Form Contracts and the Evolving Idea of Private Law Justice: A Case of Democratic 
Capitalist Justice v Natural Justice’ (2003) 1 TSAR 150, 152. 
8 FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The Influence of 
the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71, 85. 
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consumers against unfair contract terms works to the consumer’s advantage.9 The controls 
introduced by courts are insufficient because they can be simply overcome by skilled 
draftsmanship as seen in a number decided cases including the case of First National Bank of  
Southern Africa L imited v  Rosenblum and A nother 2001 (4) SA 189 (A).10
Concerning the defence of exceptio doli generalis which was invalidated in South Africa, the 
results of the study raise a number of questions: Is the doctrine applicable law in Swaziland? If 
so, what is the legal basis for such application? On the other hand, if the doctrine is said not to 
apply, what is the basis for its rejection? In exercising the discretion whether or not to apply 
South African law, what criteria will the courts apply? These are some of the important questions 
that courts in Swaziland will have to address when faced with the doctrine. Indeed, not only was 
the rejection of the doctrine a ‘calamity of major proportions’ in South African law, its 
invalidation will have far-reaching consequences in Swaziland as well.
 It is recommended 
that the legislature enacts consumer legislation that will regulate contract terms in general as is 
the position in the United Kingdom where the Unfair Contract Terms of 1977 was enacted to 
control exemption clauses. Legislative recognition of contract terms was also made in South 
Africa under the CPA of 2008. Perhaps this is the route to follow in Swaziland if consumers are 
to be protected from harsh contract terms. 
 
11 When the doctrine was 
invalidated in South Africa, it left a ‘gap’ in the law and South Africa made speedy attempts to 
fill this vacuum.12 In Swaziland, this question must also be addressed. The question whether the 
exceptio doli generalis is part of the law of Swaziland requires proper ventilation by the courts, 
unlike the unfortunate rejection of the versari in re illicita doctrine by Annandale ACJ in the 
case of R v Mnisi and Another High Court Civil Case No. 35 of 2004 as seen in chapter 1 where 
the reasons for its rejection were not advanced.13
 
 It is suggested that the bindingness of South 
African law in Swaziland be considered when the validity of exceptio doli generalis falls for 
pronouncement. 
 
                                                          
9 Aronstam (note 4 above) 206. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Brand (note 8  above) 74. 
12 Ibid 76-77. 
13 R v Mnisi and Another (unreported) High Court Civil Case No. 35 of 2004 at paragraphs 32-33.  
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3. PRODUCT LIABILITY 
The second issue with which this study was concerned revolved around the question whether the 
current product liability mechanism is adequate in protecting consumers in Swaziland. As the 
discussion unfolded it became apparent that the consumer protection challenges in Swaziland are 
rather deep-seated than initially anticipated. There are several challenges facing consumers who 
are harmed by defective products. Perhaps the starting point is to make general conclusions on 
foreign manufactured goods which cause harm to consumers in Swaziland. Since a majority of 
consumed products in Swaziland are imported from foreign countries the first hurdle is 
determining the court in which a consumer may pursue a particular claim. The deciding factor is 
the country in which the cause of action arose. As already discussed the criteria for determining 
the cause of action vary with each country and it is not clear which approach applies in 
Swaziland taking into account that such an issue is yet to be decided by the courts. Furthermore, 
jurisdictional and choice of law issues may be raised whenever courts are called upon to exercise 
their jurisdiction over foreign based business enterprises. The above considerations constitute 
impediments against consumers seeking relief against foreign based manufacturers  
 
Another challenge revealed in the study relates to the approach adopted by the courts when 
consumers pursue product liability claims. Courts adopt a relaxed approach towards product 
liability claims. The case of Wandile N dzinisa v  St eers F ast F oods and Restaurant t /a S teers 
(unreported) High Court Civil Case 1457/ 2004, is probably a classic example where the court 
can be faulted on two aspects. Firstly, the court did not consider the liability of the defendant 
under the law contract and second, the compensation award was a far cry from the amount 
claimed. The conclusion that can be drawn from the manner in which the case was decided can 
only be that courts in Swaziland have not yet begun considering product liability claims in a 
serious light. This conclusion is supported by the approach adopted by the court in Meshack 
Kunene v Swaziland Electricity Board (unreported) High Court Civil Case 849/ 2007, where the 
court mentioned that a consumer issue had to be decided but later disregarded the subject. It 
cannot be overemphasized that the onus is upon the courts to ensure that consumer claims are 




The Constitution appears to have a very limited role in product liability. The reason is that, 
unlike in South Africa, the consumer’s right to bodily integrity is not constitutionally entrenched 
in Swaziland.14 Therefore, consumers cannot challenge suppliers and manufacturers on grounds 
that physical harm caused by goods supplied resulted in the infringement of a constitutional 
right.15
Amending the Fair Trading Act of 2001 is probably one of the ways in which law reform in can 
be implemented in product liability. The reason why this statute is considered the most suitable 
in controlling the supply of goods is because its provisions are more inclined towards certain 
conduct and practices in the provision of goods.
 Perhaps depends of a consumer who died as a result of consuming defective goods may 
raise an argument based on section 15 of the Constitution which protects the right to life. 
 
16 For example, there is currently no law 
compelling suppliers to accept goods returned by consumers in Swaziland. Perhaps an 
amendment that codifies the common law implied warranties is necessary.17 The advantage of 
entrenching implied warranties is that consumers will be at liberty to return goods that are 
defective without being ignored as was the case in Wandile Ndzinisa v  S teers Fast Foods and 
Restaurant t/a Steers.18  The importance of this right was recognised more than 2 centuries ago 
in the United Kingdom when it was statutorily entrenched as early as 189319 and later under the 
Sale of Goods Act of 1979.20
Another important amendment to the Fair Trading Act may be to extend the scope of section 19 
which prohibits the importation of goods bearing false trade descriptions and trade marks. This 
section can be extended to specify which party in the supply chain is liable to the ultimate 
consumer where imported goods cause physical harm or death; whether it is the manufacturer, 
importer, distributor, or retailer. This development can also be an opportunity to lay the 
foundation for the imposition of strict liability on the party responsible for supplying defective 
 This goes to show the necessity and importance of this right.  
 
                                                          
14 Anna Elizabeth Jacomina Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd, Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (2) All SA 167 (SCA) at 
Para 9. 
15 In South Africa, this right is protected under S. 12 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 
of 1996. 
16 See the long title to the Fair Trading Act 2001. 
17 Aronstam (note 4 above) 206. 
18 Wandile Ndzinisa v Steers Fast Foods and Restaurant t/a Steers (unreported) High Court Civil Case 1457/ 2004. 
19 Under the Sale of Goods Act of 1893. 
20 Aronstam (note 4 above) 188-189. 
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products. perhaps the difficulties of establishing the source of a defect as illustrated in Lungile 
Ndzinisa v McCarthy Swaziland (Pty) Ltd t/a Savells Furnishers (unreported) High Court Civil 
Case 3305/ 2003, can be remedied by this development. 
 
4. CURRENT LEGISLATION 
It has been demonstrated that both South Africa and the UK first introduced changes in their 
consumer frameworks through judicial inventiveness, and later, through legislative innovations 
aimed at controlling the effects of unfair contract terms and liability for defective goods. With 
regard to the consumer framework in Swaziland it is quite clear that existing legislation protects 
certain classes of consumers and not all consumers generally. For example the Hire Purchase 
Act21 protects consumers who enter into hire purchase agreements, while the Money Lending 
and Credit Financing Act22
Recognizing international consumer instruments may influence law reform in Swaziland. The 
United Nations Guidelines on Consumer Protection of 1985 can be used as a stepping stone at 
ensuring that consumers in Swaziland are adequately protected.
 protects consumers who enter into money lending agreements. There 
is no broad and all-encompassing law aimed at protecting a majority of consumers who make use 
of goods and services in general. Further, the Hire Purchase Act which regulates both instalment 
agreements and hire-purchase agreements is outdated. The enactment of legislation to control 
contract terms and regulate the supply of goods is necessary. In achieving this goal there are two 
alternatives. The first may be to apply the UK approach where Separate statues regulating both 
areas may be enacted. The second alternative is to adopt the South African approach where a 
single consumer statute regulating both contracts and product liability was enacted.  
 
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
23
                                                          
21 S. 2 (1) of the Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969. 
22 S. 2 of the Money Lending and Credit Financing Act 3 of 1991. 
23 P Cartwright Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory and Policy in the U.K (2001) 139. 
 As a member of the United 
Nations, this is one of the obligations Swaziland has undertaken to fulfill in terms of 
international law. It must be noted, however, that the United Nations Guidelines on Consumer 
Protection of 1985 do not qualify as an ‘international agreement’ as envisaged in section 238 (6) 
of the Constitution of Swaziland. In terms of the Constitution international agreements only 
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attain the force of law in Swaziland upon fulfilling constitutional requirements.24
Consumer protection law is vast and addressing all the consumer problems in Swaziland in the 
present study was not a practical undertaking. Indeed, the current study on consumer protection 
in Swaziland is relatively new and focusing on unfair contract terms and product liability was 
considered to be the ideal route. This is not to suggest that these areas are of more importance, 
but there are a number of equally important areas that require attention which have not been 
addressed. In particular, consumer credit financing is vital component of consumer law in 
general and in Swaziland this area requires attention since it is regulated by outdated 
legislation.
 Therefore, the 
guidelines cannot be ratified into becoming the domestic law of Swaziland but will only serve as 
a guide when the legislature contemplates consumer legislation. While these observations are 
true, it is urged that Swaziland considers the guidelines when implementing consumer law 
reform. 
 
6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
25
In conclusion, it must be stated that there is no evidence to support any suggestion that 
consumers have been educated about their rights in Swaziland. The introduction of consumer 
education programmes either regionally or countrywide is vital in consumer development 
particularly because it is well accepted that consumers lack knowledge on their rights and are 
often in a deprived financial position.




A warning must also be directed to the importation of South African case law after the CPA of 
2008 came into force in South Africa. Courts in Swaziland must be careful not to import case 
law infused with statutory undertones of the CPA of 2008. Now that South Africa has had 
legislative developments in consumer protection, Swaziland must develop its own consumer law 




                                                          
24 Section 238 of the Constitution of 2005. 
25 Credit financing by banking institutions is regulated by the Hire Purchase Act 11 of 1969. 
26 Aronstam (note 4 above) 215. 
27 Brand (note 8 above) 72. 
 The law in Swaziland must adapt in accordance with the 
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exigencies of the present age in order to meet the social and economic imperatives of a changing 
society. While the common law remains vigilant consumer legislation will not rise and act from 
the ashes like a phoenix to shield consumers. The role of enacting laws is reserved for the 
legislature. At the end of the day, legislation is necessary to turn the page from a dark chapter to 
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